



Daily Report

East Europe

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Berisha Welcomes Opening of Tetovo University

AU1602213395 Tirana TVSH Television Network
in Albanian 1900 GMT 16 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The president's Press and Information Office reports that Albanian president Sali Berisha, considered the start of the academic year at Tetovo Albanian University a remarkable event in the history of the education of Albanians.

I express my absolute conviction, Berisha said, that this university will enable the Albanians living in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] to participate as equal citizens and contribute to the stability, prosperity, and interethnic harmony in this republic.

This very important event is undoubtedly a result of the efforts made by Albanians there, as well as of an understanding by the Macedonian Government and President Kiro Gligorov toward this problem.

This will have a positive influence on the already friendly relations between Albania and Macedonia, Albanians and Macedonians. Albania once again confirms its readiness to offer all possible help for the organization and the success of this university.

FYROM TV Newsmen Criticizes Albanian TV

95P20445A Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian
30 Dec 94 p 3

[Interview with Fiqiri Sejdia, Tirana correspondent of TV Skopje, by Erion Brace; place and date of interview not given: "Partisan Devotion Is Completely Destroying Albanian Television"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Brace] Two years ago, you left Albanian Television [TVSh] along with 30 other workers. How was this departure received?

[Sejdia] When Elida Bucpapaj wrote an article about [Austrian human rights activist] Christine Von Kohl in REPUBLIKA a lot of people were shocked. They said: "How could a woman write about another woman using words so insulting that they would make a man blush?" I was not shocked because this was the same Elida who, some time before that, from the office of the director general of Albanian Radio-Television, sent over the wire to the Voice of America the report that F. Sejdia was a journalist of the Enverist [referring to former Albanian Workers' Party first secretary Enver Hoxha] state security service, an agent of Ramiz Alia, a cryptocommunist, etc. On that night I knew that I would be leaving TVSh. The amazing thing is that I left six months later.

[Brace] What happened after that?

[Sejdia] Nothing! Why are we talking about history here? We are talking about TV, and this concerns not [TVSh directors] Bucpapaj or Sakaževa, or the Democratic

Party or the Socialist Party but the truth for which professional journalists live and die.

[Brace] Recently, TVSh has been harshly criticized. What do you think about this?

[Sejdia] You would be shocked if I told you that I do not agree with many things that have been written. After the referendum, many people reached for their pens and attacked TV. It is very easy to criticize. But where are the arguments, the alternatives, and the solutions? No, dear colleague, neither Bucpapaj nor Sakaževa, nor [TV correspondents] Roqi nor Tepelena destroyed TV. Its destruction began step by step after 22 March [1992, when the Democratic Party assumed power], at the very time when it should have been freed from the old forms of indoctrination; and at the very time when the journalists in this institution should have been racing toward the truth, they were racing toward the party in power.

Not only the journalists but also the rear guard, the technical crews, moved into the vanguard, going into the studios and shouting: "What is this plan? What is this interview? Can we see the text? Who are you with: us or them?"

In this climate, which unfortunately still exists today, the true professionals either keep their mouths shut or get accustomed to it, to earn their living. In such a situation, the inept come to the forefront. Therefore, professionalism was destroyed with the events which occurred after 22 March and, partisan devotion took its place. These characteristics can never exist together. This partisan devotion is destroying TV completely.

[Brace] Is it only partisan devotion that is destroying TVSh completely?

[Sejdia] I singled out partisan devotion, but there are other signs, such as lack of professionalism, stifling of freedom and independence, loss of integrity, etc.

Let us take the news, for example, because there is even a squabble about this. Each morning, the director of the news department says to the journalists: "You will go to the president's office, so-and-so will go to the airport, to the meeting of the government, and to the art gallery." No one is courageous enough to oppose him. If someone suggests something, if the director does not like it, then his response is known. There is no driver and no car. Let us see tomorrow—a tomorrow that never comes and that never becomes today. Let me assure you that this does not occur in any other country in the world. For the news, the protocol office has a driver available, and the newsmen are free to use him as they want. Conditions are being created by the directors, and these should be carried out as quickly as possible. It is the spectator who evaluates them.

[Brace] Do you think that TVSh presents the truth?

[Sejdia] Of course I don't. But our television does not lie when it does not tell the truth. When it says that the

president went to Dukagjin or that the prime minister went to Dukagjin, it is not lying. When it says that the prime minister returned from Cairo, it is not lying. The lie consists of what is not said. If you take the day's events off TVSh, do you know what remains? Nothing. This is the lie, unfortunately. Its deafness. [passage omitted] You never learn from TVSh that nine children died in the Tirana maternity hospital, that there is a strike in Kukes, and that a minister resigned after making accusations against the president and the prime minister.

At its most recent meeting, the TVSh trade union informed management that it would call for a strike if a portion of the TV profits were not distributed among the TV workers. Yes, this is a fact, but it is a bit of news that exceeds 10 seconds in length. What kind of television is TVSh when its newsmen do not give this news about themselves?

[Brace] Does TVSh present the policy of the state? If it does, do you think this is right?

[Sejdia] It does, because there is only one channel. It is called the state channel, the government channel, etc. The party improperly managing the TV—not the TV itself—should be blamed for this.

[Brace] Do you think TVSh profited as much as did many other sectors after Albania opened up?

[Sejdia] If we are talking about monetary profit, no other enterprise in Albania did better than TV. If you count the commercials that appear each night and multiply them by 200,000 leks, the amount speaks for itself. TVSh got more than \$400,000 from the Albanian-German [soccer] match alone. Add to this the sales of news cassettes, etc. Nevertheless, TVSh is the worst off of all sectors. Technicians, cameramen and newsmen are paid so little that they cannot buy the daily papers with their monthly wages. [passage omitted] Thus, TVSh has lost its reputation as an institution.

[Brace] Do you think the increase in the broadcasting hours is a success?

[Sejdia] Of course. [passage omitted] But I would like to ask you a question: Have you seen any program on TV from 8 to 12 [AM or PM not specified]? It is only a rebroadcast or a transfer to other channels. People want to see and hear Albanian on TVSh.

[Brace] What about satellite programs?

[Sejdia] The problems are greater in this area. There is a mechanical division. That is yours; this is ours. That is for Kosovo and this is for Albania. This program is for inside the country and that is for outside the country. Any program that bears the seal of TVSh is and should be a single program.

Except for this, the diaspora in the satellite program should watch its own TV. Later on, we [TVSh] will transmit by satellite and will not have any correspondents in Italy and Greece, in Macedonia and Croatia, and/or in Brussels and Paris.

[Brace] Perhaps our television is not prepared for such a thing.

[Sejdia] You are wrong. Our television [TVSh] has first-class newsmen.

[Brace] But you just criticized them!

[Sejdia] I criticized its partisan devotion, lack of freedom and independence, and its censorship—things that do not depend on the newsmen but on the people who manage them. [passage omitted]

[Brace] Since you work as a correspondent for Skopje TV in Tirana, can you tell us how many television channels there are in Macedonia?

[Sejdia] Some 1,936,877 people live in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. There are 221 private and state radio and television stations. In Tetovo, where there are 170,000 inhabitants, there are five private television stations, which operate 24 hours a day. But in Albania? We are all shocked and we say to each other: There is no law! Okay. Can you find any law that bans private TV? There is no law in Turkey, but there are more than 100 private channels. When there is no law that prohibits something, that means it is allowed. Otherwise Albania is not a democratic state.

Zhelev Says U.S. Visit 'Very Successful'

*AU1602174895 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network
in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 16 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] On 16 February, President Zhelev returned from his official and working visit to the United States. He was accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister Rumen Gechev, Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski, and Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov.

In the airplane en route to Bulgaria, President Zhelev briefly assessed the results of his three-day visit to the United States for our special correspondent Asen Mateev.

[Begin Zhelev recording] I think this was a very successful visit. I believe we succeeded in achieving everything we wanted to achieve. We presented all the requests we could present to the relevant institutions of the U.S. administration, at the Congress and Senate and the foreign policy commissions. There was no issue that we wanted to pose that we did not pose. There was no request we posed that was not met by at least a promise. However, the implementation of the promises is a completely different matter.

I think signing the declaration on cooperation between the two countries was the most important result of the visit. I have already said in the past that, to a large extent, this declaration has the character of a bilateral treaty, despite the fact that it is not a treaty. In any event, the declaration contains the basic principles of cooperation between the two countries and the basic commitments that the United States and Bulgaria assume within the framework of this bilateral cooperation. I mean cooperation in all areas—political, economic, bilateral military cooperation, and all that the United States could do for Bulgaria's economy through the international institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank, G-24, and so forth. [end recording]

Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski told our reporter that the visit has demonstrated that in the field of foreign policy, the president and the government will work in harmony and will cooperate.

Assembly Head, FYROM Envoy Discuss Cooperation

*AU1602201495 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network
in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 16 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] On 16 February National Assembly Chairman Blagovest Sendov received Georgi Spasov, ambassador of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] at his request.

A common opinion was expressed regarding the need to mutually seek factors that unite us rather than factors that divide us.

A willingness to implement various joint projects—in addition to those already being implemented in the fields of telecommunications, power supply systems, and so forth—was expressed.

It was agreed that Bulgaria and Macedonia should sign an accord on the mutual protection of investments and on avoiding double taxation as soon as possible.

Official Argues Need To Build 2d Nuclear Plant

*AU1502142695 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian
13 Feb 95*

[Article by Nikita Shervashidze, chairman of the Committee on Power Supply, supplied by Balkan Agency: "It Is Time To Decide on the Future of the Belene Nuclear Plant"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The issue of the Belene nuclear power plant has been somewhat forgotten, but it always remains topical because of the fact that more than \$1 billion has already been put into the project. I hope that a civilized discussion can at last begin on the subject, because everyone will gain from it—both supporters and opponents of the nuclear power industry and the public at large. By "civilized" discussion, I mean that the sides in the debate, however sure they are of the justness of their cause, should seek arguments to support their thesis—instead of plotting to compromise their opponents and making scurrilous comments. [passage omitted]

The nuclear power industry guarantees new workplaces and employment for a great number of workers and specialists. This is so obvious that it does not require proof. Between 8,000 and 10,000 workers were engaged in building the Belene nuclear plant, and at least an equal number was employed in fulfilling orders for the plant from other branches of industry. The interests of the local population are affected most of all, because infrastructure investments will improve their living standards.

I participated personally in the construction of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant in 1971 and 1972, and can say that the town of Kozloduy changed beyond all recognition. Accordingly, the ordinary locals should speak out in favor of building the Belene plant—not a small loudmouthed group of petty politicians who claim for themselves the sole right to express a view.

On several occasions I have encountered poorly concealed hints that certain groups in Bulgaria—sometimes referred to as the "mafia" and sometimes as a "lobby"—have an interest in the continued construction of the Belene nuclear plant and (oh, horrors!) in the export of electric power. I admit at once that I am a consistent supporter of nuclear power, and consider it my duty to try to convince a wide circle of people that the professional interests of the power workers coincide with the interests of the entire population, because it is the nuclear power industry that gives our state the opportunity to not remain a poor, dingy backyard of Europe. I would not want Bulgaria, a land poor in primary energy sources, to be a "secondhand" state that allows foreigners to dictate what it can and cannot do in its energy industry. [passage omitted]

There are two major arguments against building and operating the Belene nuclear power plant. One is the

nuclear waste and spent fuel problem and the other is the possibility of major accidents of the Chernobyl type. Other countries are solving the problem of nuclear waste in different ways, but two methods have been confirmed by practical experience: first, to store the waste in stable, hermetically sealed underground sites (such as abandoned uranium mines, where radiation levels are monitored); and second, storage above ground in monitored storage areas at the nuclear plants themselves. Discussions are also being held on the possibility of using dead islands (such as the Bikini atoll, where nuclear tests were carried out) and other similar sites.

World experience has shown that the problem has its own technical and technological solutions. It is important for Bulgaria to find the solution that is most acceptable to its own population from the economic and political points of view.

Last, but not least, there is the danger of a nuclear accident—an issue regarding which theatrical exaggerations are particularly effective, and easily shock those not familiar with the problem. In international pronuclear circles (which is not an offensive word) there is a widespread conviction that a really big accident would stop the development of the nuclear power industry once and for all. Accordingly, immense efforts are being made to exclude such a possibility. For all practical purposes, the new generation of reactors, equipped with so-called containment (a shield or protective housing), eliminates the discharge of radioactive substances into the atmosphere in the

event of a nuclear accident. In addition to this safeguard, the latest generation of nuclear reactors, also have so-called passive security. This means that the reactor will automatically shut itself down without human intervention, irrespective of the cause of the accident, and even if it is deprived of electric power (which in any case is guaranteed by three separate systems).

It is not without interest to mention that specialists from our own Energoproekt have been engaged for several years on developing this reactor in the United States. Apart from being a source of pride, this also provides proof that Bulgaria is one of the few countries that is training specialist staff for nuclear power plants. After breaking with the tradition according to which most of our nuclear specialists should have Russian diplomas, we realized that our higher education and postgraduate training faced a demanding task.

The problem actually lies elsewhere: Considerable numbers of our nuclear specialists find it difficult to get jobs in areas related to their special fields. The state has had to pay too much for their training to be able to afford to send them out to sell pizzas or work cash registers. These specialists are perhaps the most valuable asset that our nuclear power industry has today. Despite the confusion and disorder, they have produced and continue to produce light and heat for our homes, and we will continue to count on their professionalism and competence in the future.

Article Says BIS Bugged North Korean Embassy

AU1602201795 Prague CESKY TYDENIK in Czech
No 13 14-16 Feb p 1

[Article by Lubor Kohout and Jan T. Vavra: "The Secret Service Bugged the Korean Embassy, but Not for the Benefit of the Czech Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Cooperation between the Security Information Service [BIS] staff and the agents of foreign intelligence and counterespionage services—in which the BIS was involved at the time, since it did not have the necessary approval of the Czech Government—was not limited to just terrorism. Under no circumstances could this cooperation be considered necessary "contacts," as some members of the parliament body for the control of the BIS operation—Deputies Jan Klas (Civic Democratic Party) and Tomas Svoboda, for instance—claimed. Here are the findings of the CESKY TYDENIK correspondents.

For an extended period of time, for instance, BIS wiretapped the telephone lines of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which is located at several places in Prague 6. This, however, has not been done for our own use, which one could understand. BIS passes the transcript and the recordings of the bugged telephone conversations directly to the employees of the South Korean Embassy—in fact, to South Korean intelligence agents. Thus, BIS actually provided "services" in their own land to a foreign country's intelligence. By this cooperation, it clearly violated the BIS law. Moreover, the Security Information Service passed all of the recorded calls to the South Koreans without showing any interest in their content. Such conduct certainly is not commonplace in similar organizations abroad and is contrary to the professional custom of counterespionage services.

BIS should cooperate with such foreign organizations, particularly in the sphere of terrorism, which is what the Fifth Section of the BIS specializes in. This cooperation, including the mutual transfer of information, is also a part of the agreements signed with other countries.

We reported in the last issue of CESKY TYDENIK that, despite the speedy "adjustments" of the content of some secret service files, made by its select members on Saturday and Sunday after the publication of the accusations by the Civic Democratic Alliance, certain material is still being kept in some places at BIS, which proves the suspicion of the Civic Democratic Alliance regarding the observation of parliamentary political parties justified. According to the CESKY TYDENIK findings, this concerns mostly material of the unit conducting surveillance for BIS needs and backup computer disks containing information obtained by the secret service, including the original records that have been removed from the files. BIS Interim Director Stanislav Devaty refused to take a stand on one CTK question, but he did send a message through his secretary that "he does not intend to comment on such speculations."

The same day, 10 February, the Civic Democratic Alliance submitted to the deputies' commission for the control of secret services material proving intentional and purpose-oriented leaking of information from BIS to the media. The alliance believes that some staffers of the secret service, police, and Interior Ministry pass to selected newsmen information they want published, thereby damaging certain political parties or individuals. The secret service would thus apply a form of an influence agency to fashion public opinion and also politics. The Civic Democratic Alliance submitted to the commission certain newspaper articles and recordings of television programs together with its own analysis. The alliance points out that this BIS activity is contrary to law, and it is not possible for the secret service to use its information resources to play its own political games.

According to David Rozanek, Civic Democratic Alliance press spokesman, DENNI TELEGRAF correspondent Dusan Sramek, for instance, or RESPEKT correspondent Jaroslav Spurny are in contact with the Security Information Service.

Two of Havel's Vetoes Overridden

95CH0102C Prague PRAGUE POST in English
10 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by Victor Gomez: "Havel's Clout Waning as Deputies Override Vetoes"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President Vaclav Havel's political influence took a beating over the holidays as parliament came together for a special session and rejected his vetoes on two bills.

It took deputies only an hour and a half Dec. 27 to shrug off Havel's opinion, in votes that showed an unusual degree of unity in the oft-divided legislature. The two bills—one on the professional practice of architecture and another one amending the law on administrative fees—were vetoed by the president shortly before Christmas.

The overrides, and especially their timing, represented something of a political slap in the face for the president.

Only days before, in his Christmas Day radio broadcast, Havel announced his intention to behave more decisively in the future and to "bang the table" from time to time.

This would represent a change for a president whose current term in office has been characterized by a nonconfrontational approach toward government decisions.

Havel has only vetoed one other significant law. He rejected a parliament decision to grant legislators immunity from being searched by customs officials at border crossings. That veto stood.

But Havel's latest veto was not welcomed by deputies who had to interrupt their holidays to deal with the issue. Jiri Payne, a member of the governing Civic Democratic Party (ODS), lashed out at Havel's vetoes.

"I would implore the president to try to make good on his objections to government proposals by debating them at government sessions...instead of resolving these situations by not signing the law," said Payne, in a speech to the legislature.

In his New Year's Day address to the nation, Havel expressed his dismay.

But many deputies backed the government's position, saying the issue of a tax break will be dealt with in a complete law on nonprofit organizations that should be ready for parliament by next spring.

Party Founded To Represent Small Business

AU1602194795 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
15 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by "ljd": "Small Businessmen Have a New Party"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The newly founded Party of Small Businessmen [Zivnostenska Strana] is beginning its work now.

"It is obvious to every sensible citizen that small businesses still do not have sufficient support in the constitutional structures and that the prosperity of market principles created by the current ruling political elite has not reached even a satisfactory standard in the spheres of legislation, economics, and politics," the statement of the party preparatory committee reads. The initiator of the party's foundation is a private businessman, Jaroslav Samek. His first political involvement was, shortly after November 1989, the All People's Democratic Party of Entrepreneurs and Tradesmen [Vselidova demokraticka strana podnikatelů a živnostníků]. It ran in the first election in coalition with Sladek's republicans [Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia]. After the elections, the party changed its name to the Party of Entrepreneurs and Tradesmen [Podnikatelsko-živnostenská strana]. According to Samek, however, "Communist Party of Czechoslovakia informers" infiltrated the leadership, who discredited and financially ruined the party. Stanek then became involved in the foundation of the Democratic Union [DEU] but left the party on bad terms because, "when I see trickery anywhere, I just cannot accept it." According to Samek, DEU had not even been formed, and the leadership was assigning the posts. Jaroslav Samek has now registered his own party at the Interior Ministry. The objective of the party is, the statement reads, "to eliminate the deleterious effect of the tax regulations and instructions in effect, high rates of interest on credit, and faulty laws that hinder initiative instead of supporting it."

Summary of 1994 Arms Trade Statistics

AU1602182195 Prague RESPEKT in Czech No 7
13-19 Feb 95 p 4

[Article by Jindrich Sidlo: "RDP Has Green Light"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Last year, the Industry Ministry granted a total of 542 licenses to export military hardware (16 applications were turned down). The volume of actual exports was \$196 million, which is 16 percent higher than a year earlier. Arms from the Czech Republic went to 52 countries: 79 percent of exports consist of shipments of 51 aircraft to Egypt and Thailand (the contracts were signed already in 1993), 10 percent are OT-64 armored carriers (164 of them) and T-55 tanks (40 pieces), which had been written off from Czech Army equipment and which were able to be sold to Cambodia and Slovakia. The five biggest exporters, controlling almost 90 percent of the market, are Aero Vodochody, Ompipol, Tatra Kopřivnice, Letecké Opravárny [Aircraft Repairs] Malesice, and Zbrojovka Uherský Brod (which is also a member of the RDP Group).

Preview of Taxes for Coming Year

95CH0106A Prague PRAGUE POST in English
3 Jan 95 p 3

[Article by Jan Stojaspal: "The Ups and Downs of Taxes in 1995"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Czech Republic will be a bit more expensive and little more regulated next year, with a number of legislative changes going into effect from the first of the year.

- The nontaxable income base for individuals will increase from 21,600 Kc [Czech korunas] to 24,000 Kc (\$800 to \$890) per year.
- The income tax for individuals earning over 1,080,000 Kc (\$40,000) per year will slide one point, down to 43 percent. Corporate income tax will follow suit, dropping from 42 to 41 percent.
- The higher (23 percent) value-added tax (VAT) rate will slide to 22 percent. This will result in a 2 billion Kc reduction in government revenues next year. The loss of revenues will be compensated by increases in some consumption taxes and by moving some articles that are now subject to a 5 percent VAT [value-added tax] to the higher category. The VAT will rise from 5 to 22 percent for taxi services, construction, advertising and accommodation facilities.
- The consumption tax on cigarettes will be 51 hellers per cigarette, a 1 heller increase. Tax on beer will move up by 3 Kc per hectoliter, and spirits by 5 Kc per liter. Only the consumption tax on wine will drop, from 6 to 5.5 Kc per liter. Taxes on car fuels, both leaded and unleaded, will go up by 105 Kc per ton. A ton of diesel fuel will be taxed 90 Kc more.
- Nonprofit organizations will be permitted to write off a maximum of 30 percent of expenses from their tax base, with a limit of 3 million Kc.
- The subsistence level will be lifted to 2,440 Kc for one adult (from 2,160 Kc); 4,360 Kc for two adults (from

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3,860 Kc); and 7,580 Kc for a family of two adults and two children (from 6,800 Kc).

- Pensions, last increased by 200 Kc plus 5 percent of the base Nov. 30, won't increase again until July 1, 1995. The government is suggesting a 12 percent increase.
- Rents will be increasing in accordance with three coefficients over the next five years. The first increase will take effect on July 1, 1995, and on the same day for four years thereafter. The first coefficient is the annual inflation rate, the second depends on the number of inhabitants of a village or city (19 percent for Prague) and the third is reserved for free disposal of the government each year.
- Prices of utilities will take off too. Heat and hot water are to increase by 10 percent as of Jan. 1. Postage will go up by 20 percent as of April 1. The price of natural gas will be boosted by 10 percent as of June 1, together with coal gas (up 15 percent) and electricity (up 12 percent).
- As of Jan. 1, anyone driving on the highway must have a blue-and-white sticker posted on their car proving payment of the annual highway tax of 400 Kc for cars, 1,000 Kc for trucks of up to 12 tons and 2,000 Kc for trucks of over 12 tons. The stickers are available at more than 3,500 post offices around the country and all border crossings.
- Monthly radio fees will increase by 5 Kc, from 20 to 25 Kc. Television fees remain the same. Anyone failing to pay the fees will face fines of 5,000 Kc (radio) and 10,000 Kc (television). Foreigners without permanent residency in the Czech Republic and members of the diplomatic corps are exempt from the payment.

Minister Previews Talks With Russia on Oil

AU1602181895 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 13 Feb 95 p 4

[Interview with Sergj Kozlik, Slovak deputy prime minister and finance minister, by Oldrich Zabochnik in Bratislava; date not given: "A Recovery in Relations Follows the Recent Decline"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sergj Kozlik, deputy prime minister and finance minister, actively participated in the preparations of the visit to Bratislava by Viktor Chernomyrdin, prime minister of the Russian Federation. Therefore, the HOSPODARSKE NOVINY correspondent asked him several questions.

[Zabochnik] Which items on the agenda prepared for the talks with the Russian prime minister in Bratislava are of greatest importance to you?

[Kozlik] As the deputy prime minister in charge of economy, I have focused in the preparations for the visit on the economic sphere. I held talks with three Russian deputy prime ministers and five economy ministers so that the documents to be signed in Bratislava were thoroughly prepared.

[Zabochnik] What is of interest to both countries in their mutual contacts?

[Kozlik] It is, above all, the concept of transformation strategy, the determination of the stage in the process where the two countries are at the given moment, and what framework this can provide for the relations between the Slovak Republic and the Russian Federation. The economic contacts agenda, to the activation of which Mr. Chernomyrdin's visit here will certainly contribute, is very extensive. There is the matter of the solution to the debt of the Russian Federation to the Slovak Republic, issues of payment and accounting relations, and specific forms of cooperation between enterprises.

[Zabochnik] How would you characterize the overall level of the contacts between the Slovak Republic and the Russian Federation?

[Kozlik] After a certain short-term decline, our relations should recover in a new concept. On our side, but also on the side of the Czech Republic, for instance, there is interest in securing long-term supplies of oil and gas. We have a contract signed regarding oil and want to achieve the same regarding gas. The Russian side clearly declares its agreement to these relations, which, however, must be fulfilled on the enterprise level. If we have 5 million metric tons of crude oil guaranteed until 2000, it does not mean we will actually get it unless we secure the supplies on the enterprise level. Russia is clearly oriented toward the market, and that is projected on all relations. Hence, the Slovak Republic must reassess its approach, and the enterprise sphere, which has not rid itself of the habit of waiting to see what the government will arrange for it, must begin to act much more aggressively.

Mochovce Nuclear Power Station To Be Completed

LD1702120695 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 17 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Mochovce nuclear power station will be completed even though the European Parliament request passed to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] not to grant Slovakia a loan to complete its construction. This transpired from the meeting held at the Slovak Economy Ministry yesterday. The meeting was attended by Sergej Kozlik, Slovak deputy prime minister and finance minister; Economy Minister Jan Ducky; Karol Cesnek, chairman of the Slovak Power Stations Board; EBRD Deputy Vice President Thierry Boudan; and Alain Pilou, director of the Mochovce Construction Project.

According to Imrich Sitasz, director of the section in charge of the Economic Ministry's main departments, if the bank fails to grant the required loan, the Slovak side will begin to focus intensively on the Russian Federation's offer to complete the Mochovce power station.

Bratislava Crime Rate Up 'Fivefold' Since 1989

LD1602153695 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 16 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A comparison with the figures for the year 1989 shows that the crime rate in the Slovak capital, Bratislava, rose fivefold last year. These were the opening words of Jan Jonis, commander of the Bratislava municipal police corps headquarters, at the press conference on criminality held today.

Our editor Oto Goerner comes in with more statistics.

[Goerner] Let me give you two more details from the information presented today by Jan Jonis. There were 3,700 cars stolen in Bratislava last year, which, averaged, represents 10 cars stolen a day. Concerning serious crime, all of the murders but one were successfully investigated.

Jan Jonis also talked about organization changes at the municipal headquarters, which are currently being prepared and should be implemented in the near future. The aim of the changes is to divide the municipal police quarters into districts to improve the quality of policing on the outskirts of Bratislava.

Jonis described the crime committed by foreigners, who often stay in Slovakia illegally, as the major problem of Bratislava. In his view, this fact is supported by statistics. There were 193 crimes committed for every 171 foreigners. Regarding nationality, the foreigners most often appearing in the crime statistics are citizens of the Czech Republic, of the former Soviet Union, and the former Yugoslavia. [passage omitted]

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Government To Close Seven Embassies

LD1602192295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1900 GMT 16 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The government is hoping to save 125 million forints by closing seven embassies. It has accepted the foreign ministry's proposal according to which Hungary will close its embassies in Uruguay, Peru, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, the United Arab Emirates, Cambodia, and the Philippines. The tasks of these embassies will be transferred to the Hungarian missions operating in neighboring countries.

It was also said at the government spokesman's briefing that the foreign ministry is planning to open new embassies, for example in Slovenia.

Diplomatic Efforts Toward Integration Assessed

AU1602195095 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 16 Feb 95 p 11

[Interview with Ferenc Somogyi, foreign ministry state secretary, by Lajos Pietsch; place and date not given: "Our Western Integration Is Irreversible"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Pietsch] In connection with the recent visits abroad by Hungarian officials, opinions emerged according to which it is easier to fulfill the conditions of NATO membership than those of EU membership. Prime Minister Gyula Horn himself said that Hungary could become a NATO member as early as next year. To what extent are these opinions justified?

[Somogyi] Although NATO has not even officially formulated the concrete expectations yet, it indeed seems now that there might be greater chances of acquiring membership in NATO sooner. This could be explained by the fact that, even in the best possible case, negotiations on joining the EU can only start after the successful conclusion of intergovernmental conferences, and the mostly objective criteria of joining the EU can only be fulfilled in a relatively long period of time. In contrast to this, the possibility of a rapid advance in the process of acquiring NATO membership is still open; and under the given circumstances, political and strategic considerations will probably play a considerably bigger role in the decisions. Of course, in the case of NATO too, it is essential to create the minimal technical conditions for future cooperation and to make the NATO way of thinking prevalent. On the basis of the schedule known so far, one can count on the emergence of decisions regarding ways to expand the alliance by the end of 1995. Therefore, if the question is whether it is possible for Hungary to become a NATO member as early as 1996, the answer is that this cannot be excluded either. It is obvious, however, that this is only a possibility, and there is still no guarantee for this for either Hungary or others.

[Pietsch] What information did Gyula Horn receive about Russia and Russia's relations with NATO in the course of his meeting with the NATO secretary general?

[Somogyi] Naturally, the situation in Russia, and primarily the crisis in Chechnya and its possible effects were discussed in every meeting. This is an issue that concerns the entire world. I think that, in spite of the problems and the possible negative consequences, NATO is still sticking to its original position according to which the organization should be expanded by not isolating countries that are left out temporarily or for a longer time, and by also including Russia in the new and broader security structure. Only this will serve the original goal of broadening NATO: namely, an efficient contribution to the security and stability of all the countries in this region and of Europe as a whole. [passage omitted]

[Pietsch] We learned that all the negotiating partners declared that settling problems with neighbors is essential for Hungary's full integration. Have the basic treaties been mentioned in connection with this, as well as the fact that NATO and the EU would be ready to play some kind of role in making sure that the obligations included in these treaties are carried out?

[Somogyi] It is a fact that all our negotiating partners stressed the importance of orderly relations with the countries in the region and the need to normalize relations. In this respect, the conference on European stability scheduled for March was mentioned as some kind of milestone and, consequently, as a specific opportunity. [passage omitted]

My personal opinion is that every country—Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia—is equally interested in settling the complex problems as soon as possible, irrespective of the expectations of the integration organizations. Therefore, Hungarian diplomacy is doing everything in its power to develop good-neighborly relations and to be able to sign the basic treaties before the aforementioned conference on stability in Europe.

However, I would like to point out that the time factor, which has now become extremely important, will not change our firm determination either: namely, that we will sign only a good and adequate agreement, one in harmony with our original expectations. The treaty, or closely interconnected treaties, must guarantee that the political commitments for honoring the national minority rights already formulated in the European and UN documents become legal commitments that can be verified. We are hoping to reach such an agreement, but only the future can tell whether our hopes will become reality.

Committee Head Views Treaty Preparation

AU1702081595 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 16 Feb 95 p 3

[Interview with Matyas Eorsi, chairman of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, by Zoltan Laczik on 15 February; place not given: "On the Basic Treaties, Behind Closed Doors"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 15 February, the subcommittee of the parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee dealing with the Hungarian-Slovak and Hungarian-Romanian basic treaties held its first session. Matyas Eorsi, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, gave NEPSZABADSAG an interview after the session.

[Laczik] What happened at the meeting?

[Eorsi] Perhaps we should have held this meeting sooner, to be able to achieve the broadest possible consensus. We had a minor debate at the beginning because, according to opposition deputies, the government had not sent the material to them in time—but then it became clear that this was not so.

The point is that an exchange of views has been started on Hungary's possibilities in connection with the basic treaties and the government's room for maneuvering. It is very important for the deputies to learn about the government's strategic plans and the tactical steps that come with this. I trust there is a chance for a broad, if not six-party, consensus if the subcommittee can hold regular meetings. The precondition is that none of the parties should look upon the issue of the basic treaties as a domestic political issue, and should not try to gain domestic political advantages from it. We must strive for an optimal compromise, and this seems to be emerging now.

[Laczik] What were the most marked views, and where did you have the biggest differences of views?

[Eorsi] I would not like to answer this question because tactical issues were discussed and it would not be appropriate if information was leaked on these. This is not because of the Hungarian readers, but the information would obviously also be read by our negotiating partners. It would not be good for them to learn from a Hungarian newspaper what the Hungarian Government's strategic and tactical goals are. Suffice it to say that slight differences exist among the views of all six parties, and these views have to be brought as close together as possible.

[Laczik] When can we expect the drafts to be made public?

[Eorsi] At the moment, these are the subject of expert discussions. If they became public, a press debate would immediately ensue and this would affect the government's room for maneuvering. The treaties will probably only be made public when they are signed. The date of 21 March has been generally talked about, and Gyula Horn has announced that he would like to sign it by this date. It is to be seen whether this will succeed.

Defense Officials Discuss Coming Reforms

LD160222495 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1730 GMT 16 Feb 95

[Interview with Hungarian Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti and Army Commander Janos Deak by an unidentified announcer in Budapest on 16 February; first paragraph is announcer's introduction; from the "Extra" program—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] Armed forces reform—or at least the first step, the restructuring of the Army leadership: why, how, and for how much? This is what I asked Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti and Colonel General Janos Deak, commander of the Army, this afternoon.

Mr. Minister, you have just returned from the government session at which one of the most important subjects was the restructuring of the Hungarian Army command. Why is it necessary to restructure the Hungarian Army's command system?

[Keleti] The government adopted a decision that transforms the upper echelon of military leadership. This is important because we face a reform of the armed forces, and we intend not only to implement organizational changes but to rationalize the system of military leadership. Now, in parallel with the establishment of the new Hungarian Army command, several commands—whose functions have, in our view, become redundant during the implementation of the Armed Forces reform—will cease to exist. This means, in practice, that subordinate to the command of the Hungarian Army there will be a general staff, as well as division commands [foecsoport foenoksegek] that directly control the branches of the Armed Forces; there will be a division command that deals with material-technological issues; and there will be a new organization, a so-called human resources division command [human foecsoport foenoksegek] that will integrate into one unified framework issues related to human activities that in the past were dealt with separately. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Mr. Minister, you and the military leaders talk a great deal about the need for there to be a more flexible, smaller, more adaptable army. Some of this is obviously a professional issue, and it is obviously up to the colonel general how he interprets it. How can this be interpreted politically, strategically, and from the viewpoint of security policy? Why is this reform necessary right now?

[Keleti] We have had to examine very many things. We had to examine what the defense budget passed by the parliament was sufficient for. For this reason, jointly with the Hungarian Army command we decided that it was necessary to implement a structural change; that it was necessary to form organizational units that would mean an army with fewer people, with greater responsiveness—one that was easier to command and that could be financed on the basis of the current budget resources.

The other point: We naturally considered the sources of danger that exist or could exist in this region, from the viewpoint of security policy. Together with the general staff, and also having asked for the opinion of several independent security policy experts, we decided that there was an opportunity now for a reorganization of this type—while at the same time maintaining our security and sovereignty.

The third point: The government has the resolute intention—and it is fully supported by the Army in this—that we should join NATO. When the command structure of the Army was formed, the experts working in the general staff examined the conditions that must be met by the upper and middle echelons of the military leadership in the various NATO countries, where there is scarcely a uniform system of command, since there are national specifics everywhere. These were considered when this was planned. We believe that one of the good preconditions of our integration into NATO is transformation of the command of the Hungarian Army in this manner. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Mr. Minister, you have mentioned the economic conditions that obviously place great constraints on reform. Could they prevent it? [passage omitted] The essence of having a smaller, more flexible army is that one should have a more modern army, one with more modern weapons and which is of world standard. How can this be achieved?

[Keleti] Very many people believe that our accession to NATO costs an enormous sum of money. At the same time, I must say that the defense of the country costs a great deal. Even if we had not decided to join NATO we would have had to spend large sums of money on improving the living and working conditions of the professional soldiers, improving the situation of public employees, improving the accommodation, clothing and food of conscripts—and this sum is small, when we think of the fact that sooner or later we must begin the modernization of the Hungarian Army's military technology.

Our wish to join NATO will influence the situation in that, if compatibility with NATO is necessary for weapons systems or when modernizing military technology, we must be able to ensure this when procuring and installing new equipment. This is a lot of money. There is no doubt about that.

[Announcer] But this must be understood as money in the long term. This modernization will not take place in the space of one or two years.

[Keleti] That is so. We have plans for extended development, and we plan to submit to the parliament in the second half of the year, toward the end of the year, the medium and long-term plan for developing the Armed Forces' military technology. In my view, this is important because this parliamentary debate, the parliamentary decision, will guarantee that the costs are met. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] There was mention of a reduction in staff. [passage omitted]

[Deak] When the minister took office, it was he who raised this idea, in fact. A large number of experts have dealt with it. We can imagine nine or ten months for compulsory military service, but on certain conditions.

The first condition is money, because we can only imagine it if we can find professional soldiers on contract to fill the positions that are essential for the Army's continuous operation. [passage omitted]

If there is money, then from 1996 the Army will be ready to cut the conscripts' military service to nine or ten months.

[Announcer] Mr. Minister, the staff reduction will indeed concern part of the professional staff, which is bound to create tension. Let us recall the problems of the former Soviet Army. Is it possible that officers will face such problems as having no home, or similar things?

[Keleti] I think that an army is always based on professional soldiers. [passage omitted] We do not want to part with any professional soldier, not only because they form the backbone of the Army, but also because of our own interests, as we have invested millions of forints in training each for them.

I think that some people will leave the Army in the next few years owing to a failure to achieve the existential criteria they want. However, we want to keep everybody. [passage omitted]

We can promise that in three or four years' time we will noticeably improve the living standards of those who will stay with us on the path of the development of the Hungarian Army, those who undertake these difficulties. [passage omitted]

Institute Urges Government To Seek Debt Relief

95CH0112A Budapest "PROGNOZIS 2000"
FOUNDATION RESEARCH INSTITUTE in
Hungarian Mar 94 pp 58-69

[Article by Dr. Erzsebet Gidai, Dr. Mihaly Fecske, and Dr. Gyorgy Szretkyo: "Searching for a Way To Reduce the Indebtedness"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

4. Solution alternatives for Hungary

A review of Hungary's indebtedness and economic situation clearly indicates that

(a) only a new, income-stimulating and supply-intensifying economic policy could resolve our economic problems,

(b) provided that our outstanding debt is reduced at the same time.

The old and new governments of the past decades rejected even theoretical presumption in this regard, let alone suggestions to take practical steps in that direction.

In the course of debates over the possibility of reducing our indebtedness, one frequently heard "arguments" like these:

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- "We would lose our credit worthiness." The World Bank has provided proof in the form of data, according to which a country's credit worthiness improves if it works out an agreement with its creditors for the reduction of its debt service burden.
- "Catastrophic consequences." Facts do not support this assumption. A review of the situation of the 21 most deeply indebted countries in the world indicates that all of these countries enjoy debt relief. We should note, however, that the indebtedness situation of a majority of these countries was less grave than that of Hungary. Economic performance was better than that of Hungary's in eight of these countries between 1982 and 1990, even though Hungary had paid its debt service on time.
- "Deterrence to the influx of operating capital." This is not supported by either logic, or experience, or statistical assessment.
- "The Polish example." "Writing off Poland's debt did not produce relief." The Poles did not pay debt service even before the debt was written off, and significant economic consolidation began after the write-off.
- "Immediate withdrawal of income." "Since the remaining debt service could not be financed by new loans, the pressing burden on the country would increase rather than decrease." For this to be true, one would have to believe that representatives of Hungary would sit down to negotiate a reduction of the debt service burden, and then conclude the negotiations by reaching an agreement as a result of which the burden increases. The truth is that capitalists would think twice before withdrawing income, because doing so would be accompanied by a severe market loss. This, in turn, would cause more damage than the damage caused by reducing the debt burden.
- "We will lose the support of the IMF." From the standpoint of preserving credit worthiness, IMF support is a vital concern only to countries that require a net influx of foreign capital. There is no net foreign capital influx in Hungary. Just the opposite: The net outflow of capital should be halted temporarily. Insofar as credits granted by the IMF are concerned, these represent only a fraction of Hungary's annual need to borrow funds to make installment payments on principal. Moreover, IMF loans cost more than funds borrowed on the money market. Taking out IMF loans amounts to a luxury, hardly affordable by an overly indebted country like Hungary.
- "We have given our word." Contractual obligations agreed to must be discharged, but only as long as circumstances remain essentially unchanged. A 20 percent reduction in the gross domestic product and close to a million unemployed people represent an essential change.
- "This would be unfair to creditors who trusted us." It has become an internationally recognized fact by now that not only the debtor is responsible for becoming overly indebted, but also the creditor, the one who did not make a professional assessment of the borrower country's long-term ability to pay.
- "We find ourselves in a constrained situation." Only those countries that regard the net influx of resources as vital find themselves in constrained situations. From Hungary's standpoint it would be vital to temporarily suspend the net outflow of resources.
- "The debt burden is decreasing." In other words: The indebtedness problem is slowly coming to an end; all we have to do is to consistently pursue the policies we have followed so far. The truth is that the debt burden is not decreasing. Instead, it is increasing year after year, because the consistently shrinking economy is burdened by a consistently increasing debt service.
- "The composition of the debt." About half of our indebtedness is to governments and banks. The alleviation of the debt burden, including the writing off of debts by these entities, constitutes standard international practice. Insofar as indebtedness based on bond issues is concerned, the capital market is the most flexible market in the world: the extent of its preparedness to renew loans is of incredible proportions. All problems can be resolved in the money market. One only has to seek solutions. The rest of the indebtedness (about 17 percent) is to international organizations. Although this is the most difficult territory, practical solutions for debt relief can be found.

If arguments against seeking debt relief do not withstand the test of logic, experience, and numerical audit, as long as debt relief—even in the form of forgiving debts—is standard international practice, seeking debt relief is also a feasible path for Hungary to follow.

In the final analysis, an opportunity to achieve results exists with respect to all types of debts, for the following reasons:

First, granting credit is a bilateral responsibility. Risks are assumed not only by the debtor, but also by the creditor.

Second, as a result of negotiations, a creditor is able to salvage some of his money, provided that the outcome of the bargaining process is appropriate.

Third, the Hungarian market plays an important role in the center of Europe from the standpoint of capital and technology transfer.

Fourth, the Carpathian Basin is a strategically important region. It transcends the financial policy framework of indebtedness.

Accordingly, we once again reaffirm our belief that Hungary's indebtedness is primarily a political issue, and only secondarily an economic and financial issue.

Unlike Poland and Bulgaria in the recent past, not even in a single instance have Hungarian governments taken advantage of opportunities to achieve results that would have been favorable from Hungary's standpoint.

As we demonstrated, opportunities to obtain concessions exist with respect to all forms of credit. Now let us take a more detailed look at this matter. If we break down Hungary's indebtedness as of early 1992 by type of creditor, we find that 51.3 percent of the total indebtedness is to governments and banks, 31.3 percent represents obligations based on bond issues, and 17.4 percent of the total is owed to international organizations. The ratio of indebtedness based on bond issues increased in 1993, but this also indicates a deterioration of Hungary's credit worthiness. (In 1992 we paid \$300 million in added interest due to a deterioration of our credit worthiness. Since we received a second- or third-class credit rating instead of a first-class credit rating, we paid three percentage points of added interest.)

Arguments are being made against seeking debt relief on grounds that, unlike Poland, Hungary would not be able to count on debt relief because Hungary's indebtedness to governments constitutes a relatively small proportion of its total debt, while the overwhelming ratio of Poland's indebtedness was to governments—debts that could be forgiven—and therefore requests by Poland to forgive debts were appropriate. Most of Hungary's debt is owed to international organizations and banks, or is based on bond issues. International organizations cannot reschedule debts owed to them, and financial obligations based on bonds cannot be renegotiated, because bonds are in the hands of several thousand creditors—so the argument goes. This argument would carry more weight if the MNB [Hungarian National Bank] periodically made public the amounts owed to banks and governments, i.e., the amount of debt that could be rescheduled or written off in part, and the amounts owed to international organizations and in the form of bonds, in which cases obtaining debt relief would be difficult.

The ratio of that part of our medium- and long-term debt that could be made the subject of relatively simple debt relief—i.e., credits granted by governments and banks—has dropped from 99.6 percent in 1980 to 58.2 percent in 1990, and continues to drop, but this ratio still exceeds 50 percent of the long-term, hard-currency indebtedness, or \$10.5 billion. Insofar as bond obligations are concerned, if the large number of bond holders were the unavoidable obstacle in the path of renegotiations, the same should hold true with regard to amounts owed to banks, because in cases involving debtors owing large amounts of money, such as Brazil and Mexico, the risk is shared by between 500 and 600 banks. In practice, in such instances, representatives of the 12-15 banks that loaned the largest amounts of money form a committee (steering committee), and that committee negotiates with the debtor. So far, the rest of the several hundred banks left out of the steering committees have always accepted agreements reached by the steering committees,

even though they could not influence the conduct of negotiations. Indeed, there may be thousands of bond holders. In reality, however, the bulk of the bonds is held by a few dozen institutional investors (insurance companies, pension funds, social security institutions, etc.), and these could reach an agreement regarding the composition of a 10-15 member negotiating committee, just as several hundred creditor banks do. Solutions can be found in the money market. One has only to seek such solutions. If it was possible to find a solution for the rescheduling of Turkey's \$2.3 billion worth of short-term and demand deposits in July 1980, a solution certainly exists for settling Hungary's bond obligations. Generally speaking, no debt relief of any kind is available regarding indebtedness to international organizations, and Hungary's long-term indebtedness of this kind amounts to almost 20 percent of its total indebtedness. In practice, however, these organizations, too, are extremely flexible, and thousands of methods exist for granting actual debt relief to worthy debtors while preserving the inviolability of the principle.

We therefore ask: Why does the government insist on continuing its debt management policies when these policies, and the resultant five years of restraint on demand, have a catastrophic effect on the Hungarian economy, and when arguments opposed to changing these policies have no basis in logic or fact? The immediate cause is probably the expertise and information monopoly of the MNB, and the lesser expertise of others in government as regards international finances. MNB reports and MNB spokesmen declared 1991 to be a successful year because inflation did not become galloping inflation, because we regularly paid the debt service, because convertible foreign exchange reserves increased by almost \$3 billion, and because the current balance of payment exceeded expectations by about 1.5 billion. It appears that it was not even worth mentioning that in the meantime agriculture had become disintegrated and had fallen into crisis, industrial production had dropped by about 20 percent, the gross domestic product had declined by 10 percent, and unemployment had more than quadrupled.

Aside from these facts, the fact is that the authoritarian principle has survived socialism: This policy is good because the IMF says so. This happens because with respect to economic affairs, the IMF inherited the cloak of infallibility formerly worn by the Soviet comrades. Two motivations for sustaining this policy probably stem from the fact that today, Hungary's indebtedness is managed mostly by the same people who took out those loans over the past two decades. In the early 1970s, these people were basking in the glory of making Hungary the first socialist country to gain acceptance by the similarly exclusive international bond market. In the eyes of these people, surrendering the bond market position for which they had fought so hard looks like "insanity," irrespective of the fact that we would not need this market, if we were to receive debt relief.

Another contributing factor may be the fact that these bankers would experience a loss of prestige if they asked Western money men to provide debt relief—the same Western bankers they convinced a short time ago that Hungary would never experience any problem with its indebtedness.

Could we preserve our credit worthiness by applying liberal, restrictive economic policies? Is a debt management policy successful, if the price to be paid is so high?

Apparently, the government believes that we can preserve our credit worthiness if we pay the debt service, even at the price of rapid impoverishment. In this regard, the government fails to recognize a matter that is made clear to any banker at the start of his career: the poorer the debtor, the lower his credit rating. And in case of a debtor's becoming gradually impoverished, his credit rating deteriorates if his impoverishment is caused by full, on-time payment of the debt service. Not even Hungary is an exception from this rule. Hungary's credit rating has greatly deteriorated in the marketplace since 1988. This is demonstrated by, for example, the Moody Index, or by the ratings of the Japanese Bond Research Institute, or the curve drawn by the World Bank, all of which show the percentage of the face value for which Hungarian bonds are bought and sold on the secondary market. Quite naturally, these rates reflect Hungary's credit worthiness as viewed by the international money market.

The rates declined by about 33 percentage points during the two-year period starting in September 1989 and ending in September 1991. The ironic part of this matter is that the credit rating of the five countries whose debts were forgiven pursuant to the Brady program since March 1989 has improved by more than 20 points.

In the final analysis, we may conclude that there is nothing new about debt relief, and that it is customarily applied also on an international scale. Hungary, too, would have an opportunity to negotiate, and international support could be obtained for such negotiations. Certain international analyses (e.g., the analysis prepared by the Brussels-based Eurodad Organization) also regard the writing off of 40% to 50% of the debt as realistic. In essence, in terms of a write-off, we are dealing with money multiples of which have already been repaid by Hungary.

Accordingly, a dual task presents itself. First, the way we became indebted must be fully disclosed and made public; second, cabinet-level negotiations must be conducted in the interest of obtaining debt relief.

It would be useful to inform the heads of states of countries having the greatest influence on the IMF (the U.S., Great Britain, France, and Japan) about our situation, through diplomatic channels. We should ask these heads of state to support, at the IMF, Hungary's endeavors to change the direction of its economic policy

and to obtain debt relief, because this is in the long term in the interest not only of Hungary but also of Hungary's creditors.

We must assess the amount of debt relief that could be obtained from each of our main creditor groups. Detailed plans containing financing techniques must be developed for each creditor group, showing ways and techniques by which the desired relief could be obtained.

The following could be a recommended method for debt relief: writing off a significant volume of the indebtedness to governments and banks; renegotiating the remainder of the debt to obtain reduced interest rates, extended payment terms and grace periods.

With respect to indebtedness incurred in the form of bond issues, governments could assume the related obligations, because so far, governments have given only insignificant support in the form of credits (2.7 percent of the medium- and long-term indebtedness). The assumed portion of the debt could be paid in installments by Hungary in the form of concessionary credits, at low interest rates with extended payment terms and grace periods.

With respect to international organizations, the goal to be attained could be the replacement of a significant portion of the annually due debt service with new loans, along with extended repayment terms and grace periods, perhaps at preferential interest rates.

As regards other, mainly commercial, loans, renegotiations would have to take place with each individual creditor separately, endeavoring to obtain extended payment terms and grace periods.

Separate negotiations could be initiated concerning a targeted extent of debt relief with the various groups of creditors—the Paris Club, the London Club, bond holders, international institutions—with the support and perhaps involvement of the IMF.

Quite naturally, debt relief makes sense and produces results only if it is coupled with a good economic development program.

5. Summary

We must be aware of the fact that Hungary needs a period of five to six years of rest to heal its wounds and to establish economic order and consolidation. The precondition, and by now indispensable means, for this is a significant downscaling of our international indebtedness. What has not been attempted by any Hungarian government before could be achieved if a well-prepared, expert government with a commitment to the nation would take into its hands the settlement of the debt situation. An appropriately prepared, expert government could negotiate debt reduction (Germany, Austria, and Japan would be appropriate negotiating partners). At the same time, it is also true that reducing our indebtedness

alone would not solve our problems. It would only serve as a means to solve our problems. An appropriate economic policy strategy would be the real therapy. As part of such strategy, liquidating our indebtedness would be indispensable, but doing no more than liquidating our indebtedness would be insufficient.

Temporary Solution Urged for Parched Danube Area

95CH0115A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 16 Jan 95 p 4

[Interview with Professor Vanda Lamm, director of the Institute of Government and Law of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, by Istvan Szasz; place and date not given: "A Temporary Solution Cannot Be Delayed While Awaiting a Decision in The Hague"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Because additional documents have to be submitted to the International Court of Justice in the Bos [Gabcikovo] barrage case, hearings—the next stage in the proceedings before the court in The Hague—cannot start before 20 June, and a decision cannot be expected before mid-1996. It is essential that, in the meantime, the Slovak and Hungarian governments agree on a temporary system of water management for the Danube.*

"Considering the rather complicated rules of procedure before the International Court of Justice, one cannot expect a decision in the Bos barrage case in The Hague before the summer of next year. Even the phase of hearings will be able to begin only after the 20th of June of this year," said Professor Vanda Lamm, director of the MTA [Hungarian Academy of Sciences] Institute of Government and Law and an adviser to the team of lawyers representing our country in The Hague. Reviewing the developments to date, this jurist confirms that since 7 April 1993—day that the Hungarian and Slovak governments, upon intervention by the European Union [EU], signed a separate agreement, in other words a compromise, in Brussels to refer their dispute to the International Court of Justice—both sides have been observing all the time limits, and everything has been happening in accordance with the international tribunal's rules of procedure.

Thus, at the beginning of May 1994, ten months after the separate agreement's ratification, each government filed a bill of particulars several thousand pages long consisting of legal arguments and of opinions prepared by scientific experts. Thereupon, the court, in June of last year, sent each government a copy of the other's bill of particulars, giving both of them seven months in which to prepare their comments. In December of last year, each government filed its formal answer with the court in The Hague, but hearings could still not begin.

The cause of the unexpected delay was that both parties have been required to submit reports on additional scientific investigations. This additional material must

arrive in The Hague by 20 June so that hearings, the final stage in the proceedings, might begin. The international tribunal will have to decide three main issues: Was Hungary entitled to suspend work on the project specified in the Bos-Nagymaros agreement? Was Slovakia justified in adopting the so-called C version that involves the Danube's diversion? And: What are the consequences of the Hungarian government's note of 10 March 1993 canceling the agreement?

The international legal expert [Professor Lamm] sums up the positions of the two sides as follows: "The gist of Hungary's argument is that the 1977 agreement was a political decision not supported by even the preliminary scientific studies that were mandatory at the time. Moreover, in recent decades, views regarding the environment have changed radically. Throughout the world today, scientific considerations are being taken into account that were not even heard of 20 years ago. The unsubstantiated nature of the 1977 agreement, the previously not-even-assessed environmental damage that Hungary would have sustained from the agreement, as well as the changes in environmental thinking that are now also reflected in international law—all these are factors that, in our opinion, warranted the agreement's cancellation.

The Slovak side counters this by emphasizing that a duly concluded formal agreement does exist, one we are obliged to honor. According to the Slovaks, the Hungarians acted unlawfully when they terminated the agreement unilaterally. In addition, the Slovaks also dispute that the project's environmental impact would be as serious as we claim."

Professor Lamm added: "Hungary's position is strengthened by the fact that version C, which involves the Danube's diversion, did not even exist in the 1977 plan. That Hungary concluded the international agreement with Czechoslovakia rather than with Slovakia, which was not yet an independent state at the time, further complicates the legal situation. There is a strong opinion in international law that international agreements are not 'inherited' automatically in such cases. Accordingly, the 1977 agreement would have been valid in 1993 only if Hungary had validated the agreement with the Slovak government after Slovakia's independence. In other words, it is questionable whether a valid international agreement even existed between the two countries in the spring of 1993."

When asked what kind of decision can be expected in The Hague, Vanda Lamm did not go into details. She merely said that, according to experience, the International Court of Justice, as the highest tribunal of the United Nations, usually avoided radical, and especially one-sided, decisions. Therefore, a compromise decision could be expected that would promote a mutual settlement between the two sides and would strive to minimize the environmental damage.

Professor Lamm explained that the position Hungary was maintaining in The Hague in the interest of reaching

such a favorable compromise, would be weakened considerably by any action indicating that the Hungarian side was reconciled to the situation that had arisen in the wake of the diversion of the Danube. Therefore, the construction of a so-called sill to raise the water level of the Old Danube would be an unfortunate move. It would essentially mean that we were accepting a flow rate of between 250 and 300 cubic meters a second in the old channel, in contrast to an average flow rate of 2000 cubic meters per second before the diversion. Professor Vanda Lamm said: "In my opinion, by no means should we wait idly for a decision in The Hague. The most urgent task at present is to reach a detailed official agreement with the Slovaks on putting in place a temporary system of water management. We should strive for an intergovernmental agreement under which Slovakia would guarantee to discharge, in keeping with the EU's recommendations, at least 800 cubic meters of water into the Danube's main channel until the court in The Hague announces its decision."

Opposition Parties on Danube Proposals

95CH0115B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
12 Jan 95 p 4

[Article by Imre Bednarik: "The Opposition Would Reject a Proposal To Fill the Dunakiliti Storage Reservoir"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *At their joint press conference on Thursday, the four opposition parties announced that it would be unacceptable to them if the government were to attempt to solve the recharging of the ground water in the Szigetkoz by filling the Dunakiliti storage reservoir and installing a sill. The opposition parties held their press conference because they had been informed that the full cabinet would be deliberating this matter at its Thursday meeting. According to our information, however, on the recommendation of the cabinet's economic committee, deliberation of this matter by the full cabinet has been postponed.*

As we have reported earlier, the cabinet is expected to consider again in the near future additional technical solutions for recharging the ground water in the Szigetkoz.

Speaking at the joint press conference of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum], KDNP [Christian Democratic People's Party], FKGP [Independent Smallholders Party] and FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats]—incidentally, for technical reasons, the KDNP representative did not attend—Zoltan Illes, deputy chairman of FIDESZ and its shadow environmental minister, concluded from a Ministry of [Transport, Telecommunications and] Water Conservation study that the government was planning to solve the problem of the water supply of the Szigetkoz by filling the Dunakiliti storage reservoir and installing a sill at the 1843-km mark from the Danube's estuary. But this solution would be unacceptable to the opposition parties. And it would

also be in conflict with the National Assembly resolution, still in force, that orders the area's ground water recharged by means of pumping. According to Illes, the diesel pumps are causing much less environmental damage than what some people are claiming. Furthermore, the cost of operating the pumps is merely 400,000 forints per day, rather than 2.5 million forints. In contrast, filling the storage reservoir and installing a sill would cost Hungary over a billion forints.

Speaking for the Smallholders Party, Janos Szabo pointed out that filling the storage reservoir and installing a sill would also place Hungary in an awkward situation before the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

According to Illes, other technical solutions, too, could be employed to recharge the ground water in the Szigetkoz. If an agreement were reached with the Slovaks, the situation in the Szigetkoz could be relieved by pumping and siphoning. If the Slovaks refused to agree to this, Illes believes it would be conceivable for the Hungarian government to start talks with Austria on discharging more water into the Old Danube, through a canal from the Austrian stretch of the Danube.

Local Organizations Urge Construction of Sill

95CH0115C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
11 Jan 95 p 5

[Article by an unidentified NEPSZABADSAG correspondent in Győr: "Szigetkoz Residents Demand a Sill"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Released yesterday, a joint statement by the municipalities of Győr and Mosonmagyaróvár, the county council, and the Association of Local Governments in the Szigetkoz, emphasizes that Szigetkoz residents are indignant at the incompetence witnessed to date and are demanding a real solution to recharging the ground water, rather than a repetition of past mistakes.*

The statement establishes that, under the given circumstances, the organizations representing the 200,000 area residents regard as an acceptable solution the construction of a sill and the partial commissioning of the Dunakiliti storage reservoir. The document rates the solutions attempted to date as unsuccessful, costly, and a waste of time. It warns the present government not to repeat its predecessor's mistakes, and not to base its decision on the advice of those who have committed serious professional blunders in recent years.

At the news conference, the statement's signatories felt that sooner or later, someone would have to account for the billions wasted as a result of procrastination and unworkable solutions. They also said that there was a threshold below which it would simply not be worthwhile to bargain with the Slovaks, because if the Slovaks discharged less than 800 cubic meters per second into the main channel, the water would be unable to overflow into the river's branches.

The participants at the news conference were concerned that the Ministry of Environmental Protection is again leaning toward the Danube Circle's position. At least that is what the ministry's proposal to the cabinet reflects. But it was pointed out that the Danube Circle had gained its prestige and authority through its political espousal of the Danube cause, rather than through professional competence.

Danube Circle Opposes Proposed Sill

95CH0115D Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
11 Jan 95 p 5

[Unattributed article: "The Danube Circle Opposes the Installation of a Sill"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the news conference the Danube Circle held yesterday, it was claimed that of the nine versions for recharging the ground water in the Szigetkoz, the solution that the Ministry of [Transport, Telecommunications and] Water Management regards as the only good one, is being forced upon the government. The cabinet meeting on Thursday is expected to determine what the final solution will be. Gyorgy Droppa, the Danube Circle's administrator, said that the water management authorities are urging the installation of a sill at the 1843-km mark from the Danube's estuary, and the commissioning of the Dunakiliti storage reservoir, despite the fact that Hungary's bill of particulars

filed with the International Court of Justice in The Hague opposes this solution.

According to the Danube Circle, the purpose of the events surrounding the dismantling of the cofferdam in Nagymaros is to gain time, in the hope that the government might reverse the earlier decisions and build the Nagymaros generating plant after all. Postponement of the cofferdam's flooding and dismantling, respectively, has nothing to do with replacing the revetment's friable stone. That, too, is just a delaying tactic.

[Box, p 5]

To ensure navigation as well as ground-water recharge, the Renewable Energy Club recommends experimental replenishment of the channel at Dunakiliti. The conceptual plan calls for extending the present headwater canal as far as Pozsony [Bratislava], and replenishing the stretch of the Old Danube between Dunacsuny [Cunovo] and Dunakiliti. The conceptual plan's authors believe this would revive the river without having to resort to impounding, which is banned by a National Assembly resolution that is still in force. From the replenished stretch of the channel, water would flow by gravity into the flood plain's system of branches.

According to Tibor Holczer, the club's chairman, their proposal would be acceptable to the water management authorities and to the Danube movements as well. Indeed, even the Slovak construction enterprise, which at present is short of cash, has indicated recently that it would support such a compromise solution.

Presidential Spokesman on Walesa-Oleksy Meeting*LD1702101595 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0900 GMT 17 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Presidential spokesman Leszek Spalinski said that Lech Walesa would like the new government to be formed as soon as possible and expressed the will to continue talks with the Sejm Speaker, Jozef Oleksy. Speaking on Polish radio, Spalinski stressed that, if the process of forming the cabinet is prolonged, it would mean the parliament is inefficient and the president would have to think about more decisive steps.

Speaking about yesterday's meeting between the president and the Sejm speaker, the spokesman admitted that, on a list of candidates for ministers, there were some names that surprised the president. Spalinski stressed that Lech Walesa would not give up the rights granted to him in the small constitution on the matter of appointing presidential ministers despite the fact that the president's and the speaker's interpretations of constitutional rules differ dramatically.

Oleksy: Elections If Conflict With President*BR1602153895 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 16 Feb 95 p6*

[Report on interview with Jozef Oleksy, speaker of the Polish parliament, by A. Santa Cruz in Warsaw; date not given: "Walesa May Represent a Threat to Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw—These days the Polish Parliament's corridors are considerably more crowded than many streets in Warsaw. The reason for this flurry is a new stage in the war of nerves resulting from the open conflict between two of the state's powers, that is, Parliament and the presidency of the Republic. Now that Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak has been ousted by President Lech Walesa's persistent harassment, expectations are centering on the person who was nominated by the left-wing coalition—in power since October 1993—to attempt to form a new government, namely Jozef Oleksy.

After considering things for almost a whole week, former Communist apparatchik and current Parliament Speaker Oleksy, 48, has decided to accept the task. If he succeeds (which many people doubt, even inside his own party, now renamed "Social Democracy"—Poland's government will be headed, for the first time since 1989, by a chemically pure representative of the *nomenklatura*. Many are saying that this is too much for Walesa, in a presidential-election year. The head of state's spokesperson Leszek Spalinski told our paper yesterday that "Walesa is not enthusiastic about Oleksy, who is a former Communist Party member."

"The question of whether coexistence is possible between the president and a coalition government—

given that, as you suggest, we do not like each other at all—must be addressed to Walesa himself," Jozef Oleksy replied to EL PAIS ("Ah, the famous PAIS!" he said in Spanish), speaking in his office in Parliament. "The real question is whether Walesa is prepared to cooperate or whether he will only allow us to form a government in a formal manner. My task is to sound out his intentions."

Only yesterday the coalition between the Social Democrats (former Communists) and the Polish Peasants Party (an old satellite of the Polish Communist Party, mottled by its closeness to the land and the Church) got its act together, apparently overcoming its internal discrepancies, which "concerned lack of coordination on the part of Prime Minister Pawlak, the pace of decentralization, agriculture..." Oleksy explained, and which favored the president's sapping action. The list of the new government's members is now almost complete, but, contrary to widespread opinion, Oleksy said the list would not be submitted to Walesa in the immediate future, but only after his return from his visit to Latin America, which will start next Sunday.

Three of the cabinet's portfolios (foreign affairs, defense, and the Interior Ministry) are constitutionally "under presidential tutelage." What will happen if Walesa does not accept the nominations proposed by the incoming prime minister, as on previous occasions? Jozef's reply was adamant: "We do not want a confrontation, but this does not mean that we will accept Walesa's own candidates. The Constitution establishes that the president's opinion must be sought, his opinion, not his decision. If he does not accept this fact, then we have a problem."

Will Early General Elections Be Held?

"They will be held if the situation becomes too complicated. The coalition is not interested in holding elections, but if a conflict initiated by the president leaves no other options open, then elections will be held. The president also wants to force an extension of his term in office. This is impossible constitutionally but, for Walesa, impossible things may become possible." The future prime minister did not hesitate to say that "Lech Walesa may become a threat to democratic stability in Poland," but he was reluctant to expand on this point.

(Two hours later, at the Namiestnikowski Palace [presidential office], Walesa's spokesperson told our newspaper: "If we learn the lessons from the past, then there should be no problem. The new cabinet must accept the president's nominations for these three portfolios." In Spalinski's view, the 1993 elections, which brought a coalition of former Communists into power, were "an operational accident: only 52 percent of the electorate voted.")

The head of state's domineering personality ("he looks upon the country as some sort of war booty, like a peasant looks upon his plot of land," Jerzy Urban, the director of Poland's most influential weekly, NIE, said of Walesa), combined with the ambiguity of the so-called

"small Constitution," drafted by a Solidarity government in a moment of euphoria, when Communism had collapsed, but the USSR still existed, are the reasons behind this conflict of powers which some people believe is undermining Poland's image in Europe, a Europe it wants to belong to. Over the years, successive parliaments have addressed the task of drafting a new Constitution, but this has not yet materialized.

According to the man entrusted with the task of forming it, the new government's immediate goals are political stability and agreeing a non-aggression pact with the opposition (basically the Freedom Union, the fragmented remnants of the Solidarity movement) in order to carry out an urgent reform of the Polish social security system. Despite the fact that the latter's almost nine million beneficiaries consider it insufficient, the government claims that pensions are eating up the budget.

Lech Walesa Interviewed by Brazilian Paper

PY1602135695 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 12 Feb 95 p A23

["Exclusive" interview with Polish President Lech Walesa by Alberto Tamer in Warsaw; no date given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Tamer] President, what led you to confirm your trip to Latin America despite the tense domestic situation in Poland?

[Walesa] We are living through a transformation of our system, a "soft revolution" as some define it, which is not exempt from the political tensions that accompany the establishment of democracy in a country. These tensions are not dramatic, however, if we consider their scope and speed. My visit to Brazil and to other South American countries has a historic dimension. I am the first Polish chief of state to visit the region. Polish foreign policy and its priorities have not changed. During my mandate as chief of state, there have been many government changes but they did not affect our foreign policy.

[Tamer] What about relations with Brazil?

[Walesa] Brazil is the largest South American country, given its economic and population potential. It plays a leading role in world politics. Latin America, and especially Brazil, attracts the attention of the world on account of its integration effort and reforms that Poland is similarly implementing. Relations between the two countries are increasingly significant. Our political relations are good, but they are not accompanied by meaningful economic cooperation. This must change, and it will. Brazil is a good trade partner, but we have a lot to offer. We are a good market for investments.

[Tamer] How did you react to Russia's opposition to Poland's joining NATO?

[Walesa] During his visit to Warsaw, President Boris Yeltsin promised that Russia would not be an obstacle to

our aspirations in NATO. He then changed his tone. I want to clearly repeat what I said at the summit of the European Cooperation and Security Organization in Budapest: It is our right to make decisions as a sovereign country. We do not want further splits in Europe, but no country must create obstacles to our aspirations. Nobody wants to isolate Russia. We see Russia as a partner and we expect to be treated as such. I still believe that Russia does not want to consider itself as inheritor of the USSR or of the Warsaw Pact and that it will stop treating NATO as the opposition. With satisfaction I respect the position of this organization, which makes decisions on its own without accepting external pressures over admitting new members. The admission of Central European countries into NATO will enhance stability. There cannot be a "gray zone" in the center of Europe. The new Russia must learn to think in a new manner, to take a new approach to new kind of problems. It cannot impose on us its idea of correlation of forces in Europe.

[Tamer] The economic situation in Poland is good, but politics continue to be confused and undefined. Do you think this harms Poland's efforts to attract foreign investments?

[Walesa] Foreign investors must feel security. I want to calm them. Nothing will happen in Poland that may harm the confidence of foreign capital or upset them. There are laws and guarantees, the economy is working. Poland will not retreat in the path it chose regarding privatization, market economy, and economic opening for whoever wants to invest here. You must remember this is an election year.

[Tamer] What charges would you raise against the leftist party made up of the Leftist Democratic Alliance [Alianza Democratica de Esquerda] and the Agrarian Party [Partido Agrario]?

[Walesa] I recall that the administration of Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak had a total majority in parliament, which was a real luxury. That should have allowed him to have an efficient administration. But he did very little. Reforms lost their pace, the government and the prime minister delayed the most important decisions. They only acted with haste in what served their party or their personal interests. We must react to signs of corruption among high-ranking officials. I not only called his attention to this fact but the majority of the coalition also criticized the government. The government proved to be incapable and incompetent regarding important national matters. The current coalition gained the confidence of the voters with the slogan "We must not continue like this." We can now observe that the leftist government did not fulfill its promises.

[Tamer] What would you do that they did not?

[Walesa] I have attempted to compensate Polish society for the great costs of the reform. Only a few have benefited from the reform. Society will only be convinced of the benefit of economic transformation when

it feels that the situation has really improved. That was what the coalition promised in the last election campaign. Almost nothing was done to the social security and health systems. In general, Poland cannot continue to wait at the yellow light. We cannot remain in the current situation, which harms our economic integration and security with the West. We cannot stand still and lose the points we conquered just because the leftist government is weak and incapable.

[Tamer] Do you think the return of the communists could represent a return to the past? To what point is the Leftist Democratic Alliance an inheritor of the old regime?

[Walesa] The triumph of the left did not surprise me. The right lost "because of its own will" and because of its internal conflict and split. The left went to the elections as a large bloc.

Beside this, society had suffered the great effects of the economic transformation with the closure of non-profitable factories, unemployment, a decline in the standard of living, and a loss of security. This was decisive in the triumph of the leftists. I want to point out that 20 percent of the Polish voters (only 50 percent of the 28 million voters went to the balloting stations) voted for the right, but their votes were dispersed and wasted. This is why we cannot say the left controls Poland. A united right would be a great force, and the formation of a rightist bloc will depend greatly on what will happen in politics. Many of those who voted for the left expressed their fear for the unknown, which comes together with the harsh rules of a market economy.

[Tamer] And what about the Democratic Left [Esquerda Democrática]?

[Walesa] Its representatives are attempting to legitimize themselves in the new reality, especially the liberal wing. They said they supported foreign policy reforms. But when they felt their parliamentary power, old feelings returned to some members of that group. The Democratic Left is not a monolithic bloc. There are sensible people within it who understand the challenge of the times and our government objective, but there are also people who in Poland we call the "reinforced concrete" of the party. They dream of returning to the old order. I want to believe that the first group will prevail. Anyway, it must be clear for everyone in Poland that there will be no retreat from democracy and the reforms. There will be no retreat from our option to favor the West for development and cooperation with many countries.

[Tamer] The latest polls show a drop in your popularity. Why?

[Walesa] I am paying the price of all the hopes and dreams the Polish people believe come with the change of system. Naively, we leaders thought that a fast and painless political change like the one that took place would bring general well-being and improvement in the

life of everyone. No one realized how difficult and costly the consequences of the reforms would be for the Polish people. After a certain time many people felt disappointed. Not everyone can be a capitalist. Very few hit it lucky. As pioneers, we made many mistakes when implementing the reforms. No one had trod this path before us. We met with unknown phenomena, which sometimes upset people. Large-scale organized crime, for example. The new times are difficult for many people. In a certain manner, I am a symbol of our great transformation. People educated in the old regime cannot believe that a chief of state cannot do something or find a solution. Some see in the president the old communist party secretary who could do everything, or at least they think he could. Some time must still go by to change this. Another reason is that as chief of state I must make difficult decisions for the country, not for just one group. I believe we made a serious mistake when we did not explain to the people what would happen after the change of regime. People often feel lost. I am not seeking popularity. The most important thing is that we must follow in the right direction.

[Tamer] You have already announced your candidacy for reelection. What will you do to get the support of your people?

[Walesa] When I accepted the great responsibility of leading the government, I set as an objective to lead Poland to democracy, to a market economy, and to total sovereignty. We have attained many objectives, but not all. I decided to stand again to prevent the reform from slowing down because we must lead Poland into the European structures, to strengthen democracy. Also to comply with my promises. This is why I am not interested in a "cosmetic" or apparent presidency.

[Tamer] I heard many criticisms that, after the democratization of Poland, a "decommunization" did not take place. It is said that former members of the communist party and of the Polish Unified Labor Party [Partido Operario Unificado Polones] continue to have great influence in parliament. Communist Party properties were not confiscated by the government, and those resources financially helped it to return to power.

[Walesa] After the change, we adopted the principle that no one would be held collectively responsible. We followed a different line from that of the Czechs and East Germans. I favored holding those who committed concrete crimes and were responsible for their actions. The last communist government created juridical regulations that allowed many members of the former *nomenklatura* and regime to ensure a good position for themselves as shareholders of many companies. The financial aspect certainly plays an important role in election campaigns.

[Tamer] The media reports that you are not very democratic and that you show some authoritarian tendencies. Do you agree?

[Walesa] A free press in a democratic country can write anything or almost anything it wants. I have dedicated

20 years of my life to fight totalitarianism. Now they are trying to make the public believe I am an antidemocrat. I have already been a leader. I headed 10 million people in Solidarity. I resigned that post to create democracy and pluralism in Poland. Please give me evidence that confirms such an accusation. There is no evidence. What is said by the media and some politicians is simply rumor. I do not take them seriously. No further comment.

Walesa, Lithuanian Head Sign Joint Declaration
LD1702121195 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1105 GMT 17 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 17 Feb—Today Polish President Lech Walesa and Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas signed a joint declaration on cooperation between both states. Brazauskas is paying a two-day official visit to Poland at Lech Walesa's invitation.

"Brotherly nations are sorting out their relations in various fields," Lech Walesa said after signing the declaration. The president added that both countries move toward the future and want to help each other, because then "others will help us," the president said. Brazauskas recalled that Lech Walesa paid an official visit to Lithuania in April of last year. He said that now relations between Poland and Lithuania have become really good.

"There are many things we have in common. We can offer each other a lot, but we are still not able to do it," Lech Walesa said.

Conservative Party Head Views Future of Right
WS1702101595 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 16 Feb 95 p 5

[Article by Aleksander Hall, leader of the Conservative Party: "What Lies Ahead for the Right in the Future?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *After the 1993 parliamentary elections that brought the left into power, I wrote in RZECZPOSPOLITA that the left will wear out and that the pendulum will swerve to the right. Currently, the rightist camp stands a great chance of winning the elections. Public opinion polls show a soaring popularity of this group, although the left retains its stronghold. Last year's local elections were a major success for the rightist self-government coalitions, confirming there does exist a huge rightist constituency in Poland. The basic objective, however, was not attained: no rightist political camp emerged which could offer a distinct alternative to the governing coalition made up of parties rooted in the People's Republic [PRL].*

Why is this so? Why is not the Polish right taking the opportunity it has been given? Reducing the problem to personal issues is an oversimplification. It is true the right lacks a distinct leader, a personality around which a natural integration process could begin. It is also true

that, unlike in the Democratic Left Alliance or in the Polish Peasant Party, some rightist leaders tend to argue most of all among themselves. Personal ambitions are truly a big obstacle on the way to the emergence of a rightist political camp. They do not, however, account for all the shortcomings. The political weakness of the right has more complex reasons.

Confusion of Ideas

The right was in the height of fashion after the downfall of the old regime in Poland in 1989. It was viewed as an antithesis for the humiliated left. Yet the specific ideas and programs associated with the right differed largely, sometimes even contradicting each other.

Some expected the right to settle accounts with the PRL nomenklatura while retaining the economic system (at least its fundamental elements) inherited from socialism. Others saw the right as bequeathed with the historical duty of modernizing Poland according to national tradition and basing the economic system on private ownership. There was also a vision that the right was to build a system offering an alternative not only to socialism, but also to the liberal democracies in the West. This confusion of ideas became clearly visible for the first time during the presidential campaign of 1990.

Although it had its defendants, the Balcerowicz program was attacked from all sides both for the slow pace of privatization and because it was launched in the first place (especially as it let foreign capital in).

The confusion of ideas has endured to this day. We have a rightist camp that focuses around a trade union, wants to strengthen that union's role in the country, and comes forth with a mass privatization project for the whole nation. There is a different right which advocates a strong state with curbed powers, looks upon corporate privileges with scorn, and harbors the deep conviction that Poland should be a democratic capitalist state. It rejects the concept of seeking a third path in retaliation for the errors of socialism and capitalism.

The Problem of Modernizing Poland—A Distinct Dividing Line

Each rightist group in search of roots appeals to tradition, national heritage, common values. This trend was particularly strong in Poland. Defense against the communist system required an affirmation of national tradition, a common vision of the church united with the nation. The downfall of communism changed that. The role of factors which had previously integrated society changed and their influence waned. Poland faced the challenge of modernization, which was indispensable to secure us a worthy position in European politics and economy. The problem of modernization continues to divide the right. One part of the rightist community sees the modernization of the country as its basic aim, claiming it should be carried out with respect for our national identity and retaining our sense of community

spirit. They do, however, recognize the need for evaluating and eliminating certain elements of our national tradition.

Quite opposite attitudes may also be seen on the right. They are characterized by a sense of endangerment and fears that modernization will lead to a loss of identity and sovereignty, that it may pave the way for secularization and egoistic attitudes. In terms of politics, this leads to defensive attitudes, wariness and even misgivings about Poland's joining NATO and the EU, support for state protectionism, adherence to Christian values in state bills and in the Constitution, and advocating a peculiar political unity with the church.

Extreme Attitudes Shape the Overall View

All huge rightist parties in Western democracies represent a wide spectrum of attitudes. There are also extremes, but very rarely do they have an influence on politics and the public party image. In Poland—at least in terms of public image—it is quite the opposite. The right is often perceived through extremist attitudes, driving away the potential rightist constituency which craves law, order, and political stability. Revolutionary rhetorics (not revolutionary action) and religious fundamentalism attract certain groups of supporters, but effectively repel the right's natural clientele: the middle class, or at least those aspiring to it.

The Problem of the Freedom Union

The existence of the Freedom Union [UW] on the Polish political scene undoubtedly makes the consolidation of a rightist camp more difficult. UW is made up of two potential political groups: social-democrat and conservative-liberal. The internal structure of the party causes that thus far the two factions have been unable to speak for themselves in a full voice, and their potential remains frozen to a considerable degree. A rightist voter, however, faces the dilemma of whether he should vote for the divided and programmatically diversified right, or

choose UW without knowing whether the cast vote will support Jan Maria Rokita or Zofia Kuratowska.

Lech Walesa's Actions

The current president is dividing the right. He is aiming at winning the support of the anticommunist constituency, at the same time trying to prevent the emergence of a rightist bloc which would be independent of the president and capable of putting forth its own presidential candidate. Thus far, Lech Walesa has not displayed any skills of constructing a political camp. He did, however, demonstrate his expertise as a player in a tactical game of "divide and rule." The current political conditions are very favorable to Walesa's attempts at winning the support of the rightist constituency. Many Poles see him as a politician who is capable of effectively counteracting parties representing the political forces of the former system.

An Attempt at a Forecast

I do not believe it is possible for one rightist bloc including everyone from Solidarity's head of the Mazowsze Region Maciej Jankowski to Janusz Korwin-Mikke to emerge. It would be a blunder because such a camp stands no chance of survival. There is, however, not only a need but an absolute necessity to form a rightist conservative-liberal camp before the upcoming elections which would strongly support the modernization of Poland. That process is a necessary precondition for releasing national vigor, and—as a consequence—laying solid foundations for the future nation and state. The year 1995 should be decisive to the forming process of that camp.

Another rightist group will probably also make an attempt to unite. That, however, is not my problem. After all, I believe that Poland's prosperous future depends on the emergence of a group which could play a role comparable to that of conservative-liberal and Christian-democrat parties in West Europe.

Communique Issued at End of Atlanta Roundtable
*AU1702082395 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in
Romanian 1800 GMT 16 Feb 95*

[Dispatch by Mircea Podina from Atlanta, Georgia]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Podina] Esteemed listeners, during a news conference held this morning here in Atlanta at the end of the meeting between representatives of the leadership of the Hungarian community in Romania and certain public leaders in our country—a meeting that was held at the Carter Center and moderated by the U.S. nongovernmental foundation Project on Ethnic Relations—the participants issued a joint communique that states the following:

The participants in the roundtable held in Atlanta by the Project on Ethnic Relations 14-15 February exchanged views on issues that interest the Hungarian minority in Romania. All the participants agreed that issues can be clarified through dialogue and that appropriate solutions must be found. The participants recommended that this dialogue continue in Romania and be extended to political parties, governmental institutions, and other authorized institutions on this issue in order to ease the path toward decisions that have to be made by Parliament or the government.

A number of problems that might constitute the subject of this dialogue have been identified: easing the political climate as regards interethnic relations; concepts regarding autonomy; the education law and the situation of education in one's mother tongue; the problem of using one's mother tongue in local administration, justice, and public, economic, and social life; bilingual inscriptions; the law on minorities; the law on religious affairs; the problem of returning church property; the law on local budgets; the case of Cseresznyes Pal; and the problem of discrimination in the economy.

The Romanian participants expressed gratitude for the interest that the Project on Ethnic Relations showed in the problems discussed at the roundtable it organized.

Likewise, the participants appreciated the hospitality that they enjoyed at the Carter Center in Atlanta, particularly the meeting [former] President Jimmy Carter had with the participants during the roundtable.

As far as the opinions of the leaders of the two groups is concerned, in a declaration made to the undersigned, Viorel Hrebenciuc, general secretary of the Romanian Government, said the following:

[Begin Hrebenciuc recording] We have concluded the two-day roundtable, and I can say that the most important thing that has been gained is the fact that we will continue this dialogue. We proposed this dialogue be held at all levels of parliamentary political sides in order to adequately clarify all the issues that have created a big furor in the press and in politics in the past one and a half months.

Given the fact that the talks were completely different from what we have been accustomed to, we suggested that this dialogue continue at home in exactly the same manner as it was held here, because it was a manner suitable for dialogue and there was no reason for verbal excesses, which did not find ground here. The sides reviewed the UDMR's [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] current claims, which the UDMR considers important—some even urgent. Certainly, these issues cannot be solved from one day to the next, and one of the points that we emphasized was the fact that patience is necessary for each issue.

The second thing that we emphasized is that these claims—some of them deliberately presented in maximal proportions—prevent us from taking even a minimal step toward solving one of these problems. And another point that we emphasized, and which I am going to keep repeating until it is solved, is that this combination of the UDMR as a political party on the one hand and an organization of the Hungarian minority on the other hand is harmful for the Hungarian minority, because we are all human and, willy-nilly, politicians first look at things from a political viewpoint and then from another angle. [end recording]

[Podina] In turn, Senator Bela Marko, president of the UDMR, made the following statement in connection with the Atlanta dialogue:

[Begin Marko recording] As I already mentioned during the news conference, I do not want to draw conclusions and I do not want to talk about results, because for two days discussions were held on certain issues. However, the most important conclusion is that the dialogue must continue, and we will set up an appropriate framework for this to continue at home in order to solve these problems. If this process of finding solutions to our problems does take place, then we will be able to declare that this roundtable achieved its purpose. [end recording]

[Podina] In conclusion, I would like to add that the Romanian participants will leave Atlanta this afternoon and will arrive in Romania on the night of 17 February.

Coposu on Nonparticipation in Atlanta Conference

*AU1702092195 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian
14 Feb 95 p 2*

[Interview with PNTCD president Corneliu Coposu by Oana Iurascu; place and date not given: "Corneliu Coposu Has Forbidden the PNTCD Leaders 'To Humiliate Themselves in Atlanta'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Senator Radu Vasile, the spokesman of the PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party], stated yesterday that his nonattendance at the roundtable conference dedicated to interethnic relations in Romania (to be held 14-15 February at the Carter Center in Atlanta) is an issue pertaining to the PNTCD policy as decided upon by party leader Corneliu Coposu. That is why we asked the*

PNTCD president to explain this issue further, and to refer to other recent political events that might have consequences for the PNTCD—such as the recent statement of [Emil Constantinescu,] the president of the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania] calling for the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] to observe fully the letter of the Constitution; or the declared intent of the PSDR [Romanian Social-Democratic Party]-PD [Democratic Party] axis to set up a "great coalition" of the opposition, exempting only the non-party associations and organizations of the CDR.

[Iurascu] Why is the PNTCD not represented at the seminar on interethnic relations in Atlanta?

[Coposu] I assume all responsibility for that decision. The reasons are manifold. In my opinion, it is humiliating that the Romanians should ask for mediation within a roundtable conference abroad, as the issue is a domestic one, pertaining exclusively to the Romanian state. Besides, the mediator, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, has been busy lately with mediating armed conflicts. Everyone will believe that we are beating each other to a pulp here, at home. I recommended to Viorel Hrebenciuc [government secretary in charge of ethnic minority issues] to give up the idea. I told him: If you must have a roundtable conference at all costs on UDMR issues, you should organize it in this country, invite political leaders including the Hungarians in Budapest, and let's work out a *modus vivendi*.

Under such circumstances I have forbidden the leaders of our party to attend the Atlanta roundtable conference.

[Iurascu] Lately the PNTCD, contrary to its partners in the CDR, has not issued any official stance to amend the recent UDMR actions. Why?

[Coposu] As far as the ethnic minority issue is concerned the PNTCD position has remained unchanged since 1918. The our party's program stipulates the recognition of the ethnic minority's full equality in rights with the majority population. We do not accept either negative or positive discrimination. The things claimed lately by the UDMR are unacceptable. Their pretext with the "ethnic autonomy" is a piece of stupidity. We support administrative decentralization, which is a principle covering all the objective claims of the citizens. We agree with the right of ethnic Hungarians to use their own language and cultivate their folklore and culture, but we do not agree with their being granted additional prerogatives. This is why it would be needless for us to issue communiques every time the UDMR sneezes. That would be ridiculous. They are making too much fuss about a 1.5-million-person ethnic minority. Should the remaining 22 million be involved in a perpetual war of communiques?

[Iurascu] Was the PNTCD equally represented, similarly to its CDR partners, in the working out of the declaration issued by CDR President Emil Constantinescu [reprimanding the UDMR]?

[Coposu] The declaration belongs to Constantinescu, as it bears his signature. The other factors within the convention had not been consulted. However, personally I was consulted just before the declaration was published. Mr. Constantinescu consults me every time he wants to "go public."

[Iurascu] What is your assessment of the "great coalition" variant of the opposition, which would merely exclude the civic associations within the CDR, as envisaged by the PSDR and the PD?

[Coposu] That has already been tried once by the PAC [Civic Alliance Party]. People are trying to agitate the names of certain persons or political parties. Nevertheless, the strength of political parties lies in their way of organization and deeds. In order to avoid having to go to the battlefield with their own weight alone, some try to invoke principles. The proposal you mentioned avoids displaying the political force behind it. It may be discussed, though. I agree with the idea of an opposition coalition, but I believe that the nonparty organizations within the CDR, which have a special importance there and which support our political parties, should also participate in an active way and should be consulted any time political actions are planned. The CDR works on the basis of norms accepted long ago and intends to continue doing so. Those who are dissatisfied should feel free to withdraw from the CDR. It would not bother us in the least.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Visits Bucharest

BK1602154995 Jakarta Radio Republik Indonesia Network in Indonesian 1200 GMT 16 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Indonesia and Romania have agreed to sign an agreement on the avoidance of double taxation and to promote investments in both countries. The two countries also agreed to enhance ties in the political, economic, cultural, and scientific spheres. This agreement was reached at a meeting between Foreign Minister Ali Alatas and his Romanian counterpart Teodor Melescanu in Bucharest last night. During the meeting, the two ministers also stressed the importance of cooperation in economic areas, investments, and direct contacts between the businessmen of the two countries.

During his visit to Romania, Minister Alatas also met with Romanian Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu, who announced Romanian President Ion Iliescu's plan to visit Indonesia in May for talks with President Suharto.

Greek Minister Discusses Cooperation, NATO

NC1602193795 Athens Elliniki Radhiofonia Radio Network in Greek 1800 GMT 16 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Arriving in Bucharest today on a three-day visit, Defense Minister Yerasimos Arsenis said that in its capacity as a member of the EU, NATO, and the Western European Union, Greece will help Romania

to join the European Community. Arsenis also referred to historical ties of friendship, stressing that this friendship could help the Balkans become a peaceful region.

Arsenis and his Romanian counterpart, Gheorghe Tinca, held talks regarding bilateral cooperation on defense industry issues. The Greek defense minister supported Romania's accession to NATO, stressing that NATO's expansion to the East holds no danger for Russia.

Iliescu Speech on EU Integration Strategy

AU1702082495 Bucharest DIMINEATA (supplement) in Romanian 14 Feb 95 pp 4, 8

[Speech by President Ion Iliescu at a meeting with leaders of parliamentary political parties and parliamentary groups at Cotroceni Palace in Bucharest on 8 February: "The National Strategy for Integration in European and Euro-Atlantic Structures Is the Very Strategy of the Romanian Reform and of Our Economic Development"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The purpose of this meeting is to have an exchange of views. This is an informative and consultative talk about the strategy we must work out for our integration into Europe. All the materials relevant in this respect have been presented here, including the document adopted in Essen, which is the foundation and guiding framework for all associated countries on the basis of which they must work out their own documents and national strategies. The problems of economic integration into the European Union are at the center of this process of integration, which presupposes a number of requirements that were outlined generally in the strategy model adopted in Essen.

Now, proceeding from the specific circumstances prevailing in the country in question, each country must separately work out its own document—which will lay the basis for bilateral talks to be held between the respective country and other associated states. This process will begin in the second part of the year—that is, after June. Until then, we must finish drafting this document. Of course, this is a task for the governmental institutions. We presented here a first blueprint discussed by the government on starting this process of drafting the document in the government and the relevant ministries. There is also an interministerial committee that will conduct a dialogue with Parliament on this matter.

I received the text of a statement from Parliament on the subject of integration that looks like a political document expressing the consensus of all political forces and the entire parliament on this strategy of integration, including the Parliament's decision to set up a permanent commission on integration that will be the main means of dialogue among the parties and between Parliament and government. However, I believe that, beyond the elaboration of this strategy, the main support for the national strategy on integration should actually

be provided by the national strategy for economic development, which in our case means the strategy of continuing the economic reform in all its major strategic components and directions. As a matter of fact, as it is emphasized in the Essen strategy, each national document and strategy must contain an industrial policy and an agricultural policy, as well as policies for infrastructure, social sectors, and all other sectors: culture, science, education, cadre training, management, and so forth—up to cooperation guidelines for the legal sphere and the ministries of interior and correlation guidelines for foreign and security policies.

Therefore, the national strategy on integration must proceed from an overall concept and a national strategy of internal reforms, on the one hand; and from coupling these with the overall European process and our integration into the ensemble of the European economy and the EC. Therefore, it seems to me that we should concurrently launch another process—hence my desire to consult with you in this respect—to work out a national strategy for the longer term.

We have a consultative council for strategy matters that, for the time being, has only held discussions per branches and several problems. [as published] It has made an in-depth study of the Romanian economy today, five years after the December 1989 revolution, and noted the shifts that have occurred in the meantime. Such an analysis was first made in 1990 by a body of experts who worked out the blueprint of our transition to the market economy. They also made a study of the Romanian economy at that time and of the economic causes of the explosion that led to the December 1989 revolution in Romania. What the body in charge of working out our new strategy is striving to do now is to continue that analysis in a new context, five years later. Their endeavors should result in an outline of our future development guidelines. I believe we should speed up this process so as to give substance to the document with which we are going to present ourselves at the negotiations with the EU.

Therefore, I would say that the 1990 experience was interesting because we concentrated all our research power on the economy, various economic branches, management, social problems, and so forth. Aside from that, it was also a school for dialogue among people with various orientations. Today, many of those people who worked on that blueprint then are experts in various parties. I believe that the drafting of this strategy is not a party matter or a subject for political dispute. Therefore, I did not invite you here today to a discussion on the problems of government, politics, or topical political confrontations but rather to an exchange of views on such a platform of cooperation. Because governments come and go. Those who are in opposition today will be in power tomorrow and so forth. All kinds of governmental formulas can succeed each other. But drafting such a strategy is a longer-term matter and I believe we should start tackling such vital problems of Romanian

society with the participation of all those who can make a contribution to working out the strategy of the development of Romanian society.

We have enough examples. We are now talking about integration in the European Community, the EU. All EU member-states have gone through similar processes after the war and, if we take the example of Germany here, which is probably the most typical one—all kinds of governments succeeded one another: Christian Democratic, Social Democratic, combinations of the two, or combinations of each one of them with the Free Democratic Party—we can see that a national strategy and platform were followed by all the governments that succeeded one another after the war. Their strategic goal was the social market economy, as the Germans called it, which has also become a reference point for many economies and economic policies in the European countries.

Therefore, I believe it is high time we, too, think along these lines and I would suggest—of course, we are not going to discuss this here, today—that we set up a first nucleus in the coming days, on the basis of the one that has already been working until now on such projects, a coordinating core of people with the task of working out this blueprint, parallel to the activity of the extant ministerial and parliamentary group.

This project should then be expanded and substantiated on the basis of the document that our representatives will submit to the EU, setting out from the problems of the long-term development of the Romanian economy—which can actually be divided into two time periods: A first perspective, until the year 2000, which is the preparatory period for our joining the EU. This is also a period of transition, meaning of continuation and adjustment of our economic reform in all spheres and of making all the necessary preparations in accordance with the White Paper for integration into the EU domestic market. Therefore, we are talking here about all the elements that will make the Romanian economy compatible with the EU economy.

However, they should also take into consideration the longer perspective, up to the year 2020. This is a span of time visualized by many countries in their national researches and programs, which also takes into consideration the experience and logic of world economic development. We are talking here about long—some 25 years long—cycles of world economy ebbs and flows.

According to all the data and conclusions reached by economists examining the world economy, the decline of the world economy that began in the early seventies has ended, as has the oil crisis that triggered it all. The first positive signals of the recovery of the U.S. and European economies were noted last year and this year. According to all estimations, we are entering a long favorable cycle that will continue until the year 2020, including for drafting our programs and national strategy. Therefore, in this respect, we can think in terms of drafting such a

strategy, but this will obviously be a matter for the experts tackling this issue. In this connection, I suggest that you should pronounce yourselves on the ideas and recommendations made here, including on the proposal to set up the group that is going to draft the long-term strategy of Romanian economic development. I call upon all the parties to make suggestions on the composition of this group, whose first mission is to present a first blueprint in the next three months, which can also help to finalize the materials required by the EU.

Iliescu: Hungarian Demands Risk Splitting Nation

AU1702112795 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 17 Feb 95 p 7

[Interview with Romanian President Ion Iliescu by Michael Thumann; place and date not given: "The West Is Very Miserly"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Thumann] Mr. President, rapid reforms are one of the prerequisites for admission to the EU [European Union], but Romania is behind other countries with privatization. Why?

[Iliescu] This opinion is a very relative one. We have not experienced any gradual reconstruction such as the other former socialist countries have. We had a violent revolution. Even so, in the sphere of social and legal reforms and in the implementation of human rights, we have achieved more than the others.

[Thumann] And in the economy?

[Iliescu] In privatization we are not as far behind as you think. For example, in agriculture, 80 percent of the land is in private hands. Small and medium-sized enterprises in the spheres of trade, tourism, and services have also been denationalized. The shopping streets of our cities illustrate this fact in an impressive manner. As for the large enterprises, we passed a privatization law as far back as 1991. Our main problem is capital, which can only come from the private sector and is still insufficient.

[Thumann] Is foreign capital lacking?

[Iliescu] For years we have tried to obtain credits. After tough talks with the Group of 24, we received about half the amount we asked for. The creditors have been behaving in a very miserly fashion.

[Thumann] Other countries have similar problems.

[Iliescu] It is difficult to compare us with Poland or Hungary because the reforms were commenced punctually by the communist parties in those countries. We have had to catch up since 1990. But there is no question of the kind of credits that Poland and Hungary have received. However, this has advantages now—because, unlike us, these two countries now have giant debts.

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[Thumann] Why is your Party of Social Democracy of Romania coalescing and cooperating with extremist parties?

[Iliescu] After the 1992 elections, I suggested to all the parties that in view of the great difficulties we should form a broad government of national unity, but the opposition parties refused. Unfortunately, they are continuing this blockade with their votes against the reforms. The extremist parties have supported us in this sphere. To this extent, the term "extremist" is a relative one. One cannot judge these politicians by their words, but by their deeds.

[Thumann] But their rabble-rousing slogans against the Hungarian minority in Romania are preventing the country's integration with the West.

[Iliescu] Yes, that is a burden. Not even I condemned the words of Cluj mayor Funar, but Funar has resurfaced

because Hungarian politicians are demanding ethnic-territorial autonomy, which could lead to a split of Romania. [as published]

[Thumann] But Funar's party was on the scene long before the Hungarians' autonomy program.

[Iliescu] The Romania National Unity Party arose as a result of the doings of Hungarian extremists. At that time, the Hungarians were attempting to close down mixed schools. Bloody conflicts were the result.

[Thumann] When will a law on the protection of minorities, permitting greater autonomy, finally be passed?

[Iliescu] Local autonomy is enshrined in the Constitution, and was implemented by means of the local government elections. However, there can be no ethnic autonomy. The Hungarians have schools at all levels right up to a university, as well as newspapers and theaters, just like other minorities in Romania. Romania respects their cultural identity like no other European country.

Ganic, Zubak Discuss Current Situation*LD1602182995 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 16 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Kreimir Zubak and Ejup Ganic, respectively president and vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, had talks in Mostar this afternoon. In a statement to journalists the leaders of the Federation said they discussed the current political situation in the area of the Federation, the work of the combined armed forces' chiefs, and some economic questions. Let us now hear what Kresimir Zubak and Ejup Ganic said, among other things.

[Begin recording] [Zubak] Mr. Ganic and I together assessed—and these assessments are also those of corresponding factors in the international community—that we, in our direct engagement here in the area of Mostar and in some other areas where recently or rather over the past few days there have been certain problems [changes thought], so that we might, by acting together, make a contribution toward resolving these problems in order to improve the situation [sentence as heard]. To put it in more concrete terms, Mr. Koschnick has already stressed—he has done this on many occasions and he did so, too, at yesterday's talks with President Tudjman—that thanks to the involvement of Mr. Ganic and myself, the situation in the Mostar area has improved significantly after those incidents which are now widely known, and the situation in the Usora area has also improved. Mr. Ganic has been to the Brcko area, and the problems are fewer in the Brcko area.

Mr. Ganic got involved in order to resolve incidents in the Tuzla area, or, more specifically, in the village of Slavinovici.

We have assessed that in the future we should act together more often in order to—above all—resolve such incidents, that is, to remove causes of these incidents.

We have assessed that in the future, when we act together, we must make thorough preparations, so that after we reach agreements in conjunction with local leaders these problems will not arise again.

[Ganic] The Belgrade regime, which is leading all Serbs, has an agenda for the next five centuries: expansion and expansion. This agenda can be countered by a joint Bosniak-Croat action, which is the only way to create a balance and to bring about permanent peace and prosperity in the Balkans. I think that I will urge this. [end recording]

Presidency Divided Over Role of Religion*AU1702081895 Sarajevo BOSNJACKI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 8 Feb 95 p 3*

[Interview with Nijaz Durakovic, a member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and leader of the opposition Socialist Democratic Party, by Ada Campara;

place and date not given: "We Did Not Intend To Form Any Political Alliances nor Are We Struggling for Power"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We asked Nijaz Durakovic, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and one of the signatories of the statement issued by the five Presidency members regarding the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, about the real motives of the statement, since it has caused a lot of media attention and also different and often malicious commentaries.

[Campara] Why did the Presidency members question this particular institution, which functions and is recognized by the entire world?

[Durakovic] Our statement has been interpreted by some as a definite breach in the Presidency and the power struggle. Others have interpreted it as an attack against the freedom of religion and its place in the Army. Some have seen it as communist blasphemy and a protest of militant atheists and so forth. In my opinion, only the malicious could possibly interpret it as an attack against the freedom of religion and its place in the Army. The fact of the matter is that three signatories are true believers, while even in the former system, all five signatories proved themselves as main supporters of the changes in the communist attitude toward religion and believers.

[Campara] What is your personal attitude?

Against the Misuse of Religion

[Durakovic] Even at the time of the League of Communists and the monolith party, I initiated the adoption of the platform by which any sectarian attitude toward religion and believers was forbidden and by which the believers were finally made equal members of the League of Communists.

[Campara] What is your goal, and why did you decide to publicly announce it?

[Durakovic] Our warning refers exclusively to the misuse of religion and its manipulation for political purposes. We wanted to warn against the statements saying that only those who profess Islam can be true fighters for the liberation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are against the practice that the reviews of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army troops are carried out without the presence of the state symbols and the flag and exclusively with religious and partisan symbols. We do not think it is good that, for instance, clergymen submit reports, that religious rites are uniformly prescribed, that classes of religion and religious propaganda are unselectively introduced.

[Campara] Religion considerably contributes to the soldiers' morale in this war.

[Durakovic] It should be publicly emphasized that we do not negate its constructive contribution to the strengthening of combat morale and patriotism. We are aware that the Islamic community has been most affected by

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this war and that its many temples and much of the heritage of the Islamic culture has been destroyed, not to mention the thousands of fallen soldiers, the greatest heroes of Bosnia. We are only warning against the trend of exclusiveness, or as the statement says, the ideologization and negative instrumentalization of religion. We are convinced that such a trend mostly harms religion and the believers, particularly our Army and the state.

Power Struggle?

[Campara] The Croatian press has published and the chetnik television has reported on your statement as an attempt to bring [Prime Minister] Silajdzic to power in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Durakovic] I can resolutely refute such assertions and identify them as sheer political speculation. After all, Silajdzic is not supposed to be brought to power because he is already in power as the prime minister. We did not intend to form political alliances with anyone, nor are we struggling for power! Our primary aim was to warn against some negative tendencies, to express support for the principled implementation of what has already been approved and politically endorsed. For instance, we pointed out that the Army that defends and will protect Bosnia-Herzegovina in the future must be secular and multinational, free of the influence of parties and their competition. This is only a paraphrase of the basic constitutional principles and platform guidelines of the Presidency, and no one has the right to arbitrarily change or interpret the Constitution. President Alija Izetbegovic in his address pointed to the Army units and said that at this historic moment, when the battle for survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina is being fought, there is no place for partisan competition, and that today there actually exist only two parties—the one that supports Bosnia-Herzegovina and the other one that is against it. We consider this to be the right approach to which we give our full support.

[Campara] Then why did the five of you react so recklessly, as many people believe?

[Durakovic] Unfortunately, in practice everything has reduced itself to the predominance of only one party (the Party of Democratic Action [SDA]). The commanding staff in the Army, from the General Staff to the commanders of corps and even brigades, are as a rule members of the SDA or even the SDA leadership. The principle of moral-political suitability is being introduced gradually in the Army, while the soldiers who belong to other parties or those who are politically indifferent are frequently discriminated against or exposed to various pressures. We are convinced that all this (which can be proven by thousands of examples) not only indicates the establishment of a one-party state, but also seriously weakens our defense ability and the very combat potential of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Therefore, we proposed that the old law on the prohibition of partisan organization in the Army, the police, judicial and administrative bodies be reactivated (or, if

necessary, that a new one be adopted). This is the basic principle of democratic societies and multiparty systems.

[Campara] However, your joint statement has been understood as a breach in the Presidency.

[Durakovic] Of course, many would be very happy to see a breach in the Presidency. Because the Presidency, objectively, is a synonym and bastion of the sovereign, integral, and internationally recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina. All those who do not want such a Bosnia-Herzegovina want to eliminate the Presidency or place it on the margin of political events and state policy. I am convinced that this is reckoning without the host, and no matter how different our individual attitudes are regarding the current problems and political events, there is full political unity in the Presidency regarding all major issues that have to do with the country's destiny, its political system, conditions and ways of establishing peace, support for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and our liberation war, the support for Bosnia-Herzegovina as a civil, legal, and secular state, and so forth.

As for other issues, in view of our different partisan and ideological stances, it is normal that there exist differences, and regardless of all the pressures, ignorance, and sometimes even primitive reactions, I see them as the development of democracy. We are not a body where, as is the case with those who are denouncing us and who would like to see the Presidency come apart, there is a uniformity of opinions, where decisions are made by one person, by the undisputable will of the leader, and where those decisions are carried out unquestioningly.

Differences Still Exist

[Campara] Nevertheless, as you yourself say, the statement has revealed some differences.

[Durakovic] Despite all the differences, our subjective weaknesses, obvious shortcomings in the method of work, the tendencies that decisions are made by a limited circle of people or that power is concentrated exclusively in the hands of the president, we still remain a democratic and collective body that is jointly struggling for the liberation of the country and, in the first place, preforms the duty of the supreme commander of the Army.

[Campara] Many people are likely to consider the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an obstacle to the establishment of the announced confederation, as well as to winning over the Serbs to sign a peace agreement.

[Durakovic] First, it should be made clear once and for all that the Federation of the Bosniaks and the Croats and the announced confederation between the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia are two completely different things. According to the definition, confederation is a relationship based on a contract between two sovereign and internationally recognized states. In this case, two states determine the way of

establishing the confederation, and whether by a general referendum or by a decision made by the two assemblies, it is all the same.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation is an internal matter of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it is not closed for the Serbian side so that all three peoples will be able to build their future on the basis of absolute equality and through a federal system that includes all of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Of course, this is only a project for the time being, and the Constitution offers this possibility to those Serbian people who want Bosnia-Herzegovina and feel that it is their own internationally recognized state. A particular issue is the question of a confederation between the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia. There exists absolutely no analogy with the possible confederation with Croatia, because the latter has to do with the confederation between two internationally recognized states. No one has recognized the Serbian republic, and from a legal point of view, it is not a relevant entity at all, while from an international law point of view, it is a phantom state, not to mention it being a criminal state founded on genocide, violent usurpation, and atrocities of unprecedented proportions.

Because of that attitude, both sides are trying to present the Presidency in a different light.

[Campara] Do you think that in peace time, it is the Presidency that should be elected or rather the president?

[Durakovic] The question of whether to elect the president or the Presidency should be left to democratic procedures in peacetime, while now, under war conditions, we have a status quo!

Mostar Mayor Discusses Washington Agreement

95BA0140A Split FERAL TRIBUNE in Serbo-Croatian
30 Jan 95 pp 14-15

[Interview with Safet Orucevic, mayor of eastern Mostar, by Vjeran Grkovic; place and date not given: "The Terror Continues"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently, there was supposed to be a chess tournament in Mostar, based on an optimistic project by the European staff. In a building on the border, which the Croat side calls the Hotel Ero but the Muslim side continues to call the Pensioners Center, chess players from both sides were supposed to meet, as organized by the Koschnick team. The Croats proposed this: The two sides play against each other. The Muslims proposed this: We play an open tournament for the Mostar championship. In the end, this is what happened: The Herceg-Bosna police refused to allow the chess players from the eastern side into the Ero and the European Union police did not agree with that move. Punches were traded on both sides. Unofficially, Europe and its sissy policemen got the worst of it, and chess was postponed to some other, more peaceful time. Thus, administrator Hans Koschnick was unable to organize a

tournament even in a sport that is completely unconnected to violence, which is the embodiment of reason and pacifism. Perhaps that is why reason has long since abandoned Mostar?

Mostar today is not very different from Mostar in the summer, or even in the spring of last year. In the western, Croat part, business continues to flourish, people drive flashy cars, and the cafes are European-looking and full all day long. Anything that a person desires can be bought. The eastern part is still just as much in ruins, there is still no electricity and water, and food is still obtained from parked trucks....

We asked Safet Orucevic, the mayor of eastern Mostar, whether he will resign because of this.

[Orucevic] Well, in that case all three mayors would have to resign—the European Union administrator and the two mayors of the western and eastern parts of the city, which were created after the fighting between the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO [Croat Defense Council]. The electricity and water are exclusively a political problem, completely unconnected to technology. Everything has long since been done to allow the flow of electricity, but both electricity and water continue to be manipulated as a political obstacle to uniting the city. Every city in the world, no matter how it is set up, has a unified infrastructure, and that is the basic element of an administration. The Croat side does not agree with that, and instead continues to abide by a Berlin Wall between these two parts of the city. This was the reason for the fighting between the two armed forces in the first place, and since the cease-fire we have attempted to resolve everything through political means. The Croats must recognize that other nations and other religions have lived in this region and in this city for hundreds of years and that someone cannot wipe that out through ethnic cleansing and camps.

Granic's Partition

[Grkovic] Does what you say mean that Croat or Herceg-Bosna political leaders simply do not want the Muslim part of the city to get electricity and water?

[Orucevic] Mr. Koschnick has done a great deal since he arrived, and the easiest thing to criticize him about is electricity and water. That is why someone has gone to great lengths to see to it that even the elements for which all preconditions are in place and for which he promised to assume responsibility are not realized. The European Union has invested enormous resources, but the electricity cannot flow simply because for months we have been waiting for two square meters around one electrical pole to be cleared of mines. The Croat side is devising banal obstacles to obstruct the work of the European administration and has insisted on the impossibility of the two nations living in this territory.

[Grkovic] You say that someone is preventing the eastern part of the city from being supplied with electricity and water. Who is that someone?

[Orulevic] That is being done by the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] of Mostar Opstina, which favors two Mostars. It is unquestionably being done by the official Croat polity, because recently even Mr. Granic said that the solution for Mostar lies in two opstinas within one city, and thus a division of the city. In principle, we have nothing against new opstinas, but the question is according to what criteria that is to be done. There must be criteria, but uniform ones that would apply equally to Mostar and to Neum, for example. Why couldn't Bosniaks have their own opstina in Neum? How can Croat and Bosniak opstinas be set up in Mostar when we expect that people will return to their homes from both sides, which means that the people will be mixed on both sides? Insisting on two opstinas at the start is an attempt to freeze a situation created by violence and aggression.

[Grkovic] In your opinion, the Croat polity in Mostar is stubbornly refusing to implement what was signed on to in the Washington agreements. Why?

[Orulevic] You see, there are two factions in the Croat polity. One is for the Federation and for settling relations between the Croats and Bosniaks, while the other is for war and for drawing ethnic lines with the Serbs, a partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The latter is the faction that created Herceg-Bosna. Those same people continue to lead the official polity. It is clear that the same people cannot create Herceg-Bosna through war, camps, and ethnic cleansing and at the same time be standard-bearers of the peace process. I am saying all this regarding Mostar. Naturally, the next question is what about certain other cities where the situation is reversed. The leadership of both nations must condemn all those who are war criminals against the civilian population. Because no matter how the war turns out, if these people emerge as victors they will be a misfortune to any state. Woe be it to the state in which they remain the victors.

[Grkovic] Are there crimes being committed even today?

[Orulevic] It is a fact that the terror has not ended on the western side. Since the signing of the Washington agreements there have been 17 murders in western Mostar; recently two elderly women were murdered, and every month 10 to 15 families are evicted from their homes and apartments. All of this has happened since Koschnick's decree prohibiting evictions. These things continue to be done by the same political mafia, which is steeped in crime. We do have the names of the people who are doing this, organized gangs who are carrying out the wishes of certain Croat politicians.

Political Gangs

[Grkovic] Croat politicians? Which ones?

[Orulevic] I will tell that to President Dr. Tudjman. We have all been invited to Zagreb on 14 February and we will go to the president of Croatia. Naturally, I will go with one wish: to convince him that Mostar must be set

up in a way that allows coexistence between the Croat and Muslim nations, without ghettos and Berlin Walls.

[Grkovic] Do you think that Mr. Tudjman can be convinced of that?

[Orulevic] I think so. I simply do not know to what extent he will be able to convince others. In my humble opinion, Mostar is Tudjman's "to be or not to be." All the countries of the European Union know that Croatia is to blame for the process in Mostar. If Koschnick has to leave Mostar, he will also say so publicly. It will be hard for Germany to support Croatia after that. The Croat side must repudiate those who were in a position to make an attempt on Koschnick's life, those who have killed 17 people since the cease-fire, those who are robbing European Union officials and stealing their cars, those who are continuing quiet ethnic cleansing.

[Grkovic] You are talking as if there is no trace of crime on the eastern side!?

[Orulevic] There has not been a single murder on the eastern side since the signing of the cease-fire. There is crime, but it is typical petty crime with no political overtones. We are trying to impose order, and I think that we have also succeeded in that.

[Grkovic] Is it true that on the eastern, Muslim side there are eight Croats living among 50,000 Muslims?

[Orulevic] There are 80 Croat families living in eastern Mostar. We have also preserved the Catholic Church. We preserved it during the heaviest fighting so that no one would bomb it, so that nothing would happen to it. Tomorrow a high-ranking papal delegation is arriving with Bishop Peric to bring the church back to life, so that Croats can begin returning to this side. I have proposed to the mayor of western Mostar, Mr. Brajkovic, that our side be the one to take the first steps, including in the return of refugees. There are few Croats on this side because the majority of them moved out, but before the fighting, knowing what would happen, knowing that the HVO would attack. The Croats withdrew out of fear. Their return will be easier because they were not forced out and did not experience misfortune. They did not endure torture. It will not be easy for citizens from the eastern side who experienced the camps in Ljubuski, Dretelj, Citluk, Capljina, and at the Helidrome to return to the western side.

Visit as Illusion

[Grkovic] A good part of eastern Mostar is supplied by the Neretva valley, which is under HVO control. Are deliveries being made unimpeded?

[Orulevic] Herceg-Bosna is very much aggravating our supply situation through its regulations, customs services, and checkpoints. Herceg-Bosna has set up a legal buffer zone between Croatia and the parts under the control of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a buffer zone whose purpose is the complete financial exploitation of all

goods headed for eastern Mostar and Bosnia. Through duty, taxes, seizures of goods; regulations are enacted stipulating that a certain percentage must be set aside automatically, i.e., is confiscated in kind. This is based on the principles of Mate Boban's politics. To close off Bosnia and completely exploit it at several roads and barricades, and to preserve one's own political option.

[Grkovic] Did the visit to Mostar by Prime Minister Valentic and Ministers Granic and Susak and their talks with Koschnick change anything for the better?

[Orulevic] Koschnick asked for help, but did not find any even in the visit by high-ranking Croatian officials. That visit was given the sort of media spin that the Croat side needed at that time, but nothing actually changed. They refused to sign an agreement on a joint police force, because of which the European Union protested to the European Parliament, the company known as Dalekovodi, which was supposed to finish the electrical system, has left; the approaches to the joint water supply system have not been cleared of mines; and once again Koschnick has encountered a complete blockade.

[Grkovic] The atmosphere in both parts of the city smells of fighting?

[Orulevic] Well, right now we are treading the line between war and peace. If the current Croat polity is not aware of that and decides in favor of war, that will not end well. If the Croat side starts a war today, it will be a total conflict, which no one will be able to pacify.

Commentary Views 'Motives' of Juppe Proposal

AU1602163595 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (Europe edition) in Serbo-Croatian 16-Feb 95 p 1

[Commentary by Emir Habul: "Invitation to a Rendez-vous"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The European Union [EU] has accepted French Foreign Minister Juppe's proposal for a tripartite, Tudjman-Izetbegovic-Milosevic conference. Before assessing the motives, essence, and aims of the new proposal, we need to answer one question: What is new in the international community's position in connection to Bosnia?

The answer to this question cannot be positive. In order for the said initiative to have a realistic basis, it would have to be preceded by progress in the search for a political solution in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But no progress has been made.

When it comes to Bosnia, the international community remains confused. The UN Security Council has hitherto passed no less than 60 resolutions on Bosnia, yet very little has actually been implemented; the conclusions of the London Conference remained a dead letter; the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and plans drawn up by Cutilheiro through Owen and Stoltenberg did not

yield results; the Contact Group peace plan is experiencing the fate of earlier plans because Pale has rejected it, and the superpowers are not ready to address a serious threat regarding its implementation.

The speed with which the EU Council of Ministers embraced Juppe's initiative shows that Europe is in a hurry to avoid an unpleasant question: What happened to the present plan? Now an old political recipe is being applied: If you wish to avoid solving the old problem, you convene a new conference!

Now Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Belgrade are expected to reply to the latest initiative. Sarajevo's answer—that is, Izetbegovic's—is known. The condition is the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Belgrade. As for Slobodan Milosevic, there are not indications that the Serbian leader is ready to take this step. By recognizing Bosnia he would be burying the plan of creating "Greater Serbia," which he still hopes to achieve. True, in somewhat reduced borders, Milosevic is still not ready for this step. He is ready for a tripartite meeting at the top, which would not oblige him to do anything.

The EU ministers' declaration has been craftily worded. The significance of mutual recognition is only declaratively stressed. The European ministers are not asking for the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a prerequisite for the tripartite meeting, the binding elements are listed informally: "Peace, the Contact Group plan, and the principle of the territorial integrity of each country."

There can be no serious peace dialogue with Milosevic without the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Without that, the EU initiative for a tripartite conference simply represents an invitation to a rendezvous, which does not bind anyone.

Bihac Food Situation Serious, Not 'Disastrous'

AU1702110995 Paris AFP in English 1025 GMT 17 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 17 (AFP)—Food shortages in Bihac are serious, but no one has yet starved to death in the northwest Bosnian pocket and reports of a famine there are inaccurate, a UN military spokesman said here Friday [17 February].

Major Herve Gourmelon, of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), said the situation in the UN-patrolled enclave was "not as dramatic or desperate" as some reports had suggested, adding that "one can speak of malnutrition but not of famine" there. His comments, based on "serious" information from UN peacekeepers, came a day after the Geneva-based office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said the pocket's population—estimated at around 200,000—remained on the verge of a disastrous famine.

And in Rome Thursday, the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN organization in charge of food distribution, warned that 10 to 20 percent of the enclave's

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population risked starvation. Since mid-December, Croatian and Bosnian Serb troops and forces loyal to dissident Moslem warlord Fikret Abdic besieging Bihac have only allowed two food convoys a week into the pocket. That figure was doubled on Tuesday.

Gourmelon said the four-month Bosnia-wide ceasefire between Bosnian Serb and government forces that came into effect on January 1 had been repeatedly violated in Bihac, and life was difficult for the enclave's most vulnerable inhabitants. But "when things become critical the (secessionist) Serbs let an (aid) convoy through," he said.

A 96-tonne [metric tons] UNHCR convoy was discharged Thursday in Cazin in the south of the enclave, while Bangladeshi peacekeepers in the enclave distributed an additional 15 tonnes of food, he said. Another UNHCR transport was due in the pocket Friday.

The military situation was calm around Bihac town Friday morning and front lines were unaltered, Gourmelon said. Bosanska Krupa on the eastern edge of the enclave was also relatively calm, but artillery exchanges continued around Abdic's stronghold of Velika Kladusa, in the north of the pocket, with 347 detonations registered in the last 24 hours, including 120 Friday morning.

Meanwhile in Sarajevo three Bosnian soldiers were slightly injured Thursday by light arms fire near front lines, Gourmelon added. UN forces also said Bosnian forces were shaping to retake some sectors of Vijenac, in the south of the Mount Igman demilitarised zone above the city evacuated by the warring parties under a UN-brokered agreement.

UN military observers reported that Bosnian Serb forces had taken a 20 mm anti-aircraft gun mounted on a vehicle from a UN-monitored weapons collection point in the Serb-held Sarajevo district of Grbavica.

Separately, Bosnian Serb forces said a Bosnian helicopter landed Thursday with a million [German] marks (\$660,000) in the eastern enclave of Gorazde—in violation of a UN no-fly zone covering all of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Local Bosnian commanders had called on UNPROFOR to help them to recover 150,000 marks (\$100,000) that went missing during the transfer, Gourmelon said. There were no further details.

Serbs Reportedly Massing Arms Around Bihac

AU1702110695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 17 Feb 95

[Report by Muhamed Mulic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Text] The western regions of the Bosnian Krajina are somewhat calmer today than in recent days when fierce aggressor tank and artillery attacks alternated with infantry attacks. The joint aggressor's sporadic sniper and anti-aircraft machine gun provocations have been reported around the Bihac safe

haven, accompanied by the occasional mortar fired at the 5th Corps and HVO [Croatian Defense Council] defenses.

However, enemy troops and military hardware are massing in the region of Ripac, the Lohovo hills, and Melinovac in the UN Protected Areas of the so-called Serbian Krajina. Although the situation around Velika Kladusa is calmer, enemy shelling of the 5th Corps positions and sporadic small arms provocations were reported overnight and this morning. Considerable movements of enemy units and military hardware have also been reported in the region, particularly in the so-called Serbian Krajina.

On the Bosanska Krupa part of the front, the aggressor targeted residential areas with a Bofors gun and the 5th Corps defense with snipers, all types of machine guns, and artillery. Enemy small arms provocations and frequent sniper fire were reported on the remaining fronts, the Grmusa-Srbljani and Grabez Plateaux, Bugar, and the Buzim part of the front.

Army Suffering 'Heavy Casualties' in West Bosnia

LD1602155595 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1533 GMT 16 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 16 (TANJUG)—Forces of the Muslim government in Sarajevo are taking heavy casualties in the fighting against troops of the autonomous province of west Bosnia, both sides' media said Thursday.

Muslim Radio Cazin blamed the failure of the Ramadan offensive of the government army on its officers whom it accused of spending their time drinking and black-marketeering instead of fighting the war.

The source deplored the possibility that the Muslim Government Army's 5th Corps might not manage to take the provincial center of Velika Kladusa and honor the promise pledged to Muslim Sarajevo government leader Alija Izetbegovic to celebrate Bayram in that town. West Bosnian Radio Velkaton reported that the fighters for autonomy had early on Thursday repelled two strong attacks of the 5th Corps.

Radio Velkaton said 5th Corps troops had fired more than a hundred mortar shells on the territory of the autonomous province of west Bosnia, causing extensive material damage but no casualties. The autonomous province of west Bosnia was proclaimed in September 1993 by Muslim businessman Fikret Abdic, in opposition to the policy of the Muslim government in Sarajevo.

5th Corps Reports Serb Artillery Attacks

AU1602153195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 16 Feb 95

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic from Bihac]

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[FBIS Translated Text] The attacks by the united enemy against the Bihac region have continued today, and the situation is again particularly bad on the Velika Kladusa and Bosanska Krupa parts of the front, where Martić's, Karadžić's, and Abdić's chetniks are using tanks and artillery. They have also attempted several infantry breakthroughs.

As for the Bosanska Krupa part of the front, the chetnik artillery has caused huge material damage to districts on the left bank of the Una, and several persons have been wounded in the chetnik fire coming from the right bank of the Una.

The grouping and movements of chetniks has continued along the border with the so-called Serb Autonomous Province of Krajina, particularly on the Velika Kladusa part of the front, from where they have been providing the forces attacking Velika Kladusa itself with intense artillery support. It has been somewhat quieter on the Bihac part of the front. However, Bihac and its outskirts are trying to recover from the horrible destruction that the chetniks inflicted in the just finished latest chetnik offensive. Vedro Polje, Skocaj, Zavalje, Zegar, and [word indistinct]—which have always been predominantly populated by people of the Croatian ethnic group—have literally been razed to the ground. Barely two houses now remain standing in Sokolac [word indistinct]. That is why the letter from the criminal Mladic appears almost funny since he is demanding that the demarcation lines return to the 1 January positions, that is, that the abovementioned villages be returned to the chetniks, in which they never lived in the first place (and most certainly will not now).

Anyway, the preparations for a new chetnik offensive are well under way [words indistinct].

Karadžić: The State Comes First

LD1602215595 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2057 GMT 16 Feb 95

[Item received by fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 16 Feb (SRNA)—Radovan Karadžić, president of the Srpska republic, said in Banja Luka this evening that "if the international community wants war there will be war and we must prepare for it, but if it wants peace it will make peace, but not to our detriment."

"International factors will have to pay more attention to our interests and come up with a solution which is equally acceptable or unacceptable to all sides, and not one it has been proposing so far—a solution totally acceptable for the Muslims and totally unacceptable for us," Karadžić said.

The Srpska republic president told Serb fighters to closely guard our borders, make strong fortifications, and prevent the enemy from preparing any surprises,

because "only through victory can our army get closer to a favorable political solution."

"As soon as the war ends we will start rebuilding the country, dividing the property so that each family can have something to make a start, and concentrating on economic recovery, but there can be neither democracy nor freedom without a state," Karadžić said. In his words, the state comes first, and soldiers are already on its threshold [as received].

"Our brilliant soldiers are fighting despite the fact they are not getting any wages, in the knowledge that they are defending their own territory. I believe they know for certain that all the maps and statements in the press are one thing and that reality is much closer to the situation on the ground," President Karadžić said in conclusion.

Karadžić: Will Only Accept Union as Sovereign State

LD1602173395 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1645 GMT 16 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Banja Luka, 16 Feb (TANJUG)—President of the Srpska republic [RS] Radovan Karadžić today said in Banja Luka that in the worst case the RS could accept some kind of union in Bosnia-Herzegovina but only as a sovereign state.

"It is our aim to be part of Serbia. If that is impossible then we would want to be part of Yugoslavia as a federal unit together with the republic of Serb Krajina," Karadžić told businessmen in Banja Luka.

"If we cannot realize that, then we want to declare independence, or else, at worst we can, so as to appease the international community, enter a kind of union, but only as a sovereign state," Karadžić added.

Reiterating that the RS will not accept the Contact Group's plan in order to continue negotiations, it will rather continue negotiations with the proviso that the plan will be used as a basis, Karadžić said that even now it is not too late for all Serbian lands to unite, thus preventing the destruction of the Serbian national entity. [passage omitted]

Silajdzic Says Arms Embargo Must Be Lifted

AU1602174995 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 8 Feb 95 p 7

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by Azra Kaurin; place and date not given: "Federation—Key to Peace Solution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—Last week's round of talks of Haris Silajdzic, prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic and Federation, began by a meeting with Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock, who accepted a proposal to act as a catalyst in the peace process in order to prevent the Bosnia-Herzegovina cease-fire from turning into the status quo. Silajdzic also

went to Brussels and met with Hans van den Broek, EU commissioner for external political relations, to discuss bilateral relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the EU, as well as the FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization]. Prime Minister Silajdzic also spent a couple of days in the United States and Russia and attended the Munich meeting. Silajdzic said the following about the meeting.

[Silajdzic] I expect we will begin implementing the federation in keeping with the Constitution. So far, the Washington Agreements have only produced a cease-fire. Very little has been done since then. We have, therefore, requested international arbitration to bypass mutual accusations and end it all as soon as possible. As for who is responsible for what has happened, we should ask neutral observers. I think Koschnik said what needed to be said. Some people, especially in Herzegovina, do not want the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. The political will to do something is what counts. We have hitherto witnessed much resistance to the implementation of the federation. We will see what happens next.

The United States Did Not Change Its View

It is good that an arbiter will be appointed to help solve some controversial problems in the Federation. It was confirmed that the Federation is the key to the peace solution. At the meeting in Munich, Croatia's representatives said that there were no clandestine talks with Belgrade at the expense of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Kaurin] Does your visit to the United States bring something new? Before you went there, there was much talk about the United States changing its view toward Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Silajdzic] There has never been an official change of view. However, regarding the plan of the Contact Group, they tried to do something in direct contact with Pale. They could not do anything, of course. We wanted to be certain about U.S. views. The United States still supports the integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As far as the arms embargo is concerned, we do not subscribe to their view, at least with regard to the U.S. Administration. We think that a multilateral embargo entails the unilateral responsibility of the United States. All the embargo did in the past three years was kill innocent people and punish the victim. This embargo must be lifted. The United States advocate the multilateral lifting of embargo, but it is not prepared to do it on its own. We believe the embargo entails unilateral responsibility and that it should be lifted if there is no peace.

[Kaurin] Still, you found support in the U.S. Senate and Congress.

[Silajdzic] As opposed to the U.S. Administration, we received complete support from the U.S. Congress, Senate, and the White House. As you know, a bill on

lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina was introduced. We reiterated our determination to avoid war and that we do not demand the lifting of arms embargo for the sake of war. Bosnia-Herzegovina needs peace. If we cannot have peace because the other side does not want it, the international community must make a radical change in its policy. After three years of aggression and genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina, our enemy wants to preserve the status quo. If the international community does not react to that, it will mean that it sanctions the status quo.

Two Options

In other words, the international community helped the aggressor in two ways. First by imposing the arms embargo and second by preserving the status quo. It is probably quite likely to help the enemy for the third time: Asking to legalize that which was seized by means of genocide and plundering. I met with many people in the United States, from Vice President Al Gore to State Secretary Warren Christopher. I think the situation is quite clear now. Our views differ only in that they do not want to lift the arms embargo, believing it would jeopardize all talks and set a precedent. Bosnia-Herzegovina should not be sacrificed because of that; a country should be allowed to defend itself.

In short, the international community must make a choice: Either intervene or let us defend ourselves if there is no peace. The Pale leadership has hitherto shown no intention to accept the peace plan.

[Kaurin] What if the Serbian aggressor does not accept the peace plan by 1 May and the international community does not lift the arms embargo?

[Silajdzic] That is a good question. We said that Contact Group measures—mentioned in the communique issued on 30 July in Geneva on the ministerial level—had to be applied in that case. The communique specifies that, along with all measures and sanctions against Serbia, the international community will also lift the arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina as the ultimate measure. I think the time has come for the international community to apply that ultimate measure. During our stay in the United States, we proposed that a deadline be set, since a plan without a deadline does not mean anything. It must be determined exactly when the Serbs must commit themselves on the Contact Group's plan. The U.S. Administration is treating our proposal very carefully.

Russian Support

[Kaurin] When you came back from Russia, you said you were pleased with your visit. Does that mean that Russian leaders took your views into consideration? You had a long meeting with Kozyrev. What were the results?

[Silajdzic] Yes, we were received very warmly. We improved our bilateral relations. It is a major step forward in cooperation between our two countries. I met

with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev. Russia expressed wholehearted support for the integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Russia would like to take a more active role in the peace plan. We received complete support from the Russian Government for every peace solution that does not endanger the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Kaurin] Which concrete steps will the Russian Government take?

[Silajdzic] The Russian Government will insist on the mutual recognition of countries created on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Regarding that, the Russian Government suggested that we reinvigorate the talks with Belgrade, if possible. I believe we will consider their suggestion.

Furthermore, Russian representatives told me that President Izetbegovic would be asked to come to Moscow on 9 May to join the celebration of the victory over fascism. I hope they will be able to discuss the improvement of political relations of the two countries on the highest level. Bosnia-Herzegovina has already sent its representative to Moscow, and Russia will soon send a counterpart to Sarajevo.

[Box, p 7]

"Commercial Arrangements"

[Kaurin] During your stay in Russia, did you discuss the help they send to Karadzic's Serbs?

[Silajdzic] They always say that help is not sent by the Russian Government but that there are some "commercial arrangements" that cannot be controlled.

[Box, p 7]

Maps in Security Council

[Silajdzic] I must point out that we proposed another option to the United States—and they were very understanding with regard to that—that the plan of the Contact Group, i.e. map, be adopted at the UN Security Council. This is about the internal reorganization of a country, which our government accepted. If some people in Pale do not want that, then that is their problem. We will arrange the internal organization of the country in keeping with the plans of the international community. The matter should be raised to the official level and implemented.

Cease-Fire Violations in 2d, 3d Corps Areas

AU1602155095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 16 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Over the last 24 hours increasingly frequent aggressor's provocative fire at the entire

defense lines has been registered in the theater of operations of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 3d Corps. The aggressor is also intensifying the regrouping of forces and engineering work.

On the Zavidovici-Vozuca and the Teslici-Serici fronts, there has been small arms fire and anti-aircraft weapons fire. The aggressor has also intensified sniper fire along the entire front line. This has been reported by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 3d Corps Press Center.

Over the last 24 hours the aggressor has also intensified his attacks in the theater of operations of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 2d Corps. From the area of [words indistinct] the enemy has been firing with small arms and anti-aircraft weapons at the positions of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army members. The aggressor has been registered carrying out work on his front line positions, but he has been using captured Muslims for that.

Yesterday on the Posavina front, the enemy fired with small arms at the defense lines of the Brcko fighters, and in the afternoon the enemy switched to heavy machine guns and snipers. The traffic along the corridor was intensified yesterday, and the aggressor has also again violated the no-fly zone. Some 20 helicopter flights were registered along the Pelagicevo-Modrica route. There was no peace on the Teocak front either. The aggressor fired with recoilless guns at Stari Teocak. This has been reported by the Information Service of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 2d Corps.

Fahrudin Becic reports from Gorazde that the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor has been firing with small arms on the Rogatica part of the front.

4th Corps: Serbs Regrouping Forces at Nevesinje

AU1602154495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 16 Feb 95

[Report by Omer Karic from Mostar]

[FBIS Translated Text] From their positions on (Srednja Gora) yesterday the chetniks fired one artillery shell at the [word indistinct] road near Bijelo Polje, but fortunately there were no consequences. On the Konjic front the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor intensified fire with anti-aircraft machine guns and small arms from the area of (?Kiter), (?Buca), Bukove Glave, and [word indistinct] on our fighters' defense lines.

In the southern sector of the 4th Corps theater of operations, Karadzic's hordes fired with an anti-aircraft machine gun from [word indistinct] and M-84 machine gun from the area of (?Kukljicina Gomila), (?Srnalic Kuk), and Kobiljaca at (?Bosljak) and (?Slatiste). The aggressor is constantly trying to provoke our forces by violating the cease-fire, but he is also intensifying his reconnaissance activities. A significant number of aggressor's vehicles has been spotted in the region of Podvez, which indicates that the Nevesinje Chetniks are hurriedly regrouping their forces, and that they have

understood the cease-fire to be just a brief respite and not an chance for real peace in this region.

Muslims Expelled 40,000 Croats Since March

LD1602151695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1353
GMT 16 Feb 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 16 (TANJUG)—Head of the Croatian Democratic Union Party for Bosnia, Dario Kordic, has said that Muslims have expelled about 40,000 Croats since the signing of the Washington Federation Agreement last March.

Bosnian Croat Radio Herceg-Bosna on Thursday quoted Kordic as saying the largest number of Croats had been expelled from or had fled the region around the Muslim-held town of Tuzla, northeastern Bosnia.

Bosnian Croats and Muslims have continued to distrust each other even after they signed under U.S. pressure in Washington last March an agreement to form a binational federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The signing of the agreement was preceded by fierce fighting between the two sides for control of territories with mixed population in central and southern Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Radio Herceg-Bosna said 192,000 Croats have fled territories controlled by Sarajevo Muslim government troops since the outbreak of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992. Muslim Radio Sarajevo reports, however, that about 55,000 Muslims have been expelled from the territory of the Bosnian Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna.

Serb Soldiers Wounded in Croat Attacks

LD1602163495 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1643
GMT 16 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Drvar, 16 Feb (SRNA)—Two Serb fighters were wounded today on the Grahovo-Glamoc front in attacks by combined units of the regular Croatian army and the Croat Defense Council on positions of the army of the Srpska republic, the press center of the 2d Krajina Corps has announced.

On the Glamoc front Croatian forces fired mortars from their positions on Velika and Mala Golija at Serb lines in the area of Koricani, and at about noon they began an infantry offensive on Serb positions in the area of Skodim. Croatian units also carried out attacks on the area of Crni Lug, about 20 km southeast of Grahovo.

Serb military sources report that over the past 24 hours 52 overflights by NATO combat aircraft have been registered above the zone of military operations in this area.

SDA Presents Stance Toward Opposition, HDZ

AU1602171995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 16 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A news conference by the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] of Bosnia-Herzegovina was

held in Sarajevo today, which, among other things, also addressed the attitude of this party toward the opposition. Here is a report by Salih Huseinovic:

[Begin recording] [Huseinovic] Dr. Ismet Grbo emphasized that the SDA has been [word indistinct] for several months with [words indistinct] in which the contribution of this party toward the defense of the country is not being emphasized. The SDA fully respects the opposition and supports the restructuring of the opposition in hope that greater mutual cooperation could be achieved in this way. The efforts of the opposition parties must be geared toward strengthening the struggle for Bosnia-Herzegovina and not toward cheap political moves in the power struggle.

The likening of the SDA and the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] by the opposition is inappropriate. In connection with this, Dr. Grbo emphasized:

[Grbo] The fact that our [word indistinct] united opposition has a habit of referring to the ruling parties without [words indistinct] specifics of the SDA and the HDZ is especially indicative. The critical attitude of the opposition parties toward the assembly session in Zenica was [words indistinct] the SDA even though [words indistinct], with the participation of the opposition, did everything for this assembly session to succeed.

Everything shows that neither the activities nor the notorious contents of the work, or the approach to the current problems by the HDZ and the SDA [word indistinct] a common denominator, but for an honest, analytical, and differentiating attitude.

[Huseinovic] SDA Secretary General Mirsad Ceman also spoke about the session of the constituent session of the (?Posavina) canton, and here stressed his dissatisfaction that it was carried out without cooperation with the Bosniak people and the SDA. He pointed at the violations of territorial schemes of cantons and problems referring to cadre issues, as well as an arrogant attitude toward the Bosniaks of the Posavina canton. In connection to this, Mirsad Ceman turned to the HDZ of Bosnian Posavina:

[Ceman] We are issuing an appeal to the representatives of the HDZ of Bosnian Posavina, as well as the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to take a clear stance toward these issue, that is, to demonstrate a higher degree of cooperativeness in the establishment of the transitional offices of authority in this region. [words indistinct], mutual interest of the Croatian and the Bosniak people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, the interest in establishing the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation as a whole as soon as possible, and, understandably, the interest of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina for [words indistinct] the Republic of Croatia in its entirety.

[Huseinovic] Edhem Bicakcic, SDA vice president, spoke about Bosnia-Herzegovina's special guest status in the Council of Europe, which does not have an executive

power but offers support to Bosnia-Herzegovina and, through its activity, influences the stance of the international community regarding the resolution of the crisis in our country. It was pointed out that we intend to apply for full membership in this institution and also to nominate Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency for the European human rights award.

7th Corps Holds Forum on Koran's Lessons

AU1602210495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 16 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] As a part of Ramadan and to mark the famous (?Battle of Badr), the morale section of the 7th Corps organized a public forum with the topic: (?The Battle of Badr) and its reflections on the Bosnian reality. Brigadier General Mehmed Alagic, commander of the 7th Corps, participated in the forum along with his assistants, Travnik Mufti Mirsad Efendi Avdibegovic and Mirsad Efendic, lecturer at the military officers' academy. Here is a report by the 7th Corps Press Service:

[Begin recording] After studying a sura from the Koran which speaks of (?the Battle of Badr) and reading a translation of the sura, the fatihah [first chapter of the Koran] was studied. Adviser for religious affairs (?Fahrudin Zalocaj) in the introduction spoke about the historic facts. The Koran's account of the battle was presented by Travnik Mufti Mirsad Efendi Avdibegovic, who especially emphasized endurance, reliability, and obedience.

Professor Mahmutovic spoke about God's messenger in the form of a soldier, army commander, strategist, politician, and tactician. The [word indistinct] of Badr and a

philosophical approach provided answers to (?various) questions [words indistinct] whereby the first part of the forum ended.

Colonel Hasim Musibegovic, assistant commander in charge of morale, took charge of the second part of the forum which was dedicated to the military character of the battle, its causes, preparation, and its course. Gen. Mehmed Alagic also got involved in the forum, speaking about Muhammad Aleyk Salam, as a unique commander, a leader who must possess a natural talent for leadership and command, and about the contemporary character of the battle insofar as we can understand it and apply its principles to our struggle.

An answer to the question of the balance of powers was provided by Col. Kazim Jusic, who spoke about the soldiers in Muhammad's army and drew a parallel with our army at the beginning of the aggression, when it had stood up against a more organized military force with a far superior technical equipment.

An explanation about the motives and motivation of both sides, the battle for historic immortality, and making of the correct decisions was given by Brig. Fikret Cutkic, who added that the fostering of trust in the commander by his subordinates and vice versa is an extremely important factor. Losses, relations after the battle, and war booty were the subjects explained by Major Hamed Mesanovic.

Finally, conclusions were made, among which one can single out a conclusion by General Alagic that Bosnia is a place for deception, war, and agreement, and calling that the people be the army. [end recording]

UN Warns Tensions Rising in Dubrovnik Region

AU1602170495 Paris AFP in English 1655 GMT 16 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Zagreb, Feb 16 (AFP)—UN officers warned Thursday that tensions were rising in the Dubrovnik region of southern Croatia where Croatian troops have been building bunkers close to the border with the rump-Yugoslavian state of Montenegro.

"The situation isn't yet alarming but remains worrying," Lieutenant-Colonel Walt Natynczyk said.

Paul Risley, a spokesman for the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), linked the tensions to the fact that the Croatian army "has been constructing bunkers for over a month now in Glavica," near the Montenegrin border. UNPROFOR is also increasingly concerned by the Bosnian Serb's buildup of artillery batteries on the Croatian border, Risley added. Last summer the Bosnian Serbs shelled the Dubrovnik airport several times.

Yugoslav navy ships carried out manoeuvres Wednesday in Boka Kotorska bay, near the Prevlaka peninsula, added Natynczyk. Serbs have been seeking control of the strategic peninsula, now in Croat hands, to gain vital access to the Adriatic.

The UN officials believe the zone could become the focus of new clashes between the Croats and Serbs from both Bosnia and the rump Yugoslavia, should Croatia follow through on its demand that UNPROFOR troops leave Croatia by June 30. [passage omitted]

'Conflagration' Possible as Truce Violations Grow

AU1702130395 Paris AFP in English 1231 GMT 17 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Feb 17 (AFP)—[Passage omitted] In Sarajevo, three Bosnian soldiers were slightly injured Thursday by light arms fire near front lines, UN officials said, but Lieutenant-Colonel Gary Coward said that overall the level of ceasefire violations appeared to show a downward trend over February.

In Sarajevo alone there were a total of some 7,800 firing incidents per day in November, while in early February, following the conclusion of the latest truce, the daily level for the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina dropped to about 2,000, Coward said.

Violations to the year-long ceasefire in Croatia, however, were up, amid fears that fighting could break out anew there after UN forces are stood down when their mandate—which the Croatian government has refused to renew—runs out on March 31, according to Michael Williams, chief UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] spokesman.

Once UN forces are stood down in Croatia it will be like having "no fire brigade on mainstreet," Williams said,

adding that any small incidents could spark a full-scale conflagration that could spill over into Bosnia. [passage omitted]

Djukic: Serb Rights Violated Systematically

LD1602152195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1344 GMT 16 Feb 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Feb. 16 (TANJUG)—The president of the Serbian People's Party in Zagreb, Milan Djukic, Thursday said that Serb human rights were systematically being violated in Croatia and that in such a situation it was hard to speak about regaining the trust of the Serb people in the Croatian regime.

Speaking in a Croatian television program titled 'From Party Life', Djukic said that Serbs in Croatia were still being laid off from work and evicted from their apartments and that such activities did not cause any reaction from the Croatian authorities. Djukic said that recently Serbs were increasingly being mobilized into the Croatian army.

The vice-president of the Serbian People's Party, Veselin Pejvanovic, said that 300,000 Serbs had left Croatia since the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, i.e. the start of the war in the territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia in 1991 after its violent secession from the then Yugoslav Federation.

In view of the fact that serbs are still leaving Croatia, Pejvanovic said his party would soon send all data at its disposal to international institutions to enable them to see the true situation and comprehend the gravity of the problem.

The International Tribunal in Hague has started rising charges for war crimes, but we expect that the perpetrators of the brutal crimes against Serbs in Croatia will also be brought before justice, Pejvanovic said.

'Great Serbo-Croat War' If UN Withdraws

AU1602152995 Knin MAGAZIN KRAJINA in Serbo-Croatian Feb 95 p 13

[Commentary by Slobodan Jarcevic, former foreign minister of the republic of Serbian Krajina: "Zagreb's War Games"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tudjman's guiding star is the Croatian political thinking formed in the 19th century on monstrous and unrealistic grounds. They are monstrous because they envisage the extermination of the Serbian people, and unrealistic because they counted on a small and unconstituent nation, such as the Croatian one, being able to grab large territories from the largest and most constituent nation in the Balkans, such as the Serbian one.

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Tudjman is having delusions. He wants to make another gesture to create the impression that it is right for a Croatian state to exist on Serbian territory. This time he is demanding that the peacekeeping forces leave the territory of the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK]. What has he got to do with the RSK? Nothing, of course. However, if mentally deficient people are sitting in New York, then they will listen to him and withdraw the peacekeepers from the RSK. This would create the impression that Croatia is making decision about "its" territories, which for a few months would appease the people in Croatia, who have been expecting General Tudjman to wave a magic wand and "make Croatia whole again."

The UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] have become a nuisance to Gen. Tudjman. Firstly, because he has been persuading his people that the peacekeepers are obliged to incorporate the RSK into Croatia, and secondly, because UNPROFOR has become a witness to the real situation in the Serbian-Croatian dispute in the former Croatia. In accordance to the Vance plan, UNPROFOR cannot take neighboring territories and give them as a gift to Croatia, nor can it neglect facts, and report to the Security Council according to Zagreb's instructions. 1992 is over and UNPROFOR officers in the Balkans—which they knew nothing about when they first arrived—no longer accept "the truth" as served by the Croatian propaganda from Zagreb, and include it in their reports on the RSK. At that time, reports arriving in New York were brimming with "rebel Serbs in Croatia," with tales of their "savagery," and their "inability to organize a state." Ordinary thefts of chicken in Benkovac made up the most important part of UNPROFOR's reports, which Cedrick Thornberry, the then UNPROFOR head of civilian affairs, gave as proof at news conferences of the Serbs' inability to organize a state. At seminars, that generation of UNPROFOR was fed information about how Croatia was hospitable to the Serbs during the Turkish invasion, how it took them into its, Croatian, territory, and the ungrateful Serbs were now rebelling.

Today UNPROFOR is something entirely different. Three years have enabled its members to get to know real facts. The reports going to New York today are completely different. Former UNPROFOR Commander Jean Cot informed the Security Council in September 1993 that the Croatian Army in Dvovelo did not leave behind even a cat alive. UNPROFOR soldiers have become friends with the Serbian people, and now have a completely different picture of them than the one created by Zagreb. Tudjman cannot stand the fact that the mediators by and large believe that they have to be neutral and just in the Serbian-Croatian dispute, as they were during the signing of the Zagreb Agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and the agreement on the normalization of traffic and economy.

If Gen. Tudjman cancels the UNPROFOR mandate and—if we believe for a moment that the United

Nations will accept such an insane idea—UNPROFOR really withdraws from the RSK, both these agreements will become null and void. According to the Zagreb Agreement, UNPROFOR has to control and organize life on most of the Ravni Kotari territory, which the Croats occupied on 22 January 1993, and to regulate the traffic along the Belgrade-Zagreb highway. The Croats will want to take over these competences of UNPROFOR's, which will lead to a great Serbo-Croat War.

However, since the basic task of the United Nations is to prevent wars from breaking out, then this organization cannot possibly withdraw the peacekeepers. It will only have to send them back under much worse conditions. If Tudjman stubbornly sticks to his decision, Butrus-Ghali has the option of informing him that UNPROFOR will leave the Croatian territory, but will remain in the RSK. UNPROFOR headquarters can be moved from Zagreb to Belgrade since, anyway, when the Vance plan was signed the decision was then made to move the headquarters from Zagreb to Belgrade and the other way round every six months. Now Butrus-Ghali probably regrets having given in to the pressure from the Croatian lobby, and established the headquarters only in Zagreb.

Istria Lacking Transportation Links to Dalmatia

95BA0132A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 21 Jan 95 p 10

[Article by Mirko Urosevic: "No Boats to the Islands and Dalmatia From Istria"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pula—In the bad weather last weekend, when a storm under Velebit halted all traffic between the upper and middle Adriatic for all of two days and two nights, the isolation of our largest peninsula when it comes to maritime transportation was once again made evident in a time of trouble. As soon as the last tourists leave our hotels and beaches, every ferry stops between Istria, the islands, and Zadar. And once again this winter it will be that way until the next season begins. It is a sad picture one sees in Pula Bay when there is not a single boat, and at the customs pier, where the ferries and tourist excursion boats dock, there is nothing except small launches and a flock of sea gulls in the winter sun. Given this bad situation, if you do not intend to risk driving your own car between Istria and Dalmatia, there is nothing left except the three bus lines; from Pula to Split, for example, the trip lasts all of 10 hours, and when a storm, icy roads, or snow become involved in that connection, the trip is extended to even 15 hours or so, and waits, delays, or overturned trucks are common, as they were last weekend.

For example, the night bus of Autotrans of Rijeka, which departed Friday evening at 2000 hours from Pula for Split, was halted at exactly midnight by the storm at Senj, and the uncertain wait lasted four hours. In the meantime, the drivers several times wanted to take the bus back to Istria. In the opposite direction, after a halt of two days and a night they had to spend in Split (this is

the regular Rovinj-Split-Dubrovnik line in both directions), they returned to Istria only on Tuesday morning. In that context, it is reasonable to put the question: Why have we forgotten, especially in the wintertime, the fastest connection, which was the Pula-Mali Losinj-Zadar ferry, which was maintained at least once a week for decades by the ferry Marina, which at the moment is in winter quarters on Mali Losinj? In less than seven hours, that ancient but reliable ferry connected Istria and central Dalmatia and facilitated a reliable flow of passengers and cargo and, of course, automobiles and trucks as well. Because of diminished interest of the economy, and in particular three cities (Pula, Losinj, and Zadar), every ferry has been stopped in the off-season, and the Ministry of Transportation and Communications has not given that route priority. Thus, ferries are being introduced this winter between Dalmatia and Ancona, but there was at least an equal need for one in the direction of Istria, just, of course, until movement in this region is speeded up and brought up-to-date with the purchase of a seaplane!

In the meantime, the isolation of the Istrian Peninsula and Kvarner Islands is more and more pronounced and adverse for the inhabitants. To be sure, Cres and Losinj have ferry connections to Rijeka and bus lines unless a storm hinders traffic over the bridge to Krk.

Nevertheless, that trip takes all of four hours in one direction, while the ferry Marina traveled to Pula in only three and a half hours. Nevertheless, Jadrolinija's vessel Porec is sailing once a week this winter between Zadar and Losinj: It goes to Losinj on Saturday and comes back on Sunday. As though no one wants to travel by water to Istria or Pula! In the meantime, there are several quite fast ferries between Rijeka and Dalmatia; in the wintertime extra runs are made, but Pula has been forgotten, although by water it is nearly two hours closer to Dalmatia than Rijeka. The answers to these questions should largely be given to inhabitants and travelers by those responsible for transportation and the economy in Istria Zupanija.

Problems of Croatian Army in Istria

95BA0140B Zagreb ARKZIN in Serbo-Croatian 25 Jan 95 p 9

[Article by Bozo Matic: "Offices for Some, Trenches for Others! Croatian Armed Forces Not Paying for Municipal Services in Istria!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Occasionally stories circulate in "knowledgeable circles" in Zagreb concerning tense relations between the local offices of the Ministry of Defense and units of the Croatian Armed Forces [HV] stationed in Istria on the one hand and institutions of local self-rule and the local population on the other hand. According to some "reports," matters are slowly approaching the breaking point. In recent times, the theory that "Istrians do not like to become soldiers" has also been revived, but it is also being said that they are

less and less willing to supply the Croatian Armed Forces with electricity, water, and food.

The HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] Means Business

In the words of Emil Soldatic, secretary of the majority Istrian party, the main problem is that the Zupanija's Administration for Defense is completely under the control of the HDZ, which is filling that office with "its own" people through the Ministry of Defense. People are being replaced in the lower administrative structures as well, so that the entire structure of "people's defense," which previously existed in the opstinas and which bore the burden of initial mobilization after the outbreak of war, is now disappearing. If the HDZ does not have someone "of its own" with enough expertise to perform specific tasks, it is not unusual for that post to be filled by mobilized people instead of through regular competition. This ensures political supervision over workers in local offices of the Ministry of Defense. In addition, the problem is that the political administration of the Croatian Armed Forces, from the highest to the local level, sometimes tries to act as the "reserve variant of the HDZ," even though the Armed Forces do not need such a political administration. Instead, these are politicians, some of whom managed long ago to gamble away their reputations, and who perform the role of political commissar in the military. The military should not play a socialization role in culture like the one that previously developed at "JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] centers" and which is again being imposed by people from the "political administrations." This has proven to be counterproductive, says Soldatic, because citizens have an aversion in principle to any military institution and do not respond to invitations to events held at military centers. The balance of power in local institutions of the Ministry of Defense is leading to a situation where it is primarily politically neutral people who are being mobilized, or IDS [Istrian Democratic Assembly] members and sympathizers. On the other hand, HDZ members are called up for military service least frequently. Of the more than 600 people who make up the Pazin unit, only two or three are close to the HDZ.

Why Does the Military Not Pay Its Bills?

Right now, seven members of the Pazin City Council are mobilized, IDS representatives out of the total of 19 councilmen from that party, while not one of the six HDZ councilmen has been called up. Nevertheless, it is estimated that the best response to call-up is in fact in Istria, compared to other Zupanijas. In Pazin, for example, the response is around 93 percent, which indicates a high level of loyalty or civic awareness but certainly does not mean that those who respond also support the war option for reintegrating Croatia. Although the response to mobilization is high, there is increasing discontent because people are noticing tentativeness in their distribution; some citizens go into the military several times each, while others have never been called up.

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The populace's fundamentally positive attitude toward the state and the military is reflected in the plan for outfitting units that are leaving for the war zone. The Ministry of Defense is responsible for the poor supply situation in the military, and it is assumed that private interests and profiteering are behind that. As far as one can determine, the budget funds earmarked for the military are guaranteed, so it is unclear why the supply situation is so bad. This had led to the rumor that around 500,000 German marks are "eaten up" each month in dubious schemes and through the signing of detrimental contracts. Soldatic rejects any responsibility of the local authorities for supplying electricity to units of the standing army in Istria. Electricity is beyond the jurisdiction of local authorities because HEP is a public enterprise controlled by the HDZ. As far as water is concerned, the problem is that the military has not regularly paid for its charges. The Pula Waterworks has allegedly waived interest on these debts, but the Pula garrison of the HV has still not gone without water for a single moment. Nevertheless, in recent times some of the strongest Istrian companies have refused to carry out deliveries because the HV has not paid its outstanding bills.

Rijeka Serbs Proclaim Support for Tudjman

95BA0132B Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jan 95 p 4

[Interview with Branko Konstantinovic, former president of the Serbian National Party in Rijeka, by Damir Herceg; place and date not given: "We Are Not Second-Class Citizens!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "After I spoke on behalf of 300 Serbs in Rijeka and the Rijeka region who support the decision of Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, denying the mandate to the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], people began to call me on the telephone, all of them Serbs, some of them approving this move, emphasizing that it is good for the Serbs in the Rijeka region to finally take a stand in large numbers on a political issue, and some threatening to skin me alive. There were two women who called who asked me where I got the signatures of 300 Serbs, what right I had to speak on behalf of so many people? But those people, those Serbs, are on the list of those who want to visit their relatives in the so-called Krajina. They live in Rijeka and the Rijeka region; after Dr. Tudjman read his message, I called them on the telephone, and they agree with denying the mandate to the UNPROFOR."

We were told this by Branko Konstantinovic of Rijeka, better known to the general public as the former president of the SNS [Serbian National Party] in Rijeka; he is the informal leader of 300 to 500 Serbian citizens who with their support of Dr. Tudjman in rejecting the UNPROFOR have shocked the Rijeka and general public quite a bit, because the Serbs in Rijeka, even

though there has been no war in this region, have not come out against the Serbian aggression against Croatia in the last four years, either in an organized way or individually.

The Knin Authorities Do Not Want To Receive Us

[Herceg] In early 1994, you took the initiative for a visit of Serbs from the Rijeka region to their relatives in the so-called Krajina?

[Konstantinovic] Yes, we drew up lists of people to visit their relatives in Glina, Plaski, Slunj, Vrginmost, Vojnic, Tusilovic, and Topusko; there were also applicants for certain places in Lika, but that has been abandoned for the present because there were not enough people. However, the authorities in Knin do not want to receive us; thus, Radio Korenica announced that citizens of the Republic of Croatia, even though they are Serbs, are prohibited from entering Krajina. We have asked for help from the UNPROFOR 10 times, but they did nothing, and our position is that the UNPROFOR absolutely has not performed its mission, nor has it brought about an atmosphere favorable to moving closer to a peaceful solution. For all of four years now, the two sides have not had contacts; many relatives would like to meet and see one another, and the Cyprusization of Croatia is not going to speed up solution of that problem. We who have supported denial of the UNPROFOR believe in the good intentions of the Croatian Government, because Dr. Tudjman took the peace initiative back in late 1993, when he said: "Let us open up the roads, the lines of communication...."

Initiative for a "Goodwill Mission"

[Herceg] How do you see the road to a peaceful resolution of integration of the so-called Krajina into Croatia?

[Konstantinovic] Cultural and public figures of Serbian nationality will have to make a maximum commitment if there is to be a peaceful solution. Those 300 citizens from Rijeka I mentioned want to initiate a "goodwill mission" that would include prestigious citizens of Serbian nationality, but also representatives of Croatian political parties committed to a peaceful solution, and then members of the Croatian Government and representatives of humanitarian organizations. They would be allowed to communicate with Knin, so that we from the free part of Croatia could tell them what we think, how we are living, so they can see that we are not mistreated or second-class citizens, which is what Serbian propaganda has been saying. We have to make every effort to seek a peaceful solution, and one of the ways is to visit relatives in the so-called Krajina, because before we establish communications in terms of transportation we must first establish human communications. We must prepare both sides for a meeting, because when displaced persons return to their homes we must be sure that there is not a showdown with the Serbs they find there.

[Herceg] Mr. Djukic does not agree with the UNPROFOR's departure?

[Konstantinovic] He is a Serb from Lika. His people live there, and he probably is afraid that something might happen to them if by some chance the war option is exercised. I believe this will not be solved by force, but by peaceful means.

The Serbs Must Understand That They Are a Minority

[Herceg] Why did you resign from the post of president of the SNS in Rijeka?

[Konstantinovic] I do not agree with some of the options whereby Croatia could again end up in some federation; that would mean that people who are now refugees, when they return to their homes, say, in Plaski, Slunj, Sabor-sko..., would actually have to learn Cyrillic. The Serbs in Croatia must realize that they are a minority in this country and organize themselves accordingly. If in Rijeka, for example, the Italians and Slovenes have their meeting places, why would the Serbs not also have their center? Why should there not be societies of people from Vojvodina, from Kordun, from Lika, and so forth? However, the Serbs are not accustomed to that.... When I went to serve in Slovenia, for example, I tried to learn Slovene the very next day. I also took pains in Rijeka, because the Serbs cannot expect understanding when in a store they use the Serbian word for bread and milk; we can say that at home, but outside the rules of the majority nationality apply.

[Herceg] You are a Serb from Srem. Is there any difference between you and, say, a Serb from Bosnia or Kordun?

[Konstantinovic] The body of the Serbian nationality in Croatia is complex: Serbs from Serbia, from Bosnia, from Vojvodina, from Kordun, from Banija, from Lika, from Gorski Kotar, from the Knin region.... These groups differ enormously from one another. All we have in common is the name; the Serbs in Croatia care nothing about Orthodoxy. For example, as a Serb from Vojvodina I have far more in common (customs, dress, songs) with the Croats from Slavonia than with the Serbs from Kordun or Knin. Now that we have mentioned Orthodoxy, I would ask those high church officials of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Croatia why they did not come to the New Year's reception organized for the heads of the churches by Dr. Tudjman. Their failure to come can only hinder resolution of the Serbian question in Croatia.

All Those Who Left Were Not Criminals

[Herceg] The Serbs in Rijeka are keeping silent.

[Konstantinovic] I recently said to Slavko Linic, mayor of Rijeka, in answering a question that all the Serbs who left Rijeka are not such criminals, that they were not all bloodthirsty in fighting the Croats. Most of those who moved out of Rijeka were Bosnian Serbs; many of them because of the poor economic situation, the inability to get their bearings in the new situation. They did not leave because they were fighting against Croatia. I must

say that it is incomparably easier to be a Serb in Rijeka and Istria than in other regions of Croatia, because there has been no shooting, and people's mentality is cosmopolitan and down-to-earth; they say: "The main thing is to be a human being, wherever you come from." In the Rijeka region, according to the last census, there were between 18,000 and 19,000 Serbs, and, in my estimate, nearly 40 percent of them have moved away. I emphasize, they did not leave because of repression, but friendship had cooled, there is no cordiality, people began to feel ghettoized. That is why I appeal to the Croatian people, to all men of goodwill, so that we can begin to build bridges of understanding, cooperation, because of our children. The Holy Father has done a great deal in that area, and Cardinal Kuharic is doing the same thing on a daily basis.

[Herceg] When will you visit your people in Vojvodina?

[Konstantinovic] I am not going to Vojvodina as long as the Milosevic regime is in power. My house is in Sremska Mitrovica, where I live surrounded by Serbs, Croats, and Germans. My grandmother, for example, was German, and four of my six uncles were Catholic, and two were Orthodox. After all, under Austro-Hungary it was possible to christen the children in both churches.

In conclusion, I would say only this: Every Serb committed to living in Croatia feels that he is completely right, but the one who has one foot in Banja Luka thinks differently.

Status of Croatian Refugees From Kosovo Unresolved

95BA0128A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jan 95 p 8

[Article by Senka Budimir: "3,000 Croats Are Waiting for Aid"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bjelovar—Ivic Pasalic, adviser to the president of the Republic of Croatia for domestic policy, and Ivan Simunovic, assistant minister for social welfare, came to Bjelovar-Bilogora Zupanija at the urgent summons of Zupan Zeljko Ledinski. The reason for this urgent summons was the very bad situation of 3,000 Croatian refugees from Kosovo who had settled in the abandoned region of Djulovac Opstina. According to Zupan Ledinski, these people were farmers in their villages in Kosovo, and in Djulovac Opstina, where they have settled, conditions do exist for farming.

Nevertheless, for the present they are all forced to live on humanitarian aid, because their status continues to be unresolved. They do not have documents, they are not Croatian citizens, and therefore they have numerous problems in getting employment and everything else. The zupanija has tried to help by purchasing seed and small tools so they can engage in market gardening, and the opstina has allocated land for their use. But this is not a complete and permanent solution. They lack machinery for cultivating the land, and the questions of

a kindergarten for the large number of children and a school for 450 pupils also need to be settled.

"Three thousand people represent 2.5 percent of the population of our zupanija, and we have to solve their problem in a more permanent way. With the departure of the Serbs who lived there, the area was left almost deserted, but last year there were chetnik incursions, and five of the new settlers were killed. These people are industrious and want to work, and we must make that possible for them, above all by providing them land and a few sheep for each household. That would be enough for a modest beginning," Zupan Ledinski said.

Aside from that, the return of the Serbs to their houses must also be counted on, and then these temporary new settlers will have to move out. That is why this should not be left to the last moment, and only then to think about what to do with these people. Adviser Ivic Pasalic said that it is in the interest of all of Croatia for people to live in those areas. This, then, is by no means a problem of just this zupanija alone, but Croatian society as a

whole must stand behind the effort to organize the life of Croats returning to their land.

"Croatia has a need for its citizens to return from abroad, and it must be able to receive them. There will be work to be done for all ministries, from the question of the certificate of origin to social welfare," Ivic Pasalic said.

Ivan Simunovic, assistant minister for social welfare, called for the problems to be stated in the most specific terms so they could be solved in the shortest possible time.

"We cannot treat those people as refugees, because they will never be going back to Kosovo. We must grant them the status of citizens of Croatia, which will also make it more possible for us to solve all of their other problems. This will be a kind of test for Croatia as to whether it can take its citizens back," Ivan Simunovic said.

After brief introductory consultations in the zupanija office, the team headed by Zupan Ledinski and adviser Pasalic went to Djulovac Opstina, where it examined on the spot the problems of the newcomers.

Rally Opens Albanian-Language University

AU1602204395 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 16 Feb 95 p 4

[Article by I. Stojkovska and A. Damovski: "There Is No Force To Stop Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday in the Tetovo village of Mala Recica the president of the initiative board of the so-called Tetovo Albanian University Fadil Sulejmani proclaimed the beginning of studies at the university. In front of several thousand citizens and representatives of all the political parties of Albanians, Sulejmani said that no one could stop the people's desire for education. "There is no force that can stop this," Sulejmani said.

Although from the beginning of the initiative (December 1994) for opening a university in the Albanian language in Tetovo the police announced they would stop any activities in this connection following the decision of the government on the anticonstitutional and illegal nature of the initiative, no such thing happened yesterday. The rally was held in front of the former house of the local community of the village that was today proclaimed to be the building of the Faculty of Natural Sciences and it was not disturbed by the police. The gathered people were not prevented from hearing the proclamation of the beginning of the so-called university.

Underneath a banner bearing the slogan "Welcome, first beginners," the former U.S. congressman and the present president of the U.S.-Albanian League in the United States Joseph Diogardi addressed the rally. In his speech he recommended—"Do not be afraid, you have your own people in the United States," and he said that nobody can violate the right to education and that this right must be on an equal footing for the Albanians as it is for the Macedonians. In closing his speech, Diogardi quoted a few lines from an old Albanian song in the Albanian language: "Do not be afraid, the brothers and sisters are in the United States."

Upon his return from the United States Fadil Sulejmani said that the Tetovo "University" signed a bilateral agreement on cooperation and exchange of students and professors with George Washington University in the U.S. capital city. Mihajlo Mihajlov, a former Yugoslav dissident, attended the opening as a representative of the university in Washington and in his brief speech he said that ethnic pluralism in education can reinforce and not disintegrate the state. Mihajlov stated for NOVA MAKEDONIJA that an agreement has been signed between professor Konstantin Menges from George Washington University and Fadil Sulejmani, which represented a moral support to the initiative of the Albanian intellectuals in Macedonia.

After the speeches had ended, the organizers called the citizens to "part in peace and dignity." The rally ended in a little more than 45 minutes without any problems or provocations. Some of the future students who attended

the rally were told that the lessons would start the same day at 1000 in the building of the "University presidency." As we know, the building where the "University presidency" is located, according to the initiators, was locked and sealed by the police just after the proclamation of the "university" on 17 December last year, and it still is sealed.

According to the initiative board, lessons of the faculties of philology and philosophy should begin in this building tomorrow, as well as groups for Albanian and English, for history and pedagogy.

Before the beginning of this rally, the public was informed that the police would not prevent public rallies, but it was also informed that the police would interfere in any activities that might be connected to the beginning of the work of the university.

The organizers of the rally also informed us that lists of future students have been prepared, that they would be distributed during the day, and that they have been printed in the Macedonian and in the Albanian language. During the next week, the initiators informed, the other faculties of the university would start work.

We could notice the following members of the Macedonian Assembly at the rally: Abdurahman Aliti, Naser Ziberi, Mersel Biljali, Arben Dzaferi, Sali Ramadani, Sefedin Haruni.... None of the Albanian ministers attended the rally.

Sulejmani Gives News Conference

AU1602204695 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 16 Feb 95 p 4

[Article by "I.S.": "We Shall All Defend the University"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tetovo, 15 February—This afternoon a news conference was held in the halls of the Assembly of the Tetovo Commune on the beginning of the academic year of the "Tetovo university" where the president of the "university" Fadil Sulejmani spoke to the journalists. "The solemn opening was also a strong testimony for the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] which completely passed the exam on its Albanian citizens with the highest mark," Sulejmani said among other comments. "It passed the exam toward a civilized democratic Europe and in this way the Macedonians and the Albanians have come closer to each other, but we have to become even closer because we are citizens of this country and we shall be responsible for any good or evil."

In addition Sulejmani said: "We have been together since the Krusevo Republic [1903 first Macedonian Republic]; we were together under the Turkish and the Serbian occupation, and we shall do it all together. I say this from my heart and soul. I once again congratulate the courage of this state, of this government that acted in a democratic spirit today, as it needs to act in the present

time, the time of computerization. I congratulate President Gligorov, who acted the way he was supposed to act. I greet him and he has the full support of the Albanians."

In answering some questions of the journalists, in particular connected to his commentary on the absence of Albanian ministers from today's ceremony in Recica, Sulejmani said that the intention of the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] was for them all to take part in the ceremony, and that he has not been informed about the absence of the ministers. Concerning a possible intervention of the police aimed at stopping the beginning of classes that has been announced for tomorrow, Fadil Sulejmani said: "I do not see any reason for the police to intervene after what happened today. However, if it stops us tomorrow or after tomorrow, 200,000 Albanians will stand in defense of the rooms. The police have guns and bombs, let them kill us all. It is our wish to be educated. We want the university to be included into the curriculum of the Macedonian program. Let them call us for a discussion and we shall agree about the shape of the university."

Joseph Diogardi, former member of the U.S. Congress of Albanian origin, and now president of the Albanian lobby in the United States, also spoke at the news conference. He made his speech in English upon his own request and it was mainly directed to the cameras. He explained his presence in Tetovo as a wish and need to support Fadil Sulejmani in his efforts for the accomplishment of the initiative for the Tetovo university.

Spokesman Warns Organizers

AU1602204495 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in
Macedonian 16 Feb 95 p 4

[Article by "B.J.": "Disrespect for Political Reality"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Government of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] is fully aware and responsible in approaching the solution of various problems and questions in the area of education in general, and therefore of education of the nationalities. Normally, it strictly respects its constitutional rights and duties. For us, the institutions of the system that have been established on the foundations of the legal constitutional order are the places in which we move and in which all who intend to secure legitimacy for their public actions should move. The enthusiastic founders, openers, and promoters of the so-called university in Mala Recica should know this because this view has already been made known to them, but obviously it should be repeated to them once more. What these gentlemen do represents an insolent violation of the constitutional framework and disrespect for political reality. The gentlemen themselves appeal to the sphere of education, and it is an eminent nonpolitical sphere, while their activities are eminently political, and therefore, if they interfere into policy they should be

fully aware of the consequences of their political activities. To head a so-called initiative for a university actually means to mislead the citizens of the Albanian nationality. It is an attempt to mislead the international public, and it also causes political damage to the efforts to solve the question from the sphere of interethnic relations. It has been once again demonstrated that those who are the most vociferous on behalf of their own nation do not mean well to the nation. Let us just remember the fate of the nations in former Yugoslavia when they were headed by big self-proclaimed national leaders."

This, among other things, was emphasized by Minister Spokesman Gjuner Ismail at yesterday's news conference that was held on the opening of the so-called Albanian university in the village of Mala Recica, near Tetovo. He also noted that the Government of the Republic of Macedonia repeats its known positions that were stated in the information of last December that the consequences of the inflicted damage and of these measures will be born by the initiators who tried to promote methods other than those that are clearly stated in the sphere of education. "This government has never said that there are no problems in the sphere of education, but it is trying to find the best solutions that can cope with reality." Gjuner Ismail also informed about the presence of Joseph Diogardi, a former congressman and president of a civil association, the U.S.-Albanian Civil League, in Mala Recica. "He enjoys our democratic hospitality, and since he must be restricted in political articulation in his postcongress actions, he found it appropriate to be engaged in policy in this region. During the day the U.S. authority reassured us seriously that this is his private action, and in this sense we shall study the modalities of his stay in Macedonia in the next few days."

As for Gert Arens's visit to our country, Ismail emphasized that it had nothing to do with the Tetovo university and that it is a small reason for the stay of a high official in our country. Ismail also noted that the rally yesterday was announced in advance and that the Albanian ministers were performing their daily duties. As for the question of some possible police interventions against Albanian citizens on the border near Tabanovce and on a bus that left Struga for Tetovo, Ismail said that in the first case it was a regular activity of the border authorities, and that he has not heard of the other.

Police Fail To Obstruct Classes

AU1602181395 Skopje MIC in English 16 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Under Secretary in the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] Interior Ministry Dime Gjurev confirmed for MIC that an attempt was made in the village of Poroj today to start the classes at the illegal university in Albanian language.

Gjurev stated that around 80 citizens congregated in a religious object located in the village of Poroj, and that

this act was also attended by the self-proclaimed rector Sulejmani and the Albanian lobbyist, former Republican Congressman (Joseph Diogardi). "Sulejmani told an authorized person that the university would continue working at any cost, and that if the police continued to obstruct the classes, he would call on 200,000 Albanians to defend it." The police sources claim that Sulejmani called on the villagers from the surrounding villages to protect the "students."

The under secretary in the Interior Ministry said that the police in Tetovo was not in a state of emergency, and that all the activities went on as normal. Gjurev explained that "it is still studied what kind of legal weight and what kind of consequences are caused by the Fadil Sulejmani's activities."

The police prevented the classes in philosophy and the theory of literature, which were held by the professors Rahmed Duda and Ismet Hodza, the private TV station from Tetovo ART told MIC. The same source claims that the police did not use force and that the first lesson lasted from 1030 to 1200 hours. ART TV claims that Sulejmani told the police that he would summon the people, or more specifically 200,000 Albanians, to defend the university tomorrow, if the police continued to obstruct the classes.

Serbian Paper on Tetovo University Issue

95BA0125A Belgrade DUGA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Dec 94-6 Jan 95 pp 16-18

[Article by Mile Radenkovic: "Awaiting Robert Dole's Inauguration: Sovereignty Under Mortgage"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the recent theater of the absurd in Tetovo, the epicenter of Skipetar separatism that for the present is called an autonomous entity, when the authorities demolished the building of the "Skipetar University," whose founding document had even been signed by Skipetar ministers, who after that took part in the proceedings of the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] Government, it was shown once and for all that Macedonian sovereignty is in the hands of the Skipetars, who will state the conditions for it whenever they like. With concentric provocative activities, they are maintaining the relevance of the old argument that they are old settlers here and therefore are entitled to a share of statehood or their own autonomous state. Plural democracy in Macedonia's position has made the Skipetars a key factor in Macedonia's entire stability to such an extent that any internal shift of their position is almost precluded.

With their election victory in western Macedonia and parts of Skopje and Kumanovo, they have obtained the right to have a direct influence on overall Macedonian policy in the Macedonian parliament and to propagate their own demands, which are often absurd. Following the disintegration of Yugoslavia, an authentic political line, occasionally spiced with the tutelage of Ibrahim

Rugova and especially the regime in Tirana, has been noticeable in the genesis of their politics in Macedonia. It is based on the knowledge that there is no Macedonian sovereignty and independence without their consent, that is, that they will exist insofar as they themselves are independent in the youngest European state.

Taking this fact as his point of departure, Gligorov, as the personification of Macedonia's present, has consented to flirting with the Skipetars, which—in view of their unaltered demands—could cost him dearly. That is, so that they would not hinder his strategy of rounding out Macedonian statehood, he has often been too accommodating to them, providing them with arguments for this or that kind of behavior now and in the future. He and those who think like him in the top level of government have been repeating without basis that Serbia is the greatest danger to Macedonian sovereignty, which has pushed Skipetar intentions into the background, simply exempted from the assumed review by the self-styled reorganizers of the world.

The misfortune that Macedonia and the Skipetars have in common is that the Skipetars are demanding something it will be difficult to get regardless of the degree of democracy and the names of the outside mentors. And they are demanding either a share of statehood or the autonomous state of Illyria.

"Macedonian officials can think what they like, but we are an entity without whom they cannot have the Macedonia they imagine. The historical facts and our numbers are sufficient argument that this should not be treated as a whim or threat, but as a vital necessity."

This statement by Abdurahman Aliti, who now leads the Skipetars in Macedonia, is actually a definition being repeated in turn by all the Skipetar officials, even those who have been taking part in the Government of Macedonia over the last four years. Mr. Aliti, for example, is at present the vice president of the Macedonian parliament, which is to say he is the second man in the largest legislative body in the sovereign state of Macedonia.

Consistently aligning themselves according to this statement, the protectors of overall Skipetar identity have also been taking pains to use the "Gligorov era" for practical realization of what they intend. Two years ago, for example, they laid the legal foundation of the autonomous state of Illyria, and whenever the Macedonians get tough, they threaten to set it in motion. They can actually do it, because for all practical purposes they have in their hands the territory of western Macedonia.

The Illegal University Was Established by Official Ministers

The events concerning last week's illegal opening of the Skipetar University in Tetovo follow the same line and confirm the seriousness with which they are undertaking to organize life in Macedonia. Taking as their point of departure the conclusion that the present educational

system in Macedonia does not suit their needs—which is partially true—and unable to do this legally and publicly, they secretly established the first Albanian-language higher educational institution in Macedonia.

By lining up and analyzing the facts related to this "educational deception," one easily arrives at the conclusion that the "university" was the work of outside mentors. A certain Dr. Fadilj Sulejmani, albanologist at the university and the man who as a practical matter is not a Macedonian citizen, is chairman of the committee for establishing the university, and we have learned from circles close to him that Mahmud Bakali, once a famous communist leader in Kosovo, is the originator of the idea of that university. Media and personal support from Tirana constitute another fact that the Skipetar University in Macedonia is a segment of Pan-Albanian strategy in the Balkans, a key link in the dream of a "Great Albania" in this region.

With their official decisions of the government, the Ministry of Education, and Cyril and Methodius University, and especially with the threat of force, the Macedonian authorities frustrated the act of legal establishment of the Skipetar University, but in practice they achieved nothing. The university was opened secretly, and, the most important—more accurately, the most dangerous—thing for Macedonian sovereignty is that the document accomplishing this was signed personally by Skipetars who are now Macedonian ministers.

In a visit to Tetovo in recent days, we have seen for ourselves the resolute stance of both the Skipetar officials and also ordinary mortals who are members of the Skipetar population in Macedonia, that the university and an autonomous state are an inevitability on the soil of Macedonia. The aforementioned Fadilj Sulejmani said that the university's existence was important enough for an armed conflict with those standing in its way.

That did not occur on the day of the official opening (17 December) because of the mentor's assessment that the time is not right and that an open conflict with the police would be more harmful to the ultimate objective, the strategy of Albanian policy sketched out in the Balkans.

"I can tell you with certainty that there is no force that can keep us from what we intend, and every attempt of the Macedonian police to do so can end tragically for the Macedonian state." Two days later, after the police had prevented the public promotion of the university, Sulejmani overlooked his previous statement without batting an eye and literally said this: "As you have seen, we have carried out the promotion of the university legally and in the presence of official representatives of the Macedonian authorities."

There is no objection to that statement of his, because, in fact, the document opening the university in Tetovo was signed by Macedonian ministers and the president of the

Tetovo Opstina Assembly, that is, by official representatives of Macedonian authorities. That is why the statement of the police minister, Ljubomir Frckovski, that this is "an inappropriate joke that has nothing to do with education," may be little or no consolation to those same authorities.

With the arrest of secondary people in the university's organization: Ahmeti Murtezanti, Agni Dika, the lawyer Mehmet Jusufi, and Artan Skenderi and Ramadan Sinani, editors of the private TV station ART, the Macedonian authorities have only intensified suspicion that they are for some reason in cahoots with the Skipetar higher educational "educators."

It follows from these facts that the leaders of the Macedonian opposition are essentially right in their public statements and assertions that the Skipetars have tacit support in their activity from President Gligorov. In order to keep them in tow, it is said, until Macedonian statehood is rounded out. In the presence of representatives of the international community, Gligorov has promised them both a university and also autonomy.

The conclusion that there is truth in all of this can be drawn from the behavior of the government toward the official signatories of the document opening the university. All of them have continued to hold their important state posts, and, still more absurd, they are sticking by the position that the Skipetar University in Tetovo, that is, in Macedonia, is a reality.

On the Eve of the Pan-Albanian Congress in Tirana

There are many circumstances that favor the hardened and unshakable behavior of the Skipetars. First of all, Macedonia's present external position and especially the undeniable quarrels within Macedonia. However absurd it might seem, it is true that any rebellion of the Skipetars could postpone indefinitely Macedonia's acceptance into the CSCE and other international and especially financial institutions, and, still more dangerous, it could jeopardize not only its present sovereignty, but its very existence.

Gligorov and his associates are also aware that unrest among the Skipetars in Macedonia would arouse those of like mind in Kosovo and also in neighboring Albania, which is almost officially supporting the extreme wing of the largest Skipetar party in Macedonia and which is also standing behind the university and the autonomous state of Illyria. To make the absurdity complete, the defeated Macedonian opposition, the VMRO [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization] and Gosev, see their opportunity for returning to the main political scene in the conflict between the government and the Skipetars. Convinced that that conflict is inevitable, the opposition, which is deep underground, is preparing the decisive blow.

The leaders of the Macedonian political opposition, above all the leaders of the VMRO, are making statements in passing that regardless of the behavior of the

present authorities, they will not allow the Skipetars to have either a university or any kind of autonomy, but that the trouble, according to Ljubisa Georgijevski, who failed to become president of Macedonia, is that in that effort the VMRO will be blamed by the Macedonian authorities for the war that will result from all of the humoring and concessions of the government.

But the correspondent of Radio Macedonia in Pristina has reported that "a meeting of Albanian intellectuals was held recently" in Skopje and "laid the foundations for their future activity in the region where they live," and that it was "attended by leaders of Albanian parties in Kosovo and in Macedonia." We have learned from the same sources that a representative of Albanian intellectuals from Tirana also attended the meeting as a guest. One of the resolutions adopted by that meeting was to organize the Pan-Albanian congress in Tirana in the near future (in mid-January, author's note) and that the "platform for unification of Balkan Albanians" would be drafted at that meeting with the help of friends of the Albanian people.

The Macedonian opposition is rightly asking itself how that meeting could have occurred in Skopje without representatives of the government and the Macedonian police having any idea of it, but they should have, because the meeting, they conclude, was aimed against the integrity and sovereignty of the Macedonian state.

Those who are informed about secret Albanian intrigues in Macedonia associate all their activities closely with changes on the political scene of the United States, that is, with the election rout of President Clinton's party. It is said, that is, that Senator Robert Dole is the strategist of Albanian policy in the Balkans and therefore also of that of the Skipetars in Kosovo and in Macedonia. That these are not ordinary political rumors is confirmed by the datum that Dole heads the Albanian lobby in the United States.

An analogous conclusion, to the effect that the dispute with Greece will be postponed until the next election in the United States, shows that ultimately all of this is harmful to Macedonia. Bill Clinton will not dare to resolve this dispute properly and automatically lose the support of several million Greek voters.

The Skipetars, runs the same logic, will not oppose the Macedonians and the Serbs in Kosovo with force until their friend and protector Robert Dole heads up the U.S. administration. Incidentally, the Americans who are present in Macedonia are guaranteeing them protection against possible repression of the Macedonian authorities.

[Box, p 17]

Skipetars on the Threshold of Autonomy: Drakce Kuzmanovski, Second Man in the Tetovo Parliament, Is Categorical

In the absence of Mr. Saciri, mayor of Tetovo, who was busy preparing the ceremonial opening of the university,

we talked about the situation in that city and its 95 settlements with his deputy, Drakce Kuzmanovski, vice president.

Immediately after the greetings and without being asked, Mr. Kuzmanovski said this: "I want to tell you at once that the Skipetar University does not come into consideration at all, at least not here in Tetovo. Although the people in Skopje do not ask us anything, we will thwart that separatist ruse at any price...."

[Radenkovic] Surely, Mr. Kuzmanovski, your opstina assembly is not operating autonomously, that is, without cooperation with the bodies of government?

[Kuzmanovski] That is exactly the situation. We here are left to ourselves to such an extent that I, for example, the second man of this opstina, know nothing about today's demolition of wildcat construction here in Tetovo. Nor do I know anything about the activities of our SUP [Secretariat for Internal Affairs], which, because the unauthorized structure demolished belonged to the Skipetars, carried out that action with its own members.

[Radenkovic] Do you at least collaborate with the Skipetars, who, as far as I know, have a majority in the city assembly?

[Kuzmanovski] There cannot be any essential cooperation. We representatives of Macedonians are only a formality here, and we demonstratively leave the meetings of the assembly in which the official language is Albanian, regardless of the law and the Constitution. Perhaps you did not know that Tetovo is the only city in Macedonia in which assembly meetings are conducted with simultaneous translation.

[Radenkovic] As far as I know, with the exception of the mayor, Macedonians hold all the key posts in the opstina government.

[Kuzmanovski] Much good that does when everything in practice is otherwise. If those posts were held by the right people, what has been happening to us would not be happening. They are all thinking more about their pocketbooks than about their people and their state when they are altogether excluded from public life here. In the presence of those same people, and probably also with their consent, Tetovo will soon be left without Macedonians, that is, it will soon be an ethnically pure Skipetar community. In Tetovo and the vicinity, there has been an unprecedented and shameful selling off of Macedonian land and other property, and the authorities are not lifting a finger. Certainly, the most horrible thing is that many Macedonians are actually being forced to leave their homes. I say "forced" because they have found themselves in an intolerable encirclement of Skipetars.

[Radenkovic] Where do you, as an authority elected by the people, see the way out of all this?

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[Kuzmanovski] There is no visible way out, and how could it be seen when the present government is allowing all this and, it seems to me, working in cahoots with the Skipetars? If that were not the case, how could this be happening, how could ministers find documents creating a Skipetar University, a Skipetar state...!? The way out is for those of us who stay here not to allow them to drive us away regardless of what the authorities in Skopje think and do.

Poor Turnout in Bitola By-Election

95P20513A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in
Macedonian 7 Feb 95 p 4

[Article by G. Karevski: "At the By-Election in Bitola's 7th District: Seven Candidates for the Second Round"]

[FBIS Editorial Report] On 7 February, the Skopje daily NOVA MAKEDONIJA reported the results of a by-election held to replace the newly appointed Minister of Urbanization and Construction Jorgo Sundovski. Only 4,555 people, or 25.72 percent, voted in the parliamentary by-election in Bitola's 7th electoral district on 5 February. Not one of the nine candidates received the required minimum number of votes, 5,925 or one third of the 17,776 registered voters, to win election; therefore, a second round will be held on 19 February. Branirod Mihajlovski, the candidate supported by the Alliance for Macedonia governing coalition (which consists of the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia, the Liberal Party, and the Socialist Party), received the most votes, 1,373. Vladimir Golubovski, the leader of the VMRO-DP (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, Democratic Party) who ran as an independent, got 747 votes. Other independent candidates received about half as many votes: Nikola Stojkov (345), Lazar Nikolovski (399), and Pavle Georgievski (344). Pando Petkovski of the VMRO-MNDS (VMRO-Macedonian National Democratic Alliance) won 399 votes, and Ljupco Sekulovski of the Democratic Party of Macedonia, which holds one seat in the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), was supported by 384 voters. Two candidates, the independent Josip Dimitrovski, and Vangel Ristevski, who was supported by the League of Communists of Macedonia, received too few votes, 253 and 203, respectively, to qualify for the second round. According to the electoral commission, there were no irregularities. In addition to the 4,543 registered voters who went to the polls, 12 soldiers were allowed to vote by absentee ballot.

Defense Minister Assesses Security Situation

AU1602175695 Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 6
Feb 95 pp 26-27

[Interview with Defense Minister Blagoj Handziski by Zelimir Smilevski; place and date not given: "Weapons Come Later"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The appointment of 46-year-old Dr. Blagoj Handziski, who holds a Ph.D. in electrical engineering, to the post of defense minister of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] came as the greatest possible surprise. Up until his appointment, Dr. Handziski was the secretary general of the ruling Social Democratic Alliance.

[Smilevski] How would you assess the security situation in the state and on the borders with neighbors?

[Handziski] Despite the great number of problems in the country and in the neighborhood, we have managed to maintain inner stability and peace.

We have numerous internal problems, but two are dominant: the grave economic crisis and interethnic relations. As far as the economic crisis is concerned, it is caused by more or less the same factors as in other new states in which the political system has changed, transitions are in progress, and so on, but in our case it has been heightened by the blockade imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and the unilateral Greek embargo.

The other crucial problem is the strained interethnic relations. We believe that we have found the formula for the coexistence of Macedonians and Albanians, two of the largest ethnic groups in the country, so we are optimistic about a solution to this problem. The formula is to solve all the problems—which objectively do exist—through the institutions of the system.

As far as the borders are concerned, there were a lot of problems lately, but our constructive approach and efforts to maintain good neighborly relations have yielded significant results. We had frequent incidents on our northern border with the FRY, but the tensions have lessened considerably in recent months so that we can now say that the incidents have ceased altogether.

At one point, Albania did not monitor its borders at all, which resulted in a great number of illegal crossings, accompanied by incidents and casualties. A positive development of political relations between Macedonia and Albania led to a change in the border situation, so that there are now almost no incidents. At one point, there were also provocations on our southern border, which manifested themselves in maneuvers, a greater massing of troops than usual, and frequent violations of the airspace, but all this has ceased, so that we now consider the situation on the southern border to be stable and favorable.

There were no incidents worth mentioning on the eastern border.

[Smilevski] How do you see cooperation with neighbors and countries in the vicinity, and what associated problems have you encountered?

[Handziski] We had several meetings with Albania and we have drafted several important documents, which are

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now ready for signature. Our chief of the General Staff has visited the Albanian Army's General Staff and we are now expecting a return visit, as well as the visit of the Albanian defense minister when we shall ratify earlier agreements.

We have also had several contacts with the Bulgarian Defense Ministry. There has been a stalemate since June last year, which was primarily caused by our preelection period, and now changes have taken place in Bulgaria. We expect to soon renew the contacts.

Of the countries in our vicinity we have signed an agreement and drawn up a cooperation program with Slovenia.

The most concrete forms of cooperation have been achieved with the Turkish Defense Ministry. The majority of agreements have been signed, and some are already being implemented.

Cooperation with these countries mostly involves training and schooling cadres, exchanges of opinion in the field of defense, the presence of our teams at their maneuvers, a joint appearance at seminars, symposiums, and conferences, the schooling of our cadres for our military medical facilities, and so forth. I believe that activities in the sphere are progressing well and that cooperation will become even closer in the future.

Unfortunately, we have no cooperation whatsoever with Serbia and the FRY for two reasons: one, our two states still have not recognized each other, and two, because of the border issue. It is our wish to achieve mutual recognition as soon as possible and establish all types of cooperation, but we seem to be unable to get the process off the ground. During Mitsotakis' recent visit to the FRY, President Milosevic reiterated his position that he would recognize us only after we solve our problems with Greece, which further strained our relations. The other problem is the as yet undefined border. We insisted on the forming of governmental committees which would solve the issue. We have done so, but the other side has not.

We also do not cooperate with Greece due to the breakdown in political relations and the unilateral embargo imposed by Greece, which is causing our economy catastrophic losses and is further complicating political relations. I cannot understand the stubbornness of the Greek side, particularly as the embargo is also causing them immense damage.

[Smilevski] Macedonia is insisting on admission to the Partnership for Peace project. What would it gain by it, and is not too expensive for the already financially exhausted Macedonian state?

[Handziski] We are working on meeting the standards required by NATO and the Partnership for Peace project. The greatest problem involved in our joining the project is the Greek veto, which is exclusively connected to the solution of our political problems. However, we

cannot wait until this problem is solved, and are hurriedly preparing for meeting the required standards, so that once the obstacles are removed, we can join the program and later the collective NATO defense system.

All the partners we have been cooperating with are openly expressing the desire to see us join the project as soon as possible. That is why we are approaching the problem of lifting the Greek veto from various sides. President Clinton himself told KATHIMERINI that it was necessary to initiate a dialogue as soon as possible. Some of our partners are even militarily pressuring the Greek side in order to force it to give in, so that we expect that as soon as we meet the required standards and conditions—and given the support of members like the European Union and United States—we are going to become members of the Partnership for Peace project.

[Smilevski] Foreign press is increasingly implying that Macedonia is buying armaments from the United States. How true is this?

[Handziski] This is nonsense that a serious person cannot believe. First, you can only set out to procure armaments once you have thoroughly and precisely defined your needs. Macedonia's present organization of defense is one thing, and features required by the standards of NATO and the Partnership for Peace project are quite another, which means that if you have not reorganized and have not restructured your formations, you cannot know what your requirements are and how to go about fulfilling them. We have not defined our requirements—which will be clear only after we have completed the restructuring process—and that is why there is no realistic basis for requesting permission for procuring armaments or receiving aid in material-technical or military equipment. Therefore, this is just pure speculation.

[Smilevski] Why then did Walter Slocombe, undersecretary at the Pentagon, during his recent visit to Macedonia reply with an unequivocal "no" when asked whether Macedonia would receive a loan for the procurement of armaments? This seems to imply that the procurement of armaments was, after all, discussed? Finally, to what extent will his "no" reflect on your future plans regarding the reorganization and arming of the army?

[Handziski] We asked for neither loans nor funds. Once we have met the standards, we shall attempt to organize ourselves in accordance with them. Until we do so, we cannot apply for either loans for armaments of any type or other aid in the form of armaments. Do not forget that the UN embargo—banning states that have emerged from the former Yugoslavia from buying or importing armaments—is still in force.

Which option of arming the Macedonia Army is the one most often considered?

This will depend exclusively on the doctrine and strategy. We have opted for a defensive function of the

army and the units we form will be in accordance with our needs. The armaments will depend on the strategy, but also on the environment. If we know what type of armaments are at our neighbors' disposal, it is clear that we shall have to equip our army with such armaments that will successfully resist any possible attack of border violation. We have detailed information on the type of armaments possessed by our neighbors, and that will guide us in dimensioning our need for an organized defense.

[Smilevski] According to certain sources, Macedonia is asking for arms (tanks, helicopters, etc.) "because of the development of the situation in Kosovo." What do you expect will happen in Kosovo?

[Handziski] All ways of dealing with the Kosovo issue with the exception of peaceful means will set the entire region on fire and draw all of Europe into the conflict. Then it would no longer be a question of Macedonia's defense, but that of all the Balkan countries. It is clear

that a military solution to the Kosovo issue would not only have unwanted, but also unforeseeable consequences. We would have a wave of Kosovo refugees, Albania would get directly involved in the conflict, and later other countries would get involved as well. That is why we see the solution in a dialogue within the framework of rights that the Albanians had in the 1974 Constitution.

[Smilevski] Why do you believe that the framework of a solution to the conflict should be the 1974 Constitution?

[Handziski] I do not believe for a minute that the Republic of Kosovo is a solution nor that borders should change. I mentioned the 1974 Constitution as a model for giving back the Albanians what they had according to that constitution. I also think that is the most the Yugoslav side can offer, and according to my information, the international community and the world powers see the solution in the same way.

Kacin: UNPROFOR Decision Not 'Final'

AU1602165395 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 16 Feb 95

[Report by Robert Skerjanc from Otocec—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovene and Croatian Defense Ministers Jelko Kacin and Gojko Susak and their assistants met on a working visit this afternoon.

[Skerjanc] In a brief statement for the public after the meeting, Minister Kacin said that the meeting took place on the Slovene initiative, because Slovenia would like to obtain firsthand information about Croatia's decisions regarding the reintegration of a part of its territory:

[Kacin] Mr. Susak and his assistants informed us thoroughly about the intention of the Croatian Government to carry out this reintegration peacefully. We agreed to hold meetings at the level of defense ministers at least twice a year and at the same time find other ways of widening mutual cooperation.

The mutual exchange of information about all moves that are relevant for the security of both countries will form an essential component of the regular activities in the future. We also discussed the establishment of direct cooperation at the level of military attaches in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the first meeting was extremely productive and, at the same time, an opportunity for better cooperation in the future.

[Skerjanc] Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak said:

[Susak, in Serbo-Croatian with superimposed translation] Slovenia's concern for the situation in Croatia and the cancellation of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] mandate is justified. We are concerned, too. We conveyed the Croatian Government view that we do not wish to resolve this problems with a war, but peacefully. Here, we expect full support from Slovenia as a neighboring and friendly country.

[Skerjanc] Minister Kacin also said that the final decision on UNPROFOR's withdrawal has not been made yet, and also that NATO has not yet prepared all the plans that are supposed to precede such a decision. If this decision is made, Slovenia will assist actively in the withdrawal of the troops from Croatia. The way things stand now, the final decision about their withdrawal has not been made yet. Future developments will not depend merely upon Zagreb but also upon decisions by the United Nations, NATO, and primarily, as Kacin said, the partner that has to negotiate with Zagreb, that is, the Serbs who are Croatian citizens.

Interview With Head of Office for Refugees

95BA0127D Ljubljana SLOVENE in Slovene 9 Jan 95 p 2

[Interview with Milan Sustar, director of the Office for Refugees, by Vesna Voglar; place and date not given: "Employed Refugees Would Not Be Competition for the Slovene Work Force!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is still not over, and thus the refugee problem here is also still an acute one. A new law on temporary refugees is being prepared. We talked about the most urgent difficulties—employment, education, international assistance, and the prospects for the refugees—with Milan Sustar, director of the Office for Refugees.

[Voglar] How many refugees are there in Slovenia?

[Sustar] According to the latest data, at the end of last year there were 24,156 refugees registered in Slovenia. The Red Cross thinks that there are approximately another 5,000 who have not been registered for various reasons. Approximately 10,000 of them live in reception centers, and others are staying with families, friends, or acquaintances.

[Voglar] The draft law on temporary refugees will also spell out employment for refugees. How will it be regulated?

[Sustar] Employment is one of the most critical issues. The refugees have now been in Slovenia for three or four years without regular employment. Of course, some of them are working on the black market. At least 1,000 people are capable of working, i.e., the refugees between 15 and 60 years old. It is hard to say how many of them really have found an illegal source of earnings, however. In the winter there is somewhat less work than there is in the fall or spring. Slovenia does not allow refugees to be employed. Some have succeeded in obtaining a work permit, but they thereby lost the status of temporary refugees and became migrant workers with a one-year permit. The draft law provides for the temporary and occasional possibility of work. That would be primarily seasonal work, which they would be given by our office, in the same way that the student service works.

[Voglar] What difficulties would be resolved through employment?

[Sustar] The right to work would have twofold significance. The refugees would be able to work occasionally, and would also earn some money and thus settle for themselves part of the costs of living at the reception centers. Charitable assistance would be adjusted to their incomes, and part of the money could also be used for various supplemental payments, pensions....

[Voglar] What does temporary and occasional work mean?

[Sustar] It is an expression from labor law. In both cases, the volume of work is limited to a single employer. It is not the same thing as a work permit, because by accepting work they do not lose temporary refugee status. That provision of the law allows them legal employment because illegal employment is only a burden for the state. The refugees only derive short-term benefit from "black market" work, and in the event of accidents at work once again the state bears the burden.

[Voglar] And what about educated refugees?

[Sustar] Educated personnel are already obtaining regular employment. I know a doctor who has been regularly employed, and there are certainly more such cases. In my opinion, there should be no obstacles whatsoever to employment, but in Slovenia there is still fear about the employment of refugees because of the large number of people unemployed. I think that the refugees who would be employed would not be any competition for the Slovene work force.

[Voglar] Will you train refugees for individual jobs?

[Sustar] It will be difficult for all the refugees to start working again after three years. Some nongovernmental organizations, primarily foreign ones, have received funds for training from the EC. Abbreviated training courses are already taking place. Primarily secondary-school young people are participating in them, and training for professions such as carpenters, bricklayers, waiters, cooks.... Those are professions in which they could work in Slovenia, and also after returning to their homeland.

[Voglar] How is the education of refugees going?

[Sustar] They have an elementary school in their native language, and in the smaller regions, where they are few of them, they are included in Slovene classes. In Ljubljana there is no possibility of including refugees as well in classes that are already very full. Refugee schools only have instruction in Slovene schools. The rumors that refugees are to be included in Slovene classes are not true. This year 3,240 refugees are attending the refugee school.

[Voglar] What provisions have been made for secondary school children?

[Sustar] Secondary school children can go to school if the secondary schools have space in the class and if the refugee finds a donor to pay the tuition. One thousand refugees have been registered in Slovene secondary schools, which is very many.

[Voglar] How much money is the state allocating for refugees, and how much does the international assistance amount to?

[Sustar] Last year Slovenia provided approximately \$19 million from the budget, and there was \$10 million in international assistance from foreign charitable organizations: the office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, the world food program, and Italy and Austria. There is less and less international assistance. The Red Cross and the world food program have already announced that they will allocate less assistance for refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina because there are more and more international crisis areas.

[Voglar] What is the future like for refugees in our country, and are you sending them back to safe areas?

[Sustar] There are not many safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and consequently we have not been able to send them back to their homeland. There is not even any possibility of normal life in those "safe areas." Slovenia has to make sure that the refugees are sent back only when they have not only physical but also social security in their homeland. That is why we cannot talk about any kind of organized return. Many people have gone back on their own. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Government has offered us an agreement on organized return, but refugees are still coming into Slovenia from other crisis areas.

[Voglar] How much does it cost to take care of one refugee at a reception center?

[Sustar] It costs from 250 to 400 tolar a day, but the price depends on the market situation. That amount includes expenses for housing (water, electricity...) and food in accordance with the standards. Where they do the cooking themselves, the food is cheaper. The refugees receive at least two meals a day, one of which is hot, and school-age children also receive a school snack provided by the Republic of Austria.

State Railway Heads Meet for Coordination

95BA0111B Ljubljana GOSPODARSKI VESTNIK in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jan 95 p 15

[Article by Natasa Korazija: "Railroad Adaptation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *With the new approach to organization, the railroads will be more liberal and allow access to other railroad systems; they have proposed establishing a computer system for the sale of tickets and seats.*

"We have to eliminate the differences in quality between Eastern and Western railroads as soon as possible," Michel Walrave, secretary general of the UIC [International Railroad Union], said last week in Podcertek at a meeting of a group of four neighboring railroad administrations. At the beginning of 1992, representatives of the Austrian, Croatian, Hungarian, and Slovene railroads established the group of four railroad administrations in order to be more successful in overcoming the difficulties of unevenly developed railroads. One of the achievements of the group of four, which operates within the framework of the UIC, has been shortening the delays of trains at border crossings: Because of better organization and the sending of documents in advance, trains do not wait for more than an hour now, but rather 10 minutes.

At the last meeting, representatives of the group of four spoke about coordinating the development of the railroad infrastructure in the area between the Danube and the Adriatic, and about eliminating bottlenecks in the flow of freight through border crossings. In addition to the general directors of the Slovene, Croatian, and Hungarian railroads, the meeting was also attended by UIC Secretary General Michel Walrave and Helmut Hainitz,

deputy general director of the Austrian railroads, who is also chairing the group of four. The directors of the individual railroad administrations reported on the organizational changes necessary for adaptation to the EU guidelines adopted with respect to the new approach to organizing railroads. The essential thing about all the changes is the liberalization of railroads and allowing access to the railroad infrastructure to other users as well.

One of the specific agreements in the more general talks was a proposal to establish a computer system for the sale of tickets and seats. They were also supposed to agree on the possibility of the international use of trains with tilting equipment. Specifically, the Italian Pendolino was tested on our railroad lines. Because the train is unprofitable at short distances, they are reaching agreement on possibilities for the joint purchase of the train and joint use on international railroad lines. During experimental trips, the Italian Pendolino express train reached the speed of 208.2 kilometers per hour, a record for Slovene railroad lines. The advantage of trains with tilting equipment—the Swedish X-2000 is another one—is primarily that they can reach a speed up to 30 percent higher than ordinary trains even on railroad lines with numerous curves. Unfortunately, the experimental trips were merely evaluated in Podcertek, and specific decisions on a purchase have not yet been made.

[Box, p 15]

Helmut Hainitz, deputy general director of the Austrian railroads and chairman of the group of four railroad administrations:

"We do not expect any changes in the transportation regime with Austria's admission to the EU. We have ensured that it will not be necessary to change our policy until the year 2002. That means that very little will change in that area for the neighboring countries."

[Box, p 15]

Marjan Rekar, director of Slovene Railroads: "We need 10 to 12 years to modernize our railroad lines. That means another two or three investment cycles like this one."

[Box, p 15]

Hungarian-Slovene Corridor

Zoltan Rigo, director of the Hungarian railroads:

"Our government has ordered a feasibility study, which we are financing through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD], and it will be done in the middle of next February. The government and the Ministry of Transportation think that the Hungarian-Slovene link is important in the East-West direction. Tivador Szabo is responsible for the project at the Hungarian railroads. Last week Transportation Minister Karol Lotz visited the railroad administration in Szombathely, where an agreement was reached on the method of financing. We expect to be able to get a loan through the EBRD and the PHARE [Economic Restructuring Aid for Poland and Hungary] program, and so we could start building approximately 40 kilometers of the railroad line on our side in 1996."

Federal**Ban Lifted on UNMO Use of Radar Screens***AU1602163695 Paris AFP in English 1543 GMT 16 Feb 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 16 (AFP)—Yugoslav authorities have lifted a ban on UN Military Observers (UNMOs) watching radar screens at Belgrade Airport where they are stationed as part of the UN Security Council ban on flights over Bosnia, UN spokesman Yuri Chizhik said here Thursday. He said that the monitors were barred from the radar room for two weeks from the beginning of February, without proper explanation.

Between February 1 and February 4, UN peacekeepers deployed in eastern Bosnia reported 62 helicopter flights near the Moslem enclave of Srebrenica. The initial UN field report said the aircraft probably came from the direction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro).

Chizhik told reporters that an agreement was reached to lift the ban following talks on Wednesday between UN officials and Yugoslav military and civilian authorities. He added that the agreement "fully restored access for the UNMOs to the radar room and screens at Belgrade Airport, the minute the meeting ended."

LC-MY: Serbs Should Sign Contact Group Plan*AU1602175395 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 16 Feb 95*

[Report by Biljana Jeremic]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a regular news conference of the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia [LC-MY], it was pointed out that it is high time peace was established and the achievements of civilization resumed on the territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Jeremic] We believe that our efforts and the courage we have shown in coming before the domestic and international public with a platform for overcoming the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be supported by forces who are ready to contribute to halting the people's exodus. If the conflict is not curbed, not only will it present a threat to the biological survival of the peoples there, but it will certainly not remain on the other sides of the Drina, Sava, and Una Rivers, LC-MY President Ratko Krsmanovic said. All the national unions formed so far that concerned Bosnia-Herzegovina and plans by various peace creators have failed, above all due to the unequal treatment of the sides in the conflict, Krsmanovic said.

Mica Carevic, president of the Republican Committee of the LC-MY in Bosnia-Herzegovina, said that those people who replaced self-determination with secession and hurriedly turned the result of secession into sovereign states and proclaimed the internal borders to be

indisputable, have caused war to flare up here. The Serbs have no reason not to sign the Contact Group plan if their rights are equal to those of the other two peoples and if the sanctions are lifted, Mica Carevic concluded.

Serbia**ND: Contact Group Plan 'Incomplete, Unfair'***AU1602165195 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 16 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] All open questions on the territory of the former Yugoslavia must be resolved in a peaceful way. This is a stand that the New Democracy [ND] presented at the news conference held at the International Press Center. The latest offer presented by the Contact Group is incomplete and unfair as it leaves room for a continuation of negotiations and new diplomatic activities. This was an assessment by Zarko Jokanovic, head of the ND caucus at the Serbian Assembly. Here is Vladimir Nikolic reporting on the news conference.

[Begin recording] [Nikolic] All participants in the negotiations, including the international factors, must be responsible and must be aware of that responsibility. According to Jokanovic, the problem of Zagreb and Knin should be solved in direct negotiations, and the international community should do everything possible to prevent a new war between them. In Jokanovic's opinion, one should not overestimate the influence Serbia and Yugoslavia may exert on the leaderships and people in Krajina and the Srpska republic.

All countries that appeared on the territory of the earlier Yugoslavia must have equal conditions, Jokanovic said and added the following:

[Jokanovic] That means that, above all, we insist that the sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia be lifted completely and that it be received back into the United Nations, that is, that its equal membership in the United Nations and the OSCE be resumed. International recognition of Yugoslavia is also necessary in order to ensure this equal status.

[Nikolic] On the other hand, a mutual recognition of the republics on the territory of the former Yugoslavia will not stop the war, just as the one time international recognition of some seceded republics failed to prevent war here. [passage omitted]

Petition for Ugljanin's Return to Sandzak*AU1602183195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 16 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The signing of a petition for the return of Dr. Sulejman Ugljanin, president of the Muslim National Council of Sandzak, to Sandzak and

for the release of political prisoners, whose guilt neither existed nor was ever proven in court, was started in Sandzak on 14 February.

In Novi Pazar, 10,000 people signed the petition on the first day, and not only Bosniaks, but also Serbs, Montenegrins, and others. The signing of the petition was accompanied by the stepped-up security measures of the Serbian police, with which they were trying to intimidate citizens and thwart this action, which is backed by all Bosniak national institutions and all political parties in Sandzak—the Party of Democratic Action, the Liberal Bosniak Organization, the Party for National Equality, the Serbian Renewal Movement, and others.

The signing of the petition will be organized in all towns in Sandzak and also abroad wherever the Bosniaks live and work, the Muslim National Council of Sandzak reports.

Montenegro

Bulatovic Terms Lifting Sanctions Key to Peace

LD1702112695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2318 GMT 16 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 16 Feb (TANJUG)—President of Montenegro Momir Bulatovic said on TV Politika this evening that the issue of lifting sanctions “is the key element which would make an absolute contribution to the restoration of peace in the area of the former Yugoslavia.”

“As things are, everyone is waiting for Serbia and Montenegro to be exhausted economically so that they can take their share of the cake, but we have much more vitality than our adversaries think,” the Montenegrin president said in the “This Evening We Ask” program.

Bulatovic stressed that he is cooperating exceptionally well with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and said this is a good thing for both Serbia and Montenegro. He assessed that “recognition of Croatia by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] does not resolve anything,” adding that the FRY said in a declaration that it does not have any territorial claims.

Insistence on the issue of recognition implies that the problem of relations between Knin and Zagreb would be resolved once Belgrade recognizes Croatia, Bulatovic said. This represents confirmation of the thesis that Belgrade allegedly attacked Zagreb and not that the Serbs in Croatia organized themselves and acted like a state in opposing something they see as terror and the possibility of genocide, he added.

Those who propose recognition have hidden political goals, Bulatovic said, adding that these goals are based on the misconception that the problem of Knin-Zagreb relations can be resolved without Knin which, he stressed, is impossible. Bulatovic stressed that there is neither any need nor any sense in resolving this problem

by force of arms. He stressed that the presence of UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] forces is vital and expressed the hope that international pressure will bear fruit and that Croatian President Franjo Tudjman will find a way of extending UNPROFOR's mandate.

The Montenegrin president stressed that the interests of the Serbs in former Bosnia-Herzegovina could be realized in a more successful way if they accept the Contact Group's plan as a basis for negotiations. He expressed a high degree of concern, he said, over the fact that at present the Srpska republic does not see the need to protect its vital state and national interests through the negotiating process. Bulatovic said he is unclear as to why everything that has been achieved is being gambled with in the hope of achieving an undefined, possible gain.

On the question of Prevlaka, Bulatovic stressed that a just border with Croatia must be achieved and that Montenegro and the FRY should have unhindered access to 30 percent of their territorial waters. Our defense and state interests remain the same, Bulatovic said, adding that the way for these interests to be met lies exclusively in diplomatic negotiations. He added that the best solution is for UN observers to remain on Prevlaka and he pointed out that Montenegro surrendered Prevlaka to them and not to Croatia.

According to Bulatovic, there are many worrying indications that the war crimes' trial in the Hague will be politically biased. It would be a compromise to condemn only one group of people because they are members of one ethnic group—Serbs—Bulatovic said. He expressed the firm conviction that Serbia and Montenegro will go down the road of modern federalism once the period of war and all its tribulations has passed.

“What satisfies me about Montenegro's position in the Federation is the fact that Montenegro has real instruments with which to fight for its equality and articulate its political standpoints in a democratic way,” Bulatovic concluded.

Gas Smuggling Threatens Pollution ‘Catastrophe’

AU1702092595 Paris AFP in English 0308 GMT 17 Feb 95

[Report by Bozo Milicic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica, Yugoslavia, Feb 17 (AFP)—Rampant petrol (gas) smuggling between Albania and Montenegro, in violation of international sanctions, threatens an environmental catastrophe, Montenegrin opposition leaders have warned.

The illicit trade across Lake Skoder, which the government in Podgorica has actively encouraged in defiance of the UN embargo against the rump Yugoslavia, has provoked growing concern in Montenegro after a series of pollution incidents on the lake, a natural frontier between the two countries.

Petrol is one of several key commodities covered by the international embargo, which the United Nations placed on Serbia and Montenegro in May 1992 to punish the two rump states of Yugoslavia for supporting the Bosnian Serbs. Last September the UN lifted part of the embargo but continued to try to block the petrol trade.

It is a highly profitable trade for the government of Montenegro, which has set up five depots around the lake for the petrol, snapped up cheap in Albania and resold at three times the price. The petrol, taken across the lake in often overloaded fishermen's barges, is stored and then decanted into drums for distribution around the country by seasoned salesmen.

Frequent accidents that have left the waters polluted. Last May hundreds of tonnes of petrol spilled into the lake after a fire in one of the five "official" stores.

Opposition leaders have also raised concerns that traffickers are transporting the oil in contaminated barrels. The barrels, stolen from Bajza in Albania, contained toxic pesticides sent to Albania in 1991 and 1992 by a Germany company in Hanover. The pesticides, which were recently sent back to Germany, contained mercury, dioxin, and other cancer-causing products, according to the environmental group Greenpeace.

Specialist committees set up by opposition parties have been quick to brand the trade an "ecological crime," and have blamed the government for cashing in at the expense of the environment on the pretext of furthering the national interest. Government ministers are also under pressure over pollution in the Zeta River valley in the south of the country, caused by chemical effluent from an aluminium factory in Podgorica.

Leading Montenegrin ecologist Branko Boljevic has called it the "worst environmental problem in the Balkans." Opposition leaders have called for the factory to be closed. But the government and the company, which employs 4,500 people, have said they do not have the \$60 million needed to clean up the pollution.

The river itself and much of the surrounding agricultural land, the most important in Montenegro, is now contaminated with high levels of toxic chemicals. The government, dominated by the former communists, has said merely that it will take measures to stop any more spillages, and has asked for aid from international environmental agencies.

Kosovo

Serb Police Kill One, Wound Five Albanians

AU1602210295 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 16 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] An extremely tense situation prevails in Kosovo. Last night, a Serbian policeman killed one Albanian and wounded five other citizens in Prishtina.

Meanwhile, reports confirm Serbian police interventions in Skenderaj and Malisheve. For more, journalist Leke Musolli is on the line from Prishtina:

[Musolli] At 1830 last night in three different points in Prishtina, the Serbian security member Slavisa Stankovic killed 65-year-old Ali Obria and, within several minutes, wounded at least five others—44-year-old Nusret Latifi, 20-year-old Artan Rexhepi, 37-year-old Nexhmedin Govori, and 20-year-old Jelena Svorovic, who are receiving treatment at the Surgery Clinic in the Medical Faculty in Prishtina. Of them, Nustret Latifi is reported to be in serious condition.

According to witnesses, at approximately 1830, the pensioner Ali Obria was shot as he was entering the teahouse Sahat Kulla, near the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Kosova. After this murder, the same policeman wounded the aforementioned citizens within several minutes. A witness confirms that the policeman stopped two girls in the street and wounded one of them with a revolver. On this occasion, Jelena Chorovic was wounded in the back.

From here, revolver in hand, policeman Stankovic went to another street behind the old post office and fired at Nexhmedin Govori and Nustret Latifi, who received serious wounds.

After wounding the two, he entered the shop of Artan Rexhepi and fired two bullets at him. After changing the cartridge clip of his revolver and assuming the style of a crazy cowboy, the policeman left for another street where, according to another witness, he ran into a child and kept him lying on the ground for some moments with the revolver's barrel at his head.

Not satisfied with this, Stankovic fired shots at a locksmith shop and wounded the owner inside, Branimir Stankovic. Later, the policeman headed toward the Graphic Enterprise Rezniki, threatening with his weapon the enterprise worker Ismet Cani to open the door for him.

A witness confesses that due to the policeman's threats, two youngsters were obliged to lie on the ground in front of a shoemaker's. Meanwhile, after several minutes, as reported also by the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms, this rebel policeman was detained by security authorities.

An official communique by the Serbian police testifies to the entire drama suffered by the innocent citizens at the hands of this policeman and states that the policeman had consumed a large amount of alcohol beforehand and had allegedly committed these acts with no reason at all.

The Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms reports that the police efforts not to give the case a political dimension are not convincing, as in all the cases the policeman attacked only the bars where he indicated he would find only Albanians.

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The Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms states that the case of an Albanian youth in Gjilan being abused by a Serbian policeman and the killing of Ali Obria and wounding of five others by a Serbian policeman are, however, testimonies of the frenzied behaviors by police bodies aimed at testing and provoking the temper of Albanians in Kosova.

Commentary on Serb Police

AU1602213495 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 16 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The terrorist action committed last night and the abuse of an Albanian woman in Gjilan several days ago present another testimony to the total insecurity of people in the streets, working places, and their homes, states a commentary by the Kosova Information Center [QIK].

Even several Serbian circles in the mass media in Serbia have not managed to negate the Serbian violence and terror in Kosova. For more, Mehmet Haziri is on the line from Prishtina:

[Haziri] The terrorist action perpetrated last night in the central part of Prishtina, where there are always policemen and Serbian secret service members, leaves little room to believe in Serbian police media allegations that the criminal was a drunken policemen, states a QIK commentary.

The assessment that it is a question of an "incident" reveals that their aim is to diminish the dimensions of this terrorist act. This action followed the abuse of an Albanian woman by a Serbian security inspector in Gjilan.

The commentary reminds us that last summer, several so-called casual incidents occurred, such as the killing of six-year-old Fidan Brestovci in Ferizaj, the killing of Violeta Dervishaj in Decan, and the wounding of an Albanian taxi driver by a drunken policeman.

These so-called incidents by the Serbian press and authorities were assessed here to be incidents ordered by the Belgrade regime. The fact that the Serbian policemen who perpetrated the crimes were not held to bear any responsibility no room for doubt that these affairs were intentional.

The rape of a woman in Gjilan and the terrorist action of Wednesday evening in Prishtina are another testimony to a total insecurity of people in this area. This insecurity is a consequence of actions by Serbian forces to collect even those few personal weapons possessed by Albanians, and is aimed at opening the way to frenzied actions against Albanians.

Various associations inside Serbia, who have so far proven to be pale and heavy with chauvinism, cannot close their eyes in the face of the Serbian violence and terror in Kosova.

At a news conference held in Belgrade, Natasha Kandic, chairman of the Fund for Humanitarian Rights, stated that during last year, at least 17 Albanians were killed or died from Serbian police tortures in Kosova.

Meanwhile, Zarko Korac, vice president of the Civil Alliance of Serbia, declared to reporters in Belgrade that there is serious unconstitutional violation of fundamental human rights in Kosova. These delayed voices from Serbia, although under a hegemonic grip, can, nevertheless, open the eyes of the Serbian people as to what an abyss the current Belgrade power is leading them to.

GSS: Political Situation 'War Without War'

AU1602181795 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English No 554 16 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In yesterday's press conference organized by the Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS), Zarko Korac, vice president, speaking about Kosova said: "There is a serious violation of basic human rights in Kosovo, which is contrary to the Constitution. This was [word indistinct] to us during last week's talks at various meetings, such as the one in Skopje, where representatives of Kosovo Albanians also took part. Civic Alliance of Serbia and the whole opposition is of opinion that a real mission of good will should be organized for Kosova, consisting of democratically oriented [people] who would listen well to all sides and come up with a solution," BNA TIKER agency reported.

According to Korac, political situation in Kosova was at a standstill and that there was general dissatisfaction on all sides—among Serbs, Montenegrins and Albanians and that not everything could be described to Albanian separatism. Korac described the situation in Kosova as a "war without war," and that the refusal to start dialogue with the Albanians was a sign of weakness of the Serbian Government.

Serb Police Block LDK Headquarters in Skenderaj

AU1602213795 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 16 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Kosova Information Center reports that at about 0600 this morning, Serbian police forces blocked the headquarters of the Democratic League of Kosova [LDK] branch in Skenderaj.

Reports confirm that the chairman of the branch has been arrested and the offices of the LDK, the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms, and the Council for Self-Finance were raided. The police have sought to arrest activists of these associations.

The situation in Skenderaj is extremely tense.

Bukoshi Promises Tetovo University 'Full Support'*AU1602220095 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 16 Feb 95*

[Telegram from Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, prime minister of the Republic of Kosova, to Dr. Fadil Sulejmani, Tetovo University rector; date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the name of the Government of Kosova, the prime minister of the Republic of Kosova, Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, has sent a telegram of greetings to the Tetovo University rector on the occasion of the start of the teaching and scientific work at this university.

Prime Minister Bukoshi wishes all students and teachers at the Tetovo University a good start in the sacred mission that have undertaken for education and knowledge.

Despite the barbaric obstacles that may encounter, the Tetovo University presents the most secure step of the Albanian national conscience and will be a cradle of knowledge and a beacon of Albanianism, but at the same time a cradle of tolerance and integration.

The telegram further states that the Government of the Republic of Kosova greets and supports you, thus hoping that, in this way, we have carried out a common work in the service of the nation. The university is the most sound basis of equality and is the nursery of new shoots, whose roots traverse beyond the imposed borders. Universities neither know nor set up borders. On the contrary, they challenge borders in the service of the truth.

Let the coincidence of the start of lessons at the Tetovo University with the quarter century of life of the Prishtina University lead to a cooperation between these two institutions and their counterparts in the Albanian areas.

Your close relation and reciprocal aid is a covenant before the malicious tendencies raised to an official policy. To oppose such a policy, the Albanians of Kosova and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] should defend their institutions, knowledge, and recognition as human elements of a human being.

Knowledge should not frighten anyone, but encourage equality and development.

Wishing you a good start in the name of the Government of Kosova, I assure you of its full support and that of the Kosovar people, concludes the telegram of Prime Minister Bukoshi addressed to the Tetovo University rector, Professor Dr. Fadil Sulejmani.

Serbs, Albanians Cooperating in Kosovo*95BA0129A Belgrade DUGA in Serbo-Croatian 1-14 Oct 94 pp 14-17*

[Article by Vanja Bulic: "Who's Who in the Albanian Mafia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serbs are living better than ever; the Albanians are turned toward Albania; the Kosovo Skipetar mafia is beginning to control Albania; Ibrahim Rugova is extending a hand of reconciliation to Slobodan Milosevic; the father of the nation, Redzep Cosja, is attacking Ibrahim Rugova in an interview over Voice of America, charging him with supporting the Serbian regime with his moves; the Serbs and Albanians are collaborating more and more frequently when it comes to business; the former communists have become orthodox capitalists; the quasi-governmental authority of the nonexistent Republic of Kosovo is no longer what the Albanians want; and so on and so forth. Those who have not been to Kosovo recently will think that the preceding sentence is an exhibition by an optimistic journalist, but the facts indicate that the situation in Kosovo is changing and that this is the moment for an intelligent policy, above all a consistent policy, to get out of the blind alley that might be put this way—the Albanians have the money, and the Serbs have the authority!

Cholera in neighboring Albania did not greatly disturb the Kosovites, except those who have relatives on the other side of the most weakly guarded border in Europe. And they are seeing even them more and more rarely, because Kosovo Skipetars have realized that Albania is not the promised land. That might also be concluded from Rugova's program, which sees the future Albanian state—with 7 million Albanians—as a creation whose capital is Pristina. That is how Rugova angered Cosja, who sees a future expanded Albania exclusively as a state that has been joined by Kosovo, the stray lamb returning to the flock.

New settlements are springing up in Kosovo. Everything that is in private hands is flourishing. Everything that was socially owned is being shut down, so that reports about the resumed operation of the Trepca Mine are viewed here as a good joke. It is true that the miners are digging the valuable ore once again, but Trepca has only 10 miners and they are Serbs. What they dig in a month can be processed in a few hours. The situation is the same with Feronikel, with the oil mill, and with the Zastava plants. The old managing directors and party leaders are no longer around to motivate the workers for new efforts with fiery speeches. Where have they gone?

They have established their own enterprises, their own factories, their own holding companies! They are trading with the world, using money that they moved from the public pocket to their own. While the more distinguished Serbs—with honorable exceptions in Pec—have fled to Belgrade, motivated by political fever, prestigious Skipetars who have been engaged in both politics and business have remained in Kosovo and are managing private capital!

And that road of theirs to what they criticized as party leaders and managers in the economy is paved with illogical propositions that are possible only in Kosovo!

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Who Is Controlling the Albanian Mafia?

The U.S. economist Jeffrey Sachs has also driven the Albanians crazy. Only the Slovenes raised a question at one time with Janez Drnovsek, who gave Sachs \$760,000, while all the rest in the unhappy Balkans have glorified the youngish American. Janez answered that Jeffrey got only 260,000 German marks [DM], which reduced his percentage of the entire sum. Nothing is known about the other percentages.

The Albanians in Albania are not asking any questions about transformation of ownership, but they are preparing to amend the law on returning the land to former owners! And this has to do with the return of land sold only a year or two ago. To whom was it sold? To Kosovo Albanians! They rushed in to take advantage of the benefits of the postcommunist period: They bought up everything in Albania that could be bought. Most of the properties on the coast above and below Dures are in the hands of Kosovo Skipetars. Almost all the sizable firms in Albania are owned by Kosovites, who thus constitute the cream of the Albanian economic miracle, and as matters now stand they are also the cream of the new Albanian mafia!

The increasingly numerous cases of kidnapping, blackmail, and murder of prestigious Kosovo Skipetars in Albania indicate that this really is a mafia. This is discussed covertly, but there is an increasingly obvious gap between Albanians from Albania and Skipetars from Kosovo. TV-Tirana recently reported a survey among Kosovites which shows that a small percentage of Skipetars would defend Albania if someone attacked it! And a survey of Albanians shows that they are dissatisfied with the Skipetars in Kosovo.

That, of course, was a survey conducted among "ordinary Skipetars." Those who can be referred to as big game have no time for surveys, because they are preoccupied with business. Azem Vlasi's team is now running the Balkan market. Sadik Vasiliju, former managing director of Electric Power Industry of Kosovo, has a commercial firm that runs the oil market and has a magnificent office in Varna.

Spend Salja, former president of the Kosovo Chamber of Commerce, has a company called Illyria Holding Company, and he is trading very successfully with Serbia. At one time, he imported 5,000 metric tons of oil from Serbia and sent it on to Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], and in return he was supposed to procure drugs, but he never delivered them. The financial police of course stomped on him and took from him goods worth DM3.5 million. Well-informed people say that he tried to smooth things over by going to the very top of the Serbian political leadership and offering establishment of a new patriotic Albanian party, but that did not help him to pry loose the grip of the financial police, whose coldheartedness is proverbial.

Gasmend Krasnici, founder of the Christian Democrat Party, made enormous capital by exchanging property

with Skipetars in Sibenik. Ekrem Arifi, a member of the Provincial Committee, owns immense capital in the commercial network he runs; Kacusa Jasari, who was once the top communist in Kosovo, has a store that sells athletic equipment. They are all trading and cashing in on their former prestige and communist ideals. Teki Ukmata, former managing director of Elektrobanka, is now managing director of Privredna Banka [Business Bank] Djakovica, which could also be referred to as the official bank of the nonexistent Republic of Kosovo.

It is in banking that the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo reach the heights in their game of trying to outwit one another. A bank with Montenegrin capital—the Pristina branch of Montenegro Banka—is run by Remzi Koljgeci, previously president of the Kosovo Assembly, a tall and prestigious Albanian who is remembered even by the world public after the pictures from the Trepca Mine when Koljgeci went down into the mine in a white raincoat. A bank with Serbian capital, Gama-banka, is run by Jusuf Fejzutahu, who surprisingly turned up in Kosovo after four years in exile! He is becoming a managing director, although officially there is a warrant for his arrest, because he was one of the authors of the Kacanica constitution and the first prime minister of the illegally established Republic of Kosovo.

What has happened in the meantime has still not been made public, but the harmless answer given to the remarks of Serbian journalists about a wanted man who had returned and had been entrusted with Serbian capital was that "they ought not to write those things, because they are old friends."

Privredna Banka in Djakovica, which has moved to Pristina, is now offsetting the Serbian and Montenegrin capital concentrated in two banks. The banking war is only beginning: Teki Ukmata representing the Skipetars against Remzi Koljgeci and Jusuf Fejzutahu!

The Serbian Trio From Pec Outside Politics

The Skipetars who have gone into business are opposed by a trio from Pec: the Karic brothers, Ranko Labovic, and Milorad Rajovic. The Karices are already managing world-class capital, which is a good move for Serbian politics, because some of the capital created during the embargo in the world has returned to the country in its time of trouble, and Labovic and Rajovic, who also have banks, are slowly extending their control over this part of the Balkans.

How different people behave when big money is involved is best indicated by the example of Ekos Banka, whose owner is Ranko Labovic. His closest collaborators are two giants in Pec: Miranda and Dukaini, which have behind them two prestigious Kosovo Skipetars, who are not bothered by a Serb being the owner of a bank, because for them the most important thing in their business is to have bank guarantees!

At the same time, the owner of Miranda has experienced two kidnappings in the last year and a half. First, the

Skipetar mafia kidnapped his wife, and after he paid the ransom requested in an amount close to DM1 million, they also kidnapped his son. He did not pay the amount they asked for the son, and the kidnappers released him gratis. Or maybe that too is a part of the legend.

The way the prestigious Serbs and Skipetars in Pec obtained their capital is of interest. The story about the Karices is well-known, and in return they have built a church for their native region at the entrance to the city. The well-informed say that the provincial SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] stands behind the rise of Ekos Company: more precisely, two prestigious members of the SPS—Voja Zivkovic and Milos Mandic, and it all started with smart business moves in Belgrade—more precisely, PKB [Beograd Agroindustrial Combine] Wholesale and the people who headed it at the time: Velizar Karic and Vesna Covic.

In a time of upheaval a close watch is kept on every businessman. Thus, the journalist Milan Laketic won a case against Ranko Labovic, who had sued him because of assertions that Labovic had been given free a socialized enterprise for which Milorad Rajovic and the Construction Bureau had each offered DM1 million! What tipped the scale was Labovic's promise that he would pool intelligence and capital, and so the Serbian Development Fund decided to entrust a socialized enterprise to Labovic for DM200,000. The president of the fund at that time was Perica Gligorijevic, and the state decided that "its man" was more important to it than the money. Incidentally, Velja Mihajlovic, minister of the economy who was later arrested, was chairman of the board of directors of the Development Fund.

In this SPS story about "its man," we must mention Milorad Rajovic, who owns Raj Petrol and Raj Bank, who has a corporation named Udarnik Commerce with his brothers, and who is the Zika Mustikla of Kosovo, but not in his political commitment. Milorad was a candidate of the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement] in the election, and Jorgovanka Tabakovic, a fervent Radical, is managing director of his bank.

Three Serbian families in Pec—the Karices, the Labovices, and the Rajovices—are certainly the richest businessmen in Kosovo. Probably even in Serbia. But their commitment in politics is not great. In their business, they rely even on successful Albanians, and it is from their example that it has come to be said that "every businesslike Serb has his own businesslike Albanian." And vice versa, because money makes its way where politics cannot get through.

This can be seen even in the most ordinary examples: In the little cafes which have taken over Pristina, young people are divided on ethnic grounds. But when a Skipetar cafe owner runs out of beer, for example, he will go borrow a crate from his Serbian neighbor. And vice versa.

The little cafes also show something else: The Albanians were until recently among the most powerful drug families, but their fellow countrymen did not use drugs.

Pristina is now breaking down that taboo as well. You need only to go at night to the Babylon Cafe to see that in Kosovo drugs are becoming not only an integral part of Albanians' trade, but also of their "enjoyment." All of this was a normal consequence of the breakdown of the family, which was preceded by the political awakening of Albanian women. The men started the breakdown of the family by pushing women with children in their arms into the front ranks to face the police and the tanks. Before the demonstrations, women were only there to give birth and nurse infants, but now they are "a thing with brains." And that is the end of a time in which life conformed to the canons of Leka Dukadjini.

Why Are the Weekend Intellectuals Getting Divorces?

The Serbs who cooperate with Skipetars in doing business say that their associates do not hide the fact that this kind of system suits them: They do not do military service, and they can wheedle whatever they want from any Serb for DM100. Are they exaggerating?

The Serbs have been getting business space and apartments on favorable terms. A law has been passed whereby they may not transfer the business space and apartments. Nevertheless, they have found a way to cede the business space they have obtained for DM500 or 3,000 to Skipetars for 10 times that price.

The formula is simple: Present to the court the receipt for a loan of DM50,000, say, for one month, and if the money is not returned on time, the Serb cedes the apartment to the lender! The stock of about 20,000 apartments owned by Serbs is being diminished in this way.

A university housing development is being built at the moment in Pristina with beautiful apartments. Again, a way has been found for weekend intellectuals, who by and large are driving the Serbs in Kosovo crazy, to make money. They fake a divorce from their wives, relinquishing the old apartment to them, and they apply for a new one. This is followed by the formula already mentioned, when an apartment is sold because a loan was presumably taken with the apartment pledged as collateral!

As for the Serb-Serb war in Kosovo, this is a smoldering conflict between old settlers and newcomers. The old settlers have been in Kosovo for centuries, and the newcomers were settled there by King Aleksandar between the two wars. Antagonism is felt in politics, on the job, in the coffeehouse...Serbs will be Serbs: They take offense even where they should not, and the Albanians laugh at them and heat up those conflicts in the Albanian-language press, and the Serbian-language periodicals fall into the trap of polemics.

Officials in Pristina Opstina say that there is an increase in the number of Albanian emigres from Kosovo and a drop in the number of emigre Serbs. But when you know the numbers for the two groups, the only hope is being

put on the measures being carried out by Dragan Milovanovic, president of Podujevo Opstina. He has brought 196 Serbian refugee families from Bosnia to Podujevo, which is slowly taking over primacy in the policy of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo [DSK]. They include quite a few highly educated people, so that Podujevo, for example, now has a surveyor for the first time.

Dragan Milovanovic has introduced a number of radical measures, starting with his own family. Dragan himself is a member of the Serbian Radical Party. His wife Spresa changed her name, and now calls herself Milica. He found a way to provide Podujevo the money necessary to build housing for the newly arrived Serbs. The formula is simple, and if people are smart, they will soon be using it throughout Kosovo.

The enterprising president of Podujevo Opstina decided to legalize wildcat construction. He headed a bulldozer for the newly built houses, and the owners had two choices: either to allow the bulldozer to swallow up their houses, or to buy the land and pay all the charges. In Pristina, for example, 100 square meters cost DM10,000 in some parts of the city, but for the present no one even thinks of collecting from the squatter what belongs to the state. And here is what might be collected: The settlement Vranjevac has a population of 60,000, Gavrani in Gnjilane 30,000, Kapasnica in Pec also 30,000. These are just three settlements with 20,000 houses. If each house pays DM30,000 for legalization, you get a figure of nearly DM1 billion! That is a fantastic housing stock with which it would be possible to finance the return of Serbs and Montenegrins to Kosovo!

Few Serbs are thinking along those lines at present. They seem to have forgotten about solidarity. But here is how Albanians see solidarity: About six weeks ago, Hasan Ramadani was surrounded by 300 policemen in the village of Sajakovac near Podujevo. He was found dead. The police say they did not kill him, but the Albanians say that the police murdered him. This is a man who at one time killed the chief of police, fled abroad, and then encountered a welcoming committee on his return. After his death, two emigres each gave DM25,000 and built a new house for Ramadani. One of the donors is the owner of the airline Salihu, which connects Macedonia to Europe.

Secret Signatures of the Invisible Rich

It is the donors, incidentally, who will be quickest to destroy the ugly policy of the DSK! Ibrahim Rugova has been set up in a house whose value is estimated at DM600,000, and Bujar Bukosi, prime minister of the underground Republic of Kosovo, has a castle just like it in Ulm. Both houses were built with quasi-governmental money collected abroad to meet the needs of the Republic of Kosovo.

The recent political shocks within the DSK, even aside from the pronounced struggle between the Podujevo and Djakovica currents, arise out of disagreements over

money. KOHA, the Pristina newspaper patterned after VREME in Belgrade (the Soros Foundation is behind both papers), has been persistently reporting information to the public about manipulation of millions of marks. KOHA's editor in chief is Veton Surroi, founder of the Parliamentary Party [PS], who is now a politician in retirement. KOHA says that in the first two months of euphoria DM180 million were collected abroad for the account of the Republic of Kosovo. That amount has since been declining on a monthly basis, but these are immense amounts of money deposited in Swiss banks. Signatures have been filed by Bujar Bukosi, prime minister of the underground government, and two other businessmen unknown to the general public, who handle the money.

Bujar Bukosi submitted his resignation a year ago, but he still holds the office, which allows him to live very well as he travels constantly between Vienna and Ulm. Bukosi and Rugova never travel together, not even to see Sali Berisha, president of Albania. After Rugova spent a month in the United States, he was followed a few days later by Bukosi. The two of them travel, but everyone knows that the main headquarters is Geneva, which is run by people who never appear in public.

It is not difficult to calculate how much money has gone to the top level of the Republic of Kosovo, or more accurately, the fictional financial department. About 400,000 Skipetars are employed abroad and regularly send money to Kosovo. If only DM500 per person arrives per month, this amounts to DM200 million. In addition, businessmen abroad pay a kind of tax, which in Kosovo they refer to as the "state protection money." Exactly the same protection money is paid by firms and individuals in Kosovo. The lowest price is DM50, which is what small stores and trade establishments pay. But even here there are disagreements, and KOHA says that Kosovo has 15,000 firms, and that last month the protection money, that is, the tax, was paid by only 3,000 firms! That initial elan has dropped to one-fifth. Nevertheless, this is an immense amount of money that is vanishing somewhere.

It is no secret that the parallel school system in Kosovo requires about DM2.4 million a month. Among other things, there is also the money to pay teachers, who get DM40. That is how much they were getting at a time when teachers in the state schools were getting DM2. But teachers in the quasi-governmental schools have not been paid for three months now, but the tax is collected regularly. Where is the money going?

No one is answering that question, but a kind of comment can be found in the classifieds in the Albanian press. BUJKA, which is edited by Hidajet Hiseni, who is now vice president of the DSK, has printed an ad four times in one month seeking students for the quasi-governmental School of Natural Sciences and Mathematics. Only five students have applied! This year's enrollment pointed up a crisis, and we can expect that

young people will realize that the quasi-governmental schools are offering fog and diplomas that are not good for anything. What will be the response of teachers who are not getting paid? Do they have any interest at all in the story about how Bujar Bukosi is a German supported by German capital and the capital of Skipetars in Germany and Switzerland? Do they have any interest in the fact that Ibrahim Rugova is an American whom even the father of the nation has turned against? They will be interested in something else: why DM600,000 invested in Rugova's house was not paid out in the form of 150,000 salaries! Why were the DM600,000 invested in Bukosi's estate not paid out as 150,000 salaries? How is this calculation to be explained by Hidajet Hiseni, a man who shouted slogans with a megaphone from a tree in Pristina in 1981 and went to BUJKU straight from 10 years in prison?

There is another calculation: Two complete assemblies of the nonexistent Republic of Kosovo are roaming around Europe at the moment. Two complete sets of 120 people each. The delegates of the assembly are underground, many of them are wanted. They have to get a living somehow. Isa Mustafa, finance minister, also underground, has to answer ticklish questions. Recently, Rugova, aware of social unrest, ordered various goods worth DM700,000 from a private operator in Prizren, but when he was supposed to get the money from Germany, Haki Gagica, leader of the DSK for Germany, sent only DM300,000. The remainder was to be made up from the protection money, which amounts to 3 to 10 percent, depending on the size of the shop, but what good is that when only 3,000 of the 15,000 firms are paying it?

Protection Money for a Subtle Game

Even the official state is having a hard time with those who are supposed to be paying taxes. During the period when inflation was eating up money, Skipetars regularly paid protection money to the underground government and tax to the state. At that time, a trade establishment was paying the state "two sunflowers"—or DM2, and the quasi-state DM50!

This is how the financial police of the official state are being deceived, on the admission of Miroljub Ognjenovic, coordinator of the financial police in Prizren. A Skipetar firm orders two trailer trucks of freezers, say. One freezer is put in the window of the store, and the rest are hidden in some warehouse. At the same time, the stamp of a nonexistent firm in Ljig, say, is the destination where the rest of the freezers were supposedly sent. The documents say that the freezers were purchased as seconds for 400 dinars apiece and thus were sent to Ljig. The freezer in the window is sold for 1,000 dinars, and as soon as it is bought, another one is immediately brought from the warehouse! The state has been deceived, and a markup of 600 dinars has been made on each freezer, plus the tax that is not being paid!

Serbian businessmen say that they do not take advantage of such deceptions, but at the same time they pay

recognition to the Skipetars, who "have 20 years of experience." They also acknowledge that they have good collaboration with Skipetar firms, but they do not speak about this in public. What cannot be concealed is the fact that all the major firms in Serbia have their representatives in Kosovo, and they are Skipetars! Business is business, and an Albanian will have an easier time selling a product to Albanians.

And new settlements are springing up above Pristina, up where the city dumps are slowly disappearing. One of them is Veljanija. There are only Skipetar houses and many speed bumps on the narrow asphalt road between the splendid houses. I naively asked whether the Skipetars are all that concerned about their children. The answer was: The children will take care of themselves, but the speed bumps are just in case the police raid the settlement! A settlement of rich people! Becoming involved in a game of cops and robbers. A game in which the Skipetars have the money, and the Serbs have the police power.

In the Dora coffeehouse ("dora" means hand in Albanian), there is always a crowd. There are 60 waiters for a capacity of 700. This coffeehouse is owned by Raif Redzeqi, Kosovo's former chief of information and chief of staff of Mihailo Zvicer. Raif invested DM1.7 million in the restaurant's renovation. Both Serbs and Albanians come here. So do Balists and those who mutter to them "we will butcher and kill whoever does not join us." How is that, why is that?

Simply: At one time, both sides made fun of Raif. They spoke of him mockingly. Now he is the owner whom they did not take seriously. And he has proven that he is wiser than any of them.

All that they took too seriously is now dividing them, and in moments of sincerity they certainly are seeking the little things over which they once laughed together.

Serbian-Albanian Relations in Kosovo

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[Article by Nenad Stefanovic: "The Money to the Albanians and Political Power to the Serbs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Asia, with its crooked mouth, longing and angry, rolls along that dirty and pockmarked pavement of Kosovo streets. Gushing from the waist, from the blind loins of Eros, it swells up like proud flesh on the skeleton of the Serbian state.

The proud flesh of the Albanian ethnos and the skeleton of Serbian statehood—that is the aporia of Kosovo today. The conflict lies in what is more urgent: What is subordinate to what—the ethnic rights of the majority or reasons of state?

One day, the question of priority may be put in Paris, when the million Arabs there shake everything from

their briefs and grow to 5 million. By majority right, the Champs-Elysees will then have to be renamed Avenue Abu Nidal.

It may turn out that the problem of the Kosovo dilemma is an essential trial of democracy as a universal principle. By contrast with the limited ancient democracy, which held only for an agreed extent of the population, civil democracy tolerates no prefixes or suffixes, as, for example, to say Serbian democracy or democracy of Albanians. It is either valid generally or co-opted. The problem arises when that kind of democratic right is set against the totality of the state as the totality of the democratic techné. Contemporary theory of law and ethics still have not found a solution that would bring the totality of the state and the entity represented by a geographic majority into harmony.

When I talked about this problem to Peter Gloz, professor of anthropology and ideologist of German Socialists, he offered a universal model by which such disputes must in principle be resolved. Professor Gloz was convinced that the model of a "shared homeland," of which he was the initiator, will experience success as the model by which Palestine and Israel will live together. In that concept, an attempt is made to bring the ethnic principle into harmony with survival of the valid constitutional order. Although I presented a multitude of examples to Professor Gloz and set forth with immense skepticism the reasons why the model of "shared homeland" will have difficulty "taking root" in the Near East, and a particularly insurmountable difficulty in the still nearer and hotter Balkans, he remained convinced that the model of sharing a homeland must be universally applied and that this will be the strong and direct spirit of the final resolution of the Yugoslav crisis. And that spirit, according to Professor Gloz, will be the only alternative to the prevailing chaotic tendency toward creation of a Great Serbia and Great Albania.

"The international community will not allow either," Professor Gloz told me.

The author of these lines not only displayed a fatigued smile, which to some extent was ironic, because he was convinced that in the end the world will become bored with these petty, small, dirty, and incomprehensible conflicts, and then the world will invent some resolution that cannot be carried out in order to quiet its conscience, and then actually take its hands off and let all those with bloodshot eyes eat each other alive in peace, at the same time strangling one another in their own excrement, their intelligence and senses having become numb.

I therefore believe that the world does not know what to do with us and especially does not know what to do with Kosovo. There is nothing left for me to do, then, but to drop down a few Serbian latitudes and take a closer look at those preparations for the bloody wedding in Kosovo. Which will be paid for out of our own pockets and with our own broken heads. In the end, the world will lace up

the plastic bags for the dead. The Red Cross will put Band-Aids on skulls; Vesna Pesic will get the Mother Teresa Prize, which will be presented to her in ceremonies held in Bombay; Stojan Cerovic will get his fifth anniversary six-month stipend to go to Washington and environs, and he will depart indignantly. The SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] will again be victorious as the alternative to chaos, and once again we will be ashamed to be Serbs.

Although perhaps it will happen differently. The Albanians will pay taxes, and the Serbs will rule. And the more impressions I gather in Kosmet, the more it seems to me that that is how it will be in the end. And here is why, that is, here is what I saw down there. (That adverbial phrase "down there" is a synonym for Kosovo we have in common with those who live there: When the Serbs say "down there," they feel a uterine twinge: Kosovo is the womb of Serbia, while the Albanians throw up their hands in disgust when they say "down there": Kosovo is the appendix of Serbia, what do you want with it?)

I started first, as is proper, with the government. The top man down there, at least formally, is Aleksandar Nesovic, deputy chief of Kosovo District. The chief, Aleksa Jokic, minister of transportation, who is from Valjevo, has turned up in Pristina only twice, and because he is busy, he left it to his deputy in the ministry, Nesovic, to run Kosovo District. Nesovic lives in Kraljevo, where he was born; weekdays he spends on the job, but he spends his weekends with his family in Kraljevo. The Serbs in Kosovo did not exactly greet him with open arms, but they did accept him as a reasonable measure of their own discord. The Government of Serbia appointed Nesovic instead of Milos Simovic, a Kosovite, in order to stop the conflicts between the Kosovite clans, which have almost brought to a halt the functioning of the system in the province. For example, last winter Pristina was the only city in Serbia that had no heat at all.

One gets the impression that the new chief still has not set his sights and taken the bearings of the objective and the point from which he is firing. That impression was aided by the immense framed photographs of Jugoslovan tankers on the open sea, which hang in the corridors of his headquarters. This reminded me of that Hungarian complex whereby an admiral is always the commander of the Hungarian infantry. Where do those Kosovo tankers sail to? I asked myself like Zen-zenitist Micic. Those tankers did not bother me all; they gave the impression of being imaginary and Nusician. Who knows who put those tankers up there and what longing he had in his heart? For Albanian separatists, the message would be that Kosovo has an outlet to the sea and its seaport Durres, while for Serbian expansionists Kosovo has an outlet to the sea so long as there is a Montenegro. Where is the Kosovo tanker actually going, emptied of petroleum and petroleum products, but overflowing with cramped and smothered humanity in the underdecks,

and with a dozen captains striding the deck? Such a tanker must always be on the open sea, and what seaport would accept it?

Aleksandar Nesovic, top man in Kosovo, smokes cheap cigarettes, wears a Beko-style Yugoslav-made suit, and, of course, does not do the collar button beneath his tie, so that it is quite comfortable for his tall and wrinkled neck in the striped shirt that does not really go with the patterns in his dark suit and certainly not with the gray socks, but his entire appearance reveals someone living away from home (his family is in Kraljevo). He actually seems like a typical bureaucrat, a man who has come to do the job assigned him conscientiously. From his large desk, and in his office everything is huge and oversized, somehow recalling the time when the Executive Council of Kosovo was the supreme body of a state, he brings a pile of papers and pamphlets from which he reads figures and articles of laws regulating the rights and duties of district chiefs, thus representing himself as a man of order and regulations. But he first asks us proudly:

[Nesovic] Have you noticed the way the Grand looks now? Those men with crew cuts that made the ruckus are gone. We cleared out all that, we brought in normal people who will run the hotel the way it should be. What do we want with demonstrative Serbian nationalism in the hotel? Those 40 with crew cuts were demonstratively expressing Serbian nationalism, and no one wanted to go into the hotel!

Repair of the Heat Distribution System and Civilizing Arkan's Hotel

[DUGA] For those who did not know it, the Grand was supposed to be Arkan's hotel and the headquarters of the Serbian Guard for Kosovo, so that the peace option in Kosovo has obviously taken on life with Nesovic's arrival.

The next thing for which Nesovic took credit was repairing the Pristina heat distribution system.

[Nesovic] Pristina will have heat this winter. This is costing us 5 million dinars. They said to me: "Why are you spending so much money when the Skipetars are not going to pay?" I replied: "They will pay, just as they pay their taxes." I came here to aid the law-governed state. Everyone is going to pay everything they owe.

[DUGA] Now that we are talking about the law-governed state, will you be inviting the Albanians to vote in the election?

[Nesovic] Of course, the State of Serbia wants to see the situation normalized in Kosovo. If they voted in the federal elections, the Albanians would have between 10 and 12 deputies, in the republic elections they would take about 30 seats, and in the opstinas and Pristina Municipal Assembly they would have almost all the seats. But they will not do that. They are only interested in secession.

[DUGA] Well, are they going to secede?

[Nesovic] How can they, do you not see our army here? I love the army, I love it, I am not ashamed to say so. I have two daughters, but, brother, I love our army. There is a garrison on five hectares of my patrimony in Kraljevo, but I have never had a pang about the field for a moment. I love it, and that is that!

[DUGA] Do you have a plan for settling Serbs in Kosovo?

[Nesovic] I certainly do! There will be 120 housing units completed in Pristina by the end of the year. Mainly for administrative agencies. That is important when money is so short. Why, Kosovo will be the pride of the law-governed state, you will see.

[DUGA] Chief Nesovic was completely right when he spoke about the law-governed state in the future tense, because I heard an identical observation at several places in Pristina:

"The Albanians could not be happier with Serbian Government. They say that it is better for them than if they had their own. They had to give the Skipetar in the opstina 1,000 German marks [DM], but the Serb does everything for 100!"

They Believe More What They See Than What They Hear

I noted another anatomical detail of the Serbian skeleton in Kosovo, one which perhaps does not mean anything, but it is as bright as a firefly when surrounded by commonplaces concerning the southern province. I was told that a certain Zoran Janjic is still police commander in Kosovo Polje. What that "still" means is that he also commanded the Kosovo Polje police in 1987, when that famous sentence about who dares to beat whom was uttered in the night. The continuity of the Serbian Government is beyond doubt, so that the only question to pose is that of quality and purpose.

But it is certain that it is the person of the president of Serbia around whom the confidence of Serbs in the authority there revolves. Although a dozen Serbian opposition parties have been established, it is rare for any of them to attack the president openly. Milosevic's personality cult in Kosovo is not dying out, and it is not subject to daily political changes or any at all. A witness in Kosovo Polje told me how he perceived the president on that fatal night of the "one sentence."

"He sat there the whole night, he did not move from the chair. He only listened, he did not frown, he did not laugh. He neither approved nor concurred. He did not exchange whispers with those around him. A statue. A living bust. An entire tray of cutlets was brought over from this restaurant. They were smoking hot. The cutlets were brought to a side door, and then one by one they came from behind the red curtain to eat. Milosevic did not eat anything, he just wagged his finger no. And he

did not get up at all until morning, even for a call of nature. And when he spoke in the morning, I did not listen to him. I believe more what I see than what I hear."

When I mentioned that it is a likely future for Kosovo that the Albanians will pay their taxes and the Serbs will rule, that thought came to me from the resolve with which the Serbian state established order and the commitment of the Serbs there to be an integral part of Serbian territory, while, on the other hand, there is a fear of armed rebellion on the part of the Albanians. After all, no doubt, a state is born in blood, that has been shown by Slovenia, Croatia, and Krajina, and the Albanians in Kosovo do not have that revolutionary and rebellious atmosphere they had in 1981 and 1990. The police are stubbornly taking away weapons, breaking up underground groups, and showing a determination to protect the constitutional order. At the entrance to Pristina, in the settlement Vranjevac, which was the starting point of all the demonstrations, there is a blue police tank standing in the courtyard of the police station, yes, a tank, a crawler vehicle with a turret, painted blue, a combat vehicle and recoilless cannon. There is no fooling around with Serbia. Even the proximity of the NATO units in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] does not give the Kosovo Albanians the heart to rebel. That would be a bloody wedding, and the music played would be the Funeral March.

If the commitment of the Albanian parties is clear and held in common as to the parting with Serbia, the roads to that objective are foggy and different, even diametrically opposed. The main ideologue of the radical option is Redzep Cosja, whom many call the father of the nation, the Albanian Cosic. This Albanian writer, literary historian, is keenly opposed to Rugova's Gandhian methods, which he thinks have contributed nothing to getting them closer to the objective, except that Rugova's team has been traveling around the world. Cosja advocates demonstrations, rebellion. Because he is operating as a nonparty figure, he did not manage to verify the popularity of his views in legal elections. When I studied the documentary material on Cosja, I was very much struck that Cosja, father of the Albanian nation, received the 7 July Prize in 1975. The journalist Zejnel Zejneli asked him at the time: "How much does this recognition mean for your future work?" Cosja first replied that he did not expect the 7 July Prize, but then he explained that he perceived this as "the highest social recognition":

"I consider this esteemed prize not only as recognition for my work in the past, but above all as a moral obligation for still more persistent efforts in the future. It is possible that the greatest purpose of social recognition is to give encouragement and impose obligations."

The question remains what obligations and incentives Cosja derived from the 7 July Prize. What could that prize encourage one to do anyway, except to raise an uprising in Serbia?

It is of interest as a picture of a process in Kosovo to go back in a time machine and read a little bit about a close

encounter in the pages of POLITIKA, back in 1972, which is not so long ago, between Cosja and R. Zlatanovic, who was then a journalist, but better known as a poet, who in 1987 rhapsodized over someone's straw-colored lock of hair and smile to the gathered crowd. In an introduction to the interview, Zlatanovic introduces Cosja to readers as an Albanian Jovan Skerlic and goes on to say:

"Young Professor Redzep Cosja was fated, or, rather, one would say that he himself chose that career, to grow to be one of the most industrious, conscientious, and educated literary critics following our Albanian language."

Zlatanovic then poses his essential question by reflecting the benevolent attitude of the Serbs at that time toward the rapprochement between Pristina and Tirana:

"As is evident from *Antologija albanske lirike* (*Anthology of Albanian Lyric Poetry*), you treat as one Albanian literature what is being written in Albania and what is being created in that language in Yugoslavia. To what extent does the poetry written in Yugoslavia in the Albanian language constitute an enrichment for Albanian literature as a whole?"

And when we bear in mind this friendly attitude on the part of the Serbs toward the unified Albanian cultural space, which resulted in the creation of their state in Kosovo from 1968 to 1989, it should be no wonder that the Albanian population in Kosovo has a fixed idea about a state of their own.

The strategy of the leaders of the leading party, Ibrahim Rugova's DSK [Democratic Alliance of Kosovo], is the opposite of Cosja's. It is to boycott government institutions and incessantly internationalize the Kosovo problem. In the headquarters of his party, in a barracks next to the stadium, which stands on a dirty and rough piece of wasteland, there is a framed photograph on the wall showing Pope John Paul II and Rugova taken in the Vatican. The pope is wearing a white alb and Rugova a black suit. Rugova sat beneath that picture and gave a news conference as though he was sitting beneath a verification of his own international position. I then asked Fehmi Agani, party vice president, whether Mr. Rugova is a Catholic. He answered that he is a Muslim by birth. "But does he go to the mosque?" "I have not seen him," Agani replied.

Rugova is wearing a black suit and the inevitable Bordeaux scarf whose ends are tucked into his red pullover sweater. On his wrist, he has a gold watch a la Cartier, whose glamour is offset by the ugly horn-rimmed glasses. He combs what little hair he has over the crown of his head, he has a deep tan, and his lips are broad and dark. His teeth have not been cared for, which does not stop him from smiling frequently, displaying the gestures of world-class politicians. He smiled with particular pleasure at my question:

Are you disappointed that the international community for relaxation of the sanctions on Serbia did not stipulate resolution of the Kosovo issue as a condition?

[Rugova] It is certain that that condition will be posed. The sanctions will be removed in two or three phases, and our problem will be in one of them.

[DUGA] Rugova first spoke in Albanian, and then he repeated the same thing in Serbian. What he had to say was in two parts. In the first, he presented examples of repression against Albanians in Kosovo. He listed dozens of names and just as many cities and villages. Then the court trials against underground groups are described as political farces. At one point, he called in as witness police inspector Mladenovic, who revealed that some of the trials were rigged. The second part of what he had to say was the conclusion: International protection and international observers are being requested because of repression. Removal of the sanctions is conditional upon a report of Amnesty International concerning the state of human rights in Kosovo. In conclusion, Rugova spelled out that they will seek confederal status with Albania if the Serbs get that kind of status in Bosnia.

The Man in the Tree and the Man With the White Scarf

Rugova arrived at the conference in a black Opel Victory, accompanied by a Golf and a Mazda. Tall security guards set up a line in front of the entrance to the party headquarters, staging the glamour of a president of the Republic. That is how Albanian newsmen address Rugova, as Mr. President.

As far as we have been able to learn, the budget of the Republic of Kosovo amounts to DM12 million monthly. The money is collected mainly from the 300,000 Albanians from Kosovo working abroad and regularly paying the tax. As for foreign aid, Soros and the French organization Droit de Parole, which provide newsprint for BUJKU (FARMER), are the only ones mentioned. Although the Serbs in Kosovo think that Rugova is in the complete control of West European embassies in Belgrade. They mention in this connection that when in mid-September Agani resigned and the party ranks of the DSK began to rock dangerously, Avery Roberts, charge d'affaires in the British Embassy, arrived immediately from Belgrade to adjudicate the dispute. The Serbs think that Roberts reconciled Rugova and Agani. One day, when someone opens the right drawer, we will learn what really brought Roberts to Pristina.

Rugova was elected in the party convention by acclamation, while Hidajet Hiseni, editor in chief of BUJKU, better known as the man in the tree, or the man with the megaphone in the tree, received the most votes. After those demonstrations in 1981, he was sentenced to 15 years in prison for "counterrevolution." He served 10 in the Central Prison [CP] and in Nis. His stories from

prison seem simply incredible. Hiseni gives the impression of being shy and breaks off sentences midway, he has a kind of tic as he evades the topic, and several characteristic wrinkles around his lips work like an accordion. His eyebrows are always bent in an expression of amazement, or they are lowered as an expression of apology.

[Hiseni] During the investigation, I spent a year in solitary at the CP. Then another year in the prison mental ward. Again the CP. I spent the rest in Nis. In a mixed cell. The uprising in Pozarevac was in the past. We inmates were not split on an ethnic basis. We joined the strike with the Serbian criminals. I had Serbs from Kosovo come to me, they wanted to be in my cell, because they said they could communicate with me easier than with the Serb from Kragujevac. I know him. I agree. They turn up even now. We visit one another, but covertly, so that no one sees.

Kosovo Is One Version of Prison

[DUGA] He came out of prison a national hero, but he says that even now he is constantly on the alert because of UDBa [State Security Administration]. "Kosovo is one version of prison," Hiseni told me. His theory is that Serbia should let Kosovo go to relieve itself, just as Turkey was relieved when it let Serbia go.

[Hiseni] Ask the Serbs in Kosovo who they prefer to live with. They do not dare to admit it publicly, but we here have a similar mentality. I tell you that no one moved out of Kosovo under pressure. We imagine an independent Kosovo as a civil state. This government cannot set us at odds with our Serbs. We say that the government is water, and the people a stone.

[DUGA] The only one of the old guard of Kosovo politicians still active is Mahmut Bakali. He does not belong to a party, but he writes in the foreign newspapers, he receives delegations, and he travels. Last month, he was in the State Department. I asked him what he advocated there? He replied as though it were taken for granted:

[Bakali] A peaceful parting of the ways.

[DUGA] Bakali lives in the same three-room apartment above the foundations of the new Orthodox church in Pristina. Fromm's *Revolution of Hope* lay open on his desk, and CNN, which he gets with a satellite antenna, was on. This is the string on which Bakali now vibrates: *Revolution of Hope* and CNN. The past is spread around that taut wire of reality. Hunting trophies. An entire preserved bear stands upright in the room with a raised paw. First-class trophies are packed around him and on the walls. Eagles from Prokletije, antlers, a gold medal from Belje, a mouflon from the Zajecar Hunting Preserve, a wildcat from the Rugovska Gorge. And among the trophies, pictures of Tito. My eye began to count them. He deterred me.

[Bakali] That's nothing. They began to yellow in the sun, and so I preserved them in an album.

Tito Liked To Be Kissed by Young Girls

[DUGA] Bakali seems cheerful. He is gray, plump, and cheerful. He relates anecdotes about Tito (he liked to be kissed by young girls). Tito is still his idol. At the age of 33, he was given Tito's confidence to become chairman of the Kosovo Provincial Committee [PK], the top man in the province.

[Bakali] I had everything. Power, youth, looks. I loved life, but I was a liberal. They pushed me out of politics because I did not accept the proposition that those demonstrations in 1981 were counterrevolutionary. Do you know what counterrevolution is?!

[DUGA] But you said that those demonstrations were carried out with clear territorial claims against our country.

[Bakali] You know what, those were different times; at that time we were a part of the federation. I wrote that 1974 Constitution. The objective was in between, both to loosen and to tighten, the federation. Kosovo's development was fantastic. Things were constantly being built here. Even now, 10 years after the demonstrations, I have been writing the same thing that they were harmful. But at this point we cannot go back to the 1974 Constitution, as people in the world are telling us, because that state no longer exists. This Yugoslavia is only an expanded Serbia, and we can never have equality in that federation. That is why I favor a peaceful parting of the ways. That is realistic.

[DUGA] Has Rugova forgiven you?

[Bakali] What is there for him to forgive? Politics is a realistic business. I am giving them advice, I am experienced in politics. I told Bilandzic when he visited me here last month with Markovic that Tudjman made a mistake when he did not first find a common language with the Serbs, and then separate. You cannot deal with the Serbs that way. Bilandzic agreed with me completely, but Markovic was silent. That is what I hope to achieve with the Serbs, a peaceful parting of the ways. We will preserve the monasteries better than if they were in Kragujevac. We will pass a law that prevents majority rule at the expense of the Serbs. They will have all rights in an independent Kosovo. Geostrategic Kosovo is Serbia's appendix. It is easy for you to dispense with it. Croatia cannot part ways with the Serbs, because then that state would not look like anything. It is much easier for Serbia, and we will certainly arrive at agreement easily, only this war in Bosnia has to stop and that dream about an expanded Serbia spend itself. Then it will be easier for the Serbs to cut away that appendix.

[DUGA] Professor Fehmi Agani is the vice president and ideologue of the DSK. As a representative of continuity, he is also considered an ideologue of the national movement. He belonged to the so-called Djakovica

group: Agani, Krasnici, Ali Hadri, and Gazmend Zejmi. And the fact that he and Mihajlo Markovic, SPS ideologue, were students together started stories that they had secret negotiations in the Norwegian Embassy in Belgrade. When I put that question to Rugova, both of them smiled significantly at the mention of M.M. The answer was, of course, no.

Mr. Agani, why do you not consent to the description of your movement as secessionist?

We Have Frustrated Serbia Politically in Kosovo

[Agani] Well, secessionism is a kind of label. Why not say that this is a movement for some kind of self-determination, self-government, making our own decisions? And another thing is what we would be seceding from.

[DUGA] From the Serbian state?

[Agani] No, no. During World War II, Kosovo was independently constituted as a separate unit, an administrative unit. In July, June it seems to me, 1942, Kosovo decided in an act of determination to join a federal Serbia and Yugoslavia. Accordingly, this was an act of self-determination.

[DUGA] You know, professor, that international law does not recognize any treaty signed during the war.

[Agani] No, no. Everything depends on who concluded that treaty. Second, the content of that treaty. Kosovo was a part of the antifascist movement, it expressed its free will in the Buje Declaration. Incidentally, the dominant factor of the antifascist movement was that Kosovo would be debated after the war. You see, it turns out to be too broad when we say secession. Kosovo is an independent entity, it was a separate part within Serbia, a corpus separatum, included in Serbia under condition of Yugoslavia's existence. Accordingly, because there is no Yugoslavia, that independent part wants to be independent.

[DUGA] Is there a current in your party that would consent to autonomy within Serbia?

[Agani] No. Not in the Democratic Alliance or in any political party of Albanians, because the parties are divided that way, there is no commitment to accept autonomous status of Kosovo.

[DUGA] How do you explain that the Badinter Commission, which prepared the Hague resolution on the disintegration of Yugoslavia, did not take the problem of Kosovo under consideration at all?

[Agani] The Badinter Commission took the republics as state entities. As we see it and in the general opinion, that point of departure was erroneous. Either they were not aware of the actual state of affairs or for some other reason the question of Kosovo was not taken up at that time. They decided that Yugoslavia could break down

into independent republics. Kosovo was not only autonomous within Serbia, it was also a federal unit.

[DUGA] But the Badinter Commission did not honor your arguments.

[Agani] It made a mistake. It took into account only the actual state of affairs. We feel that we have been greatly handicapped. We consider this a mistake of the international community. We will fight for Kosovo's independent status and get it.

[DUGA] I think that no one up to this point has asked you this, although it is extremely logical. On the principle that similar movements are being aided everywhere in the world, why did you not support the struggle of the Serbs in Croatia for separation from the parent republic, when that is the same thing you are attempting?

[Agani] ... We absolutely do not want the rights of any ethnic entity to be restricted. In the case of the Serbs in Croatia, however, I think that there are elements there that would have to be taken into account. In the case of the Srpska republic, that was created by war and an exodus of the population. That is one factor. Second, we think that a solution that would splinter the state of Croatia would be...

[DUGA] But is that not the same as with the Republic of Serbia?

[Agani] No, that solution would be unacceptable in Croatia. We really favor a status that would give the Serbs in Croatia all internationally guaranteed rights.

[DUGA] Wait, are we not getting away from the parallel?

[Agani] That cannot be the same. The state of Croatia cannot function that way. But Kosovo is a border area, and accordingly it has a clearly determined majority of the Albanian population, and it does not essentially incapacitate Serbia.

[DUGA] Do you expect the international community to hand you a state on a platter, or will you have to fight for it with weapons like the Serbs in Croatia?

[Agani] The forms the movement of Albanians will take depend on the times. Today, we are in a position of peaceful resolution of the problem in Kosovo. I think it will remain that way. The Albanians are insisting on the peace option, because they are so convinced that their demands are legitimate, and they expect that they will have the support of the international community. The international community will not hand us a state, but we will not get a state without its help.

[DUGA] Could you enumerate for me certain specific steps toward your objective?

[Agani] Well, now, that is difficult. So far, we have seen that Serbia has to be politically frustrated in Kosovo, and we managed to do that. It is still a fact that Serbia has no

support in any segment of the Albanian people in Kosovo. But that is not enough, and we think that in future we will achieve at least some of our demands with the help of the international community in the sense of eliminating discrimination and flagrant disenfranchisement.

[DUGA] My question was technical in nature. Do you have some plan, or is this only a wish list?

[Agani] You see, when it comes to certain specific problems like the schools, the health service, I think that we will be able to quickly resolve that, because Serbia will not be able to tolerate any longer this problem of having 300,000 pupils out of the classroom. But beyond that.... It is a fact that it will be hard for us, but it will not be easy for Serbia either. We think a solution will be found that will also realize the interests both of the Serbs here and also of Serbia. But also Kosovo's independence.

Why Secession Is Not Secession

[DUGA] Independence presupposes an independent Kosovo or confederation with Albania.

[Agani] When we say independence, we are thinking of an independent Kosovo, that we have clearly committed ourselves both through the convention of the Democratic Alliance and through other documents that Kosovo will be a community of both equal citizens and nationalities. We are willing to have international monitors. Second, that it will be completely open to all neighbors, and accordingly to Serbia as well, and this will be to such an extent that the Serbs will be able to realize their interests.

[DUGA] How?

[Agani] Historical, economic, or any other interests.

[DUGA] In what sense? A Balkan federation—Serbia, Albania, Kosovo?

[Agani] You see, we realize that a small state, and therefore Kosovo, has no long future on the basis of self-sufficiency and that it must enter into associations. It will be interested, then, and willing to join all forms of integration, regional and so on.

[DUGA] You, then, have other grounds for linkage than the monoethnic connection?

[Agani] We think... I will put it this way: Kosovo would not consent to be a bone of contention and locus of conflicts, but within the dimensions of its power would really be a factor for rapprochement and association to form broader communities.

[DUGA] Does the Pan-Albanian movement have a center and a leader, or is it developing without coordination among Tirana, Pristina, Tetovo, and Presevo?

[Agani] You see, the Pan-Albanian movement is a common denominator. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the Albanians live under differing sociopolitical conditions,

and accordingly they are forced to advocate the formation of certain separate objectives. That is a fact; however, I think that we should realize that progress in one region also signifies general progress of all Albanians.

[DUGA] Does Sali Berisha, president of Albania, support the DSK program?

[Agani] Yes, he supports the DSK program, and he has said so publicly on several occasions.

[DUGA] Is that not contrary to international law for a state to aid secession in a neighboring state?

[Agani] No, it is not a question of secession here. Albania's position is very clear, I think very acceptable. Albania is supporting the demands which the Albanians in Kosovo formulate as their objective. Once again, the question of secession. It is not a question of secession.

[DUGA] That is your opinion; I think it is a question of secession.

[Agani] Essentially, it is not a question of secession, but really of a national liberation movement.

[DUGA] NOB [National Liberation Movement]?

[Agani] No, let us not make references.... Why not take this element into account: A classic annexation of Kosovo took place in 1989 and 1990. The parliament was dissolved, the government was dissolved, the Presidency was dissolved. All institutions were dissolved. The general population was frightened; people did not go to work and they did not go to school. Under the constitutional system, one federal unit had no right whatsoever to dissolve another federal unit. So, why would it be punishable for one people to fight for its rights that have been taken away?

[DUGA] Mr. Agani, we will not agree, which is, of course, natural, because you love your people, and I mine. Let us go further. Above your head is a photograph of Ibrahim Rugova and the pope, but not, for instance, of Khomeini and Rugova. Does that mean that the Vatican is a closer ally to you than the Islamic countries?

[Agani] At present, I would say that the Albanians both here and in Albania have a relationship of equal proximity and equal distance vis-a-vis all religions. Albanians belong to several religions—there are Muslims, and you have Orthodox, you have Catholics. Religious tolerance is characteristic; there has never been any major religious conflict among them. They are interested in having good relations with the Vatican; it is not a question of any particular closeness!

[DUGA] On what great power do you rely: the United States, Germany, Britain?

[Agani] I would not really be able to say, but it is true that we have more understanding with the United States. It shows more understanding. In those contacts that we

have, there is more understanding and more support on the part of the United States.

[DUGA] What interest does the United States have in supporting you?

[Agani] Why should they not support us, when we conform to international standards? The world understands and supports what we are seeking. I do not see any particular interest, except that the United States has an interest in peace, because the United States must objectively intervene wherever the fire of war breaks out.

[DUGA] Does the presence of the NATO brigade in Macedonia give you confidence? Do you have contact with them?

[Agani] We do not have contact with them, but their presence is encouraging for us, because it means less chance of the war spreading southward.

[DUGA] Do you anticipate that NATO would intervene if there were an armed rebellion in Kosovo?

[Agani] I know that at one time Bush, and later also Clinton, made public statements, and I assume that a public statement is an obligation, that if there were a war conflict in Kosovo, they would intervene. However, I would add that such statements do not mean a great deal to us; they have not given us negative encouragement to do something reckless. We continue to be cautious.

The Tanker Is Still Sailing on the Open Sea

[DUGA] At the time that Macedonia separated from Yugoslavia, I was in Skopje and talked to some members of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Macedonian parliament, and they told me that German emissaries were against secession of Kosovo, because that would also signify secession of a part of Macedonia!

[Agani] It is true that when emissaries come from Europe and Germany they try to persuade us to accept the status of Kosovo under the 1974 Constitution. In that connection, I think that they are coming more and more to understand that that solution is not possible when the federation that existed at that time exists no longer. That type of federation and that state no longer exist.

[DUGA] I noticed that you have a very negative assessment of Russia's role.

[Agani] Mr. Rugova had a conversation here with Russian parliamentarians, and he spoke very favorably about Russia's ability to work for peace here.

[DUGA] What was it that the Russian parliamentarians told you?

[Agani] That was a kind of combination of those who took a very favorable view of this.

[DUGA] Of secession from Serbia?

[Agani] No, that idea of Rugova. They were in favor of our independence, but by agreement. There were also

those who had a markedly negative attitude toward us. That was the makeup. Nevertheless, I want to say that it seems to us that Russia is publicly identified with Serbia and has no understanding for our problem.

[DUGA] The stupidest thing in a story from Kosovo would be to write a final passage summing up things. There are no clear premises here, and accordingly no conclusion is possible either. Everything here is open, just like that tanker sailing on the open sea.

Vojvodina

Proposal for Normalization of Serb-Croat Relations

95BA0128B Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jan 95 p 3

[Letter to Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, from the Reform Democratic Party of Vojvodina, dated 14 January: "Proposal for Permanent Resolution of Serbian-Croatian Relations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—The Reform Democratic Party of Vojvodina [RDSV] sent a letter on Saturday to Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, "as one of the persons most responsible for the future development of the situation on the territory of the former Yugoslavia," under the title "Proposal of the Basis for Permanent Resolution of Serbian-Croatian Relations," which was signed by Prof. Dragoslav Petrovic, RDSV president. The text was also delivered, the cover letter states, to the "president of Serbia, the president of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], and to international factors taking part in resolving the crisis on the territory of the former Yugoslavia."

We print the letter in its entirety:

"Whereas disintegration of the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] is an indisputable political reality, and new integrations at the state level cannot be expected for the foreseeable future on the territory of the former Yugoslavia;

"Whereas orderly Serbian-Croatian relations are a precondition for reestablishment of peace, political stabilization, and development of democracy both on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and the entire Balkan Peninsula, and whereas renewal of Serbian-Croatian relations is a priority interest of both peoples, we propose the following steps in working out Serbian-Croatian relations:

"1. Mutual recognition of the states of the FRY and the Republic of Croatia.

"2. Facilitation and stimulation of the closest economic and scientific-technological ties.

"3. Opening all highway and rail routes linking the two states.

"4. Renewal of telecommunications between the two states.

"5. Reciprocal elimination of visas and customs duties on all goods, services, and trade.

"6. Establishment of the possibility of dual citizenship of Serbs and Croats as citizens of both states.

"7. Arbitration to resolve all mutual claims in dispute at both the state level and the level of private individuals, and assurance of the right of private ownership by citizens of one state in the other state.

"8. Renewal of mutual cultural and athletic ties.

"The steps proposed would facilitate the process of political consolidation, which is a precondition for material consolidation and further development of the entire area of the former Yugoslavia, and it would open up the conditions for taking specific steps. Priority here would be given to the following:

"—The return of all displaced persons and refugees to their prior places of residence and recovery of their real estate or compensation for damage by those who committed it.

"—Settlement of all political, ethnic, social welfare, and cultural rights of the Serbs in the Republic of Croatia and of Croats in the FRY, according to the standards that apply in the European Union.

"—Maximum mutual opening up of markets and invisibility of borders.

"—Commitment of the mass electronic media to renewal of life together and interethnic tolerance.

"—Economic coordination in areas where the inherited complementarity of economic sources, production technology, and knowledge orient the economies of the two states toward one another and increase their competitiveness on the world market.

"Support should be given to the agreements already reached in Zagreb and Knin and to further negotiations in the belief that this is the way to resolve the question of the krajinas in Croatia."

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